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THEOLOGY OF CREATION 
AND NATURAL SCIENCE 
WOLFHART PANNENBERG 
Half a century ago Karl Barth wrote in the preface to his treatment of creation 
in his Church Dogmatics (III/1, 1945), that there are "absolutely no scientific 
questions, objections or supports concerning what Scripture and the Christian 
Church understand to be God's work of creation." Such a restriction of the the-
ology of creation to a "retelling" of what the Bible tells us about this subject, has 
its price and the price to be paid here was that it could no longer be made clear, 
in how far the biblical faith in creation means the same world that the human 
race now inhabits and that is described by modern science. The affirmation that 
the God of the Bible created the world degenerates into an empty formula, and 
the biblical God himself becomes a powerless phantom, if he can no longer be 
understood as the one who originates and completes the world as it is given to 
our experience. For this reason one should not agree with Barth, but rather with 
Karl Heim in his attempt to relate theological affirmations on creation and final 
consummation of the world to the respective conceptions of contemporary sci-
ence (1953). In the context of English theology a theological appropriation of 
Darwin's doctrine of evolution was developed as soon as 1889 in the famous vol-
ume Lux Mundi, edited by Charles Gorn, where the biblical conception of a his-
tory of salvation culminating in the event of incarnation was combined with the 
modern evolutionary perspective, and this view has been effective until the pre-
sent day together with related ideas issuing from the work of Teilhard de 
Chardin . 
In spite of all the difficulties of a theological interpretation of the natural 
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world, Christian theology must not evade the task of interpreting the same world that 
is described by scientists to be in fact the creation of God. It is not enough to simply 
affirm the world to be God's creation, but such a theological affirmation has to be 
made plausible. This is not to suggest that theology should enter the discussions 
among scientists on their level of scientific description and theory. Theological inter-
pretation of the world of nature in terms of creation cannot want to present itself as 
competing with physics or with any other natural science. Claims like that are exclud-
ed by the fact that theological arguments move on another methodological level than 
the hypotheses of natural law in the sciences and their examination by experiment do. 
From a theological perspective the reality of the world presents itself in the form of a 
unique and irreversible historical process which is the result and expression of divine 
action. Certainly, in the process of this history there emerge uniformities and struc-
tural types of sequences of natural events that correspond to the scientific concept of 
natural law. In the book of Genesis it said after the story on the flood: "While the 
earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and 
night, shall not cease" (Gen. 8:22). Such regularities of natural processes, however, 
are themselves considered as products of a unique divine decision, not as evidence of 
a timeless order of nature. The theological focus on the historically unique and on the 
irreversible process of history is also related to the fact that theology does not con-
ceive of space and time in the sense of homogeneous sequences of spatial and tempo-
ral units-sequences that can be geometrically constructed, counted, and measured. 
The mathematical form of representing and describing natural processes and the sci-
entific concept of law belong together. The absence of mathematical descriptions in 
theology, on the other hand, does not only express the inability of theologians, but 
also corresponds to the peculiarity of the theological subject matter and its appropri-
ate treatment. 
Now the question arises, whether theology exemplifies a qualitative way of describ-
ing reality, such as has been so often reduced in the history of modern science to a 
quantitative and consequently mathematical way of description. The ideas of the bibli-
cal reports on creation about the sequence in the emergence of natural forms have 
been indeed replaced in modern science by conceptions which are based on quantita-
tive descriptions of processes regulated by natural law. Should this tendency be gener-
ally valid concerning the relationship between theology and science? The American 
physicist Frank Tipler of New Orleans claims in his recent book, The Physics of 
Immortality, that theology finally has to be absorbed in physics. In his book, he tries to 
show that the history of the universe tends towards an omega point, which is charac-
terized by peculiar properties of the traditional concept of God and does not only func-
tion as the result, but also as creative origin of the movement of the universe, and there 
is occasion for an identical repetition of all forms of intelligent life in the dimension of 
eternity . Professor Tipler accounts for these claims by a proposed theory of scientific 
cosmology . The educated layman cannot help being impressed, but he or she is also 
impressed by the multitude of different models of scientific cosmology produced over 
the last decades. Cosmology , to all appearance, is a highly speculative discipline . But 
how is theology to be expected to relate to the possibility of those arguments? 
I think that attempted transformations of theology into physics should be observed 
with curiosity on the one hand, but also with a certain degree of skepticism on the 
other. Curiosity and openness are appropriate, since even tentative constructions of 
this kind of work against the widespread prejudice that theological and scientific con-
ceptions are unrelated-a prejudice the effect of which is usually that theology seems 
to be irrelevant concerning our understanding of the reality we inhabit. Skepticism, 
however, is appropriate because of the apparent incommensurability between the sci-
entific conception of natural law and the theological approach to reality. Could 
indeed the conception of the world in terms of a unique and irreversible history of 
ever new and contingent events including the idea of God providing their origin, and 
of Christian eschatological hope, be dissolved without important remnant into a 
description of the world process on the basis of natural law? Even at this point I see 
no basis for theological anxieties. After all, there is the historical parallel of 
Aristotelian physics, the objects of which included the existence of God, though not 
of a future resurrection of the dead . A proper conception of God as creative origin of 
the natural universe, to be sure, had to describe the creation of the world by starting 
from God as origin of it rather than dealing with God as an exponent of the cosmic 
process. In Christian theology, such a comprehensive knowledge of creation that 
would comprise all the different aspects of created reality is not expected before the 
final consummation of the world in connection with the eschatological vision of the 
glorified ones. Until then it seems likely that human knowledge about the world will 
develop under conditions of human finitude and therefore in the form of conjectures 
only and by way of their examination and revision. In a reverse argument, Christian 
theology seeks to conceive of God as creator of the world on the basis of His revela-
tion in Jesus Christ. But in doing this, theology is not in a position to explain in detail 
the processes in the natural world. 
The aim of reaching an agreement between the theology of creation on the one 
hand and the scientific knowledge about the world of nature on the other , may be 
indicated, then, more properly by the term consonance between the two perspectives 
than by way of reducing one of them to the other. Consonance presupposes the 
absence of contradiction. But it requires more than that. Contradictions can be 
absent, simply because ideas stand unrelated , one beside the other. Consonance, how-
ever, implies the image of some harmony and consequently of a positive relationship. 
How can such a consonance be claimed with respect to affirmations that belong to 
quite different methodological levels? In such a case, it is necessary to look for a third 
level, which the two others are related to . In the case of the dialog between science 
and theology such a third level has indeed always existed. It is the level of philosoph y. 
Whenever scientists talk about the relevance of their findings and theoretical for-
mulas in view of our understanding of reality, they move in the medium of philosoph-
ical reflection on procedures and results of their science, but no longer on the level of 
scientific argument in the strict sense . Reflections on the relationship between natural 
law and the contingency of events, between causality and freedom, matter and energy, 
the concepts of time and space or evolution take place inevitably in a medium that is 
impregnated with philosophical language and its history . Furthermore , in most cases 
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the key concepts of science have philosophical origins and underwent modifications 
in order to fit the requirements of their use in science. Recent investigations into the 
history of scientific concepts like space, time, mass, force, and field demonstrated 
connections between the philosophical meaning of these concepts and their scientific 
use. Therefore, together with familiarity with the philosophical discussions on these 
subjects, a degree of knowledge in the history of science and especially about the his-
tory of scientific terminology, is a presupposition of a productive dialog between the-
ology and the sciences. 
Christian theology , on the other hand, in the entire course of its history, developed 
in close connection with philosophy, though the relationship was not without its 
complications and strains. In the case of theology and in distinction from the sci-
ences, the relationship to philosophy is not, in the first place, a matter of philosophi-
cal origins of a particular terminology, but rather the task of integrating into theology 
and into its explication of the relation of God the creator and redeemer of the world 
and of humanity the philosophical language about God, the world, and the place of 
human beings in it. Such integration of philosophical theses and conceptions into 
Christian theology always meant a more or less incisive transformation of the philo-
sophical meaning, and the occasional tensions arising between theology and philoso-
phy in the course of history often arose from such attempts at appropriation . 
Theology, however, is affirming the abiding truth of the biblical God and of His reve-
lation as concerning every human being always depended and will depend on rational 
universality of philosophy and therefore had to assimilate to itself not only the philo-
sophical doctrines on God, but also the philosophical affirmations on the world and 
human beings. At this point it finally becomes apparent in how far for Christian the-
ology the relationship to the philosophical interpretation of the world becomes the 
basis of a dialog with the sciences: the inclusion of scientific considerations and 
results in a reflection on how to perceive of reality at large and of the situation of 
human beings in the world is not the first and only subject of a theological doctrine of 
creation, but belonged always to the philosophical interpretation of the world we 
encounter. In dealing with its task of critical appropriation and assimilation of a 
philosophical view of the world, theology implicitly dealt always with the knowledge 
of nature it contained, and on the other hand the -theological transformation of philo-
sophical concepts of the world has to be measured like philosophical hypotheses 
themselves by their ability to do justice to scientific views and results . 
Unfortunately, the task of the philosophy of nature and of its integrative reflection 
of scientific descriptions of nature is now neglected by most philosophers. The result-
ing gap is often filled by natural scientists, who from the perspective of their respec-
tive discipline offer generalized philosophical reflections and conjectures concerning 
the world at large . In this connection, however, the horizon of philosophical prob-
lems connected with the respective subject matters and the history of those philo-
sophical problems is not appropriately considered. In these cases it belongs to the 
task of theology in the dialog with scientists to remind them of the philosophical 
problems involved in the subject matters dealt with in such dialogs and to argue with-
in such a framework for the specific theological conc erns . 
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The rest of this paper is to exemplify what has been said so far in general terms on 
the dialog between theology and science in relation to a number of particular issues 
that appear to me as particularly important for such dialog, because they are impor-
tant in the foundation of any interpretation of the world . In the first place, some 
reflections on the concept of law seem to be appropriate, and this in relation to the 
correlate of law in what is contingently given . The correlation of these two aspects in 
describing natural processes can be shown in the concept of natural law itself, but this 
also offers the opportunity for Christian theology to relate the specifically biblical 
understanding of reality to the description of nature by formulas of law. A second 
consideration shall focus on the ideas of space and time, which are not only basic in 
science, but also important in theological affirmations on God's relationship to the 
world . A third question will deal with the relationship of affirmations about God and 
about his activity to the movements of bodies, their development and decay-this is 
the classical theme of scientific descriptions of nature in the framework given by the 
ideas of space and time. A clarification of how the idea of God relates to space and 
time, therefore, may have consequences for an understanding of created existence and 
movement within space and time in their relationship to God. In this connection 
finally certain conclusions will arise in relation to the concept of evolution, but not 
only with respect to the evolution of organic life, but also to its setting in the history 
of the universe. 
In 1970 I published an article on "Contingency and Natural law" that has been the 
object of close discussion for a number of years in a circle of physicists and theolo-
gians and has undergone considerable modifications as a result of these discussions. 
The subject was interesting from the theological perspective, because the biblical 
reports on God's action in history emphasize the element of the new and unexpected 
in divine actions-an emphasis that also characterizes the action of God in the cre-
ation of the world. The history of God's action constitutes a unique and irreversible 
sequence of such contingent acts. The concept of contingency that is used to charac-
terize the divine action in history has its philosophical origin in Aristotle and there it 
refers to what occurs by chance and to what is non-essential or possible by contrast 
with the necessary. In Aristotle, however, contingency was connected with the con-
cept of matter, while medieval Christian Aristotelianism, especially since Duns Scot, 
connected it with God's freedom in his will and action. The concept of natural law, on 
the other hand, is logically related to conditions of its application that are contingent 
in relation to the formula of law as such, initial conditions and marginal conditions of 
the processes described by a formula of law. Those initial and marginal conditions can 
themselves result from processes that in their turn may be described by formulas of 
law. This does not change the basic fact, however, that each such description presup-
poses contingent conditions of its application, with the effect, that the laws of nature 
may be conceived as descriptions of certain uniformities in natural processes that 
occur in what basically is contingently given. This implies the assumption that all 
events are in the first place contingent, even when the sequence of events shows simi-
larities or uniform structures. This consequence appeared to the natural scientists 
participating in the above mentioned discussions of the sixties as rather problematic, 
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although such an assumption is also suggested by the irreversibility of time . In the 
meantime, the contingency of events in distinction from contingency in a merely logi-
cal sense seems to be generally accepted in view of the fact that many natural process-
es take place in chaotic forms. Especially, contingency of events can be affirmed with 
relation to the indeterminacy of elementary events in quantum physics, provided that 
it is taken into account that the same events, because of the uniformities in their 
sequence, also become objects of descriptions in terms of natural law. The possibility 
of such description, on the other hand, does not eliminate the fundamental contin-
gency of events; rather , the regularities that can be observed in contingent sequences 
of events and can be described by hypotheses of law, are themselves contingent facts. 
But, while theological affirmations concerning the reality of created existence and the 
action of God in his creation are primarily related to this aspect of contingency in nat-
ural processes, a scientific description of these processes is primarily concerned with 
the demonstration of regularities in those processes, although the dependence on 
something contingently given is a precondition in the applicability of the concept of 
law itself. 
To those involved in the sixties in the discussions at Heidelberg a common basis 
for the dialog between theology and nature seemed to emerge from the clarification of 
the correlation between natural law and contingency, a common basis beyond vague 
analogies and metaphors transferred from one discipline to the other. Nevertheless, 
the agreement on the correlation of natural law and contingency did not yet open an 
access to a more concrete understanding of nature in theological perspective. In order 
to find the key to open up such an interpretation, a theological approach to funda-
mental concepts of physics, like energy or force and movement as well as to their pre-
supposition in ideas about space and time, had to be developed. 
In the early eighteenth century a philosophical dispute on the concept of space 
took place, where theological implications played a decisive role. Even today, the cor-
respondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke on Newton's description of space as 
sensorium Dei in his Optics 1706, has more than merely historical interest. Certainly, 
Newton's concept of absolute space has become obsolete to Einstein's theory of rela-
tivity, but Newton's thought about space and on God's relation to space was very 
complex. It is worthwhile to take a closer look to find out just how much of these 
ideas has become obsolete and what hasn't. The conceptions of absolute direction in 
space and of absolute dimensions of objects in space are certainly no longer valid. But 
Newton's and Clarke's ideas about God's relation to space contain another insight that 
is still important. Clarke defended Newton's attribution of the concept of space to the 
idea of God against Leibniz' objection that God in such a case would be divisible and 
composed of parts . Clarke's main argument was that all division in space already pre-
supposes space, because division can only take place within space . The space that is 
presupposed in all spatial division is infinite and undivided, and this space-not geo-
metrical space that is composed of parts-be identical with the divine immensity that 
enables God to be present to each of his creatures at their own place . This argument 
was still reproduced by Kant in his critique of pure reason in 1781-according to 
Kant the intuition of space as an infinite whole is presupposed in any conception of 
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determinate spaces (A 240. Kant did no longer explore the theological implications of 
this idea, because he conceived of space as a merely subjective form of human intu-
ition. As soon as somebody wonders about this subjectivism, however-as it occurred 
in this century to Samuel Alexander-the theological implications of the priority of 
infinite and undivided space in relation to every determinate concept of spaces 
reemerges before one's eyes. The point of this argument is that the infinite space that 
is presupposed in each division of spaces is necessarily undivided, by contrast to all 
geometrical conceptions of space. Geometrical concepts of space are constructed on 
the basis of units of measurement-each geometrical unit of measurement is itself a 
unit of space the concept of which presupposes the undivided whole of infinite space. 
That, however, is an infinity that is not to be conceived like it happens in geometry by 
indefinite addition of units of measurement, but an infinity that is prior to all division 
and therefore also prior to all forms of measurement. The mistake of Spinoza in his 
conception of space as an attribute of divine substance consists in the fact that he did 
not distinguish infinite geometrical space from the infinite and undivided space of the 
divine immensity that is already presupposed in every geometry. If one considers this 
distinction, then no pantheistic consequences result from such a close connection 
between God and space, consequences that Leibniz seems to have suspected in 
Newton. The transition from the undivided space of divine immensity to the space of 
our experience that has parts and places can be considered then a consequence of the 
occurrence of finite objects and their relations to each other. In such a way one can 
also do justice to the relativity of spatial relations with regard to the masses moving in 
space. Each type of space that consists of parts presupposes, as Kant emphasized, 
some undivided whole of space, because divisions and parts are only possible within 
some space that is already there and therefore prior to geometrical conceptions of 
space. The ideas about divine immensity and omnipresence with God's creatures can 
be referred to this presupposition of undivided space, like Newton and Clarke did, 
without violating the divine transcendence over the world, in contrast to the concep-
tion of Spinoza that Einstein felt sympathetic with, which however, did not distin-
guish between the undivided infinite space of divine omnipresence and the space of 
geometry . 
The relationship between God's eternity and time is largely analogous to that 
between his immensity and space . Kant's treatment of time in his transcendental aes-
thetics corresponded closely to this treatment of the idea of space-in both cases an 
infinite and undivided whole is considered the precondition of all division and of all 
conceptions of parts. With reference to time this means-"Different times are but 
parts of one and the same time" (A31). The undivided whole of time or rather the 
whole of life that appears divided in the sequence of time, has been termed eternity in 
the philosophical and theological tradition since Plotinus' treatise on time in his 
Enneads. Eternity, Plotinus says, is ultimate completion without parts or division (III, 
7, 11) of what occurs in divided form in the sequence of time. Boethius, who trans-
mitted this definition to later generations, called eternity the simultaneous and com-
plete presence of unlimited life (intenninabilis vitae tota simul et pe1fecta possessio, De 
Cons. phil. V, 6, 4). Eternity, then, is not atemporal in the sense that eternity and 
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time were completely foreign to each other. Rather, according to Plotinus, time is 
constituted by eternity, because the transition from one temporal moment to the next 
is understandable only if we presuppose some presence of the whole that is separated 
in the sequence of temporal moments even within that separation, in other words, a 
presence of eternity in the course of time itself. The same idea is expressed in Kant's 
sentence, different times are just parts of one and the same time. But Kant did no 
longer see time as constituted by the presence of eternity, but in analogy to his con-
ception of space he thought time constituted on the subject of experience, more pre-
cisely on the "standing and persisting" human ego (A 123) which, as persisting 
through time, according to Kant, forms the basis of the unity of all human experience . 
In view of the temporality of the ego itself, however, that we are aware of in our self-
consciousness, Kant's attempt of accounting for the unity of time on the basis of the 
unity of the subject may seem to be considerably more problematic than Plotinus' 
foundation of time on the concept of eternity. 
From a theological perspective of nature, then, God's eternity is present in time, 
more specifically as origin and completion of time and of all temporal reality-origin 
in the sense of conditioning the continuity of what occurs separately in the sequence 
of time, completion, however, because all temporal reality according to Plotinus tends 
toward the future in order to realize the whole of its being. It is through the future 
that eternity enters into time . 
With relation to time as well as to space, the result is that these ideas cannot be 
successfully defined on the basis of measurement by clocks or by spatial units of mea-
surement. This may be a very important point in the dialog between theology and sci-
ence, because the scientific interest in time, as well as in spatial dimensions, is so 
closely connected with the possibility of measurement. The ideas of space and time, 
however, claim priority with relation to all techniques of measurement. If this priority 
is neglected, contradictions are the inevitable consequence. This is so because all 
units of measurement are themselves already parts of time and space, that have to be 
delimited within time and space from other such parts and therefore already presup-
pose time and space as such. 
Much more difficult than the question of the relationship of space and time to 
God's immensity and eternity is a clarification of God's relation to the forces working 
in the movements of nature. And yet this is a decisive question for every biblically-
based doctrine on creation, because at this point the possibility of an action of God in 
His creation is at stake, an action not only in the beginning, but also in the entire 
process of the history of His creation. It was at this point that in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the alienation between Christian theology and the scientific 
description of nature began. The starting point of this alienation was the mechanistic 
interpretation of natural processes that Descartes already had inaugurated and that 
against Newton's intentions triumphed in the eighteenth century, when all natural 
force was reduced to bodies and to their effects upon each other. This conception nec-
essarily excluded God from the understanding of natural processes. If there was a 
point , where modern philosophical theology was in unanimous agreement with the 
earlier scholastic teaching about God , it was the affirmation that God cannot be a 
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body. Consequently any idea of an exercise of power issuing from God and conse-
quently any assumption of divine action in the course of nature was apriori excluded, 
if all natural force resides in bodies. Thus God was respectfully urged out of the nat-
ural world. 
When the far-reaching consequences of the reduction of the forces of natural 
movements to conceptions of bodies and masses toward producing an atheistic pic-
ture of nature are duly considered, one also can imagine the potential significance of 
the introduction of field concepts into the description of natural processes since 
Faraday in favor of a theological interpretation of natural processes. This statement 
does not mean that the demonstration of the efficacy of electric and magnetic fields 
could immediately be used as a model to conceive of God's efficacy in nature . But 
although field effects usually have their correlate in masses, Faraday already enter-
tained a vision of finally interpreting all bodily phenomena as manifestations of fields. 
A vision like that was close to that of Newton that the forces of natural movement are 
finally not material, they do not issue from bodies. Rather, Newton conceived of 
God's efficacy in the universe in analogy to how our spirit moves the parts of our 
body. 
An introduction of the field concept into theology is not, however, primarily sug-
gested by the question of how to understand God's activity in nature, but it is suggest-
ed first by internal problems in the doctrine of God. The designation of the divine 
being as "spirit" in the Gospel of John Qohn 4:24) has been interpreted since Origin 
in the sense that God is Nus, a bodiless spiritual intellect, but this platonizing inter-
pretation does not correspond to the original meaning of this biblical word pneuma 
nor to the corresponding Hebrew word ruach. In both cases the root meaning is 
moved air, breath, even wind. In Greek thought the word pneuma, which is usually 
translated by "spirit," was used in the sense of air in movement like in breath or wind . 
This applies to the presocratic philosophers, especially to Anaximenes, but also and 
particularly to the Stoics. According to Stoic doctrine, air as the most subtle element 
penetrates everything and keeps together the entire cosmos through its particular 
"tension" (t6nos). The early Christian theologians before the third century understood 
the New Testament identification of God as pneuma in similar ways. Now one of the 
most renowned historians of science in our century, Max Jammer, who investigated 
the history of a number of key concepts of physics, considers the pneuma concepts of 
classical antiquity as predecessors of the field concepts of modern physics. Indeed, the 
intuitive idea of a field of power comes to paradigmatic expression in a state of ten-
sion in the air. Modern field concepts, however, differ in an important point from the 
conceptions of pneuma in classical antiquity-field effects do not require, although in 
the nineteenth century this was still assumed, a material medium like air or "ether." 
They can pervade space without such a medium. The materialism of the Stoic doc-
trine of pneuma as air, however, in the sense of a most subtle element that penetrates 
everything else, formed the main reason of Origen's rejection of this conception in 
interpreting the Johannine characterizing of God as spirit. The absurdities of a con-
ception of God as body-divisible and composed of parts-formed the negative rea-
son for interpreting pneuma in terms of Nus, and thus for conceiving of God in the 
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image of a bodiless intellect. Now it is evident that this conception does not corre-
spond to the root meaning of pneuma. At this point the field concept that replaces the 
pneuma doctrines of classical antiquity can become helpful in theology, because it 
allows to distinguish the root meaning of pneuma from the conception of a material 
basis or medium. If the divine reality is conceived in terms of a field that manifests 
itself in the three "persons" of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, then one can do justice to 
Origen's objections against any conception of God as body and yet preserve the gen-
uine meaning of pneuma. 
Is such a theological use of the field concept a mere metaphor? At the first moment 
it may look like that. But one should not overlook that the fundamental requirement 
for the application of the concept of field is met in theology . That is the relationship 
to time and space, though in the sense of what has been said about the undivided infi-
nite space of divine immensity, presupposed in all geometrical description of space, 
and about the undivided unity of time in God's eternity as condition of all temporal 
sequence. The interpretation of the pneumatic particularity of God's being as field, 
can be accounted for by relating it to the undivided wholeness of time and space prior 
to all geometrical description. By the same reason it is distinguished from the field 
concepts of physics, but would function as a condition of those in analogy to what 
had to be said concerning space and time. The field of divine omnipotence, then, does 
not compete with concrete physical fields, but its activity works through all the natur-
al forces without being exhausted by them. Like God's omnipresence is copresent to 
all things without falling prey to the relativistic paradoxes of simultaneity, since God's 
omnipresence is not dependent on the velocity of light, in a similar way the field 
effects the divine omnipresence are not in need of being transmitted by waves . The 
concept of waves, though important in the field notions of classical physics and espe-
cially as a basis of quantitative description of field effects may not be constitutive of 
the field concept as such, while that concept would be empty with being related to 
time and space . If the concept of field in the strict sense can be conceived of without 
the idea of expanding through waves, then also types of non-local, instantaneous 
communication between physical phenomena can be conceived of in terms of field 
effects. 
In the framework of this paper it is no longer possible to apply what has been said 
so far upon a theological interpretation of the world of creatures according to the 
sequence of their emergence in the history of the universe. A sketch of such an inter-
pretation has been published in the context of my treatment of the doctrine of cre-
ation in the second volume of my Systematic Theology. In the dialog between theology 
and science, however, it is still more important to reach agreement about the founda-
tions of interpretations of such a type. Only this much may be said here-the key for 
perceiving the interconnection of eternity and time lies with the relevance of the 
future in understanding everything existing in time. It is through the future that eter-
nity enters into time . Ever new contingent events proceed from the future, and on the 
other hand everything existing in time can expect from the future only the possible 
wholeness of its life. All things proceed towards the kingdom of God, but God's sov-
ereignty is already at work by entering from His future into the presence of His crea-
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tures. From th e point of view of the creatures this relationship gets reverted . The 
future becomes the direction of extrapolations from the present and from whatever 
we know from the past. That is also true in the history of the universe. Mythical inter-
pretation of the world looks at the order of the universe as founded in its beginning . 
Even the biblical report on creation, though no longer a myth in its literal form , 
exemplifies this way of looking at the world. The image of the foundation of all crea-
turely forms, in a first week of seven days , is in a certain tension, however , to the per-
spective otherwise characteristic for the biblical understanding of reality, the perspec-
tive of ever new actions of God in the history toward the future completion of His cre-
ation . The idea of an order of creation, complete in the beginning and not significant-
ly changed in subsequent time made an agreement between theologians and scientists 
difficult for a long period, especially during the struggle about the doctrine of evolu-
tion. Much more important, however, in view of a possible consonance between a 
theology of creation and natural science , is that the evolution of life occurs within an 
irreversible process, where again and again contingencies occur. It is similar with the 
history of the universe . With regard to the origin and evolution of life as well as in the 
field of cosmology the ideological barriers between the scientific description of the 
world and the interpretation of the same world in Christian theology broke down . 
One would ask too much, if scientific cosmology were expected to produce right away 
a demonstration of the existence of God, as Pope Pius XII believed at the time of the 
first enthusiasm about the present standard model of the expanding universe . It is 
sufficient that theological interpretation of the history of the universe in terms of cre-
ation can be developed in consonance with scientific data and procedures . To this end 
it is necessary that the theological doctrine of creation remains able to learn, not in 
the sense of adapting itself apologetically to every change of the scientific description 
of nature, but in the sense that theology remains vigorous enough to develop from its 
own resources ever new interpretations that try to do justice to a changing state of 
experiential knowledge of our world, in order to integrate it into the Christian under-
standing of the world as being created by the God of the Bible. 

THE EMERGENCE OF 
CREATURES AND THEIR 
SUCCESSION IN A 
DEVELOPING UNIVERSE 
W OLFHART PANNENBERG 
The term "create" serves in the biblical tradition and in Christian theology to 
relate the reality of the world to the God of the Jews. It expresses a rather specific 
way of conceiving the divine origin of the world . The term "create" emphasizes the 
unconditional and free character of the divine act of producing the world and thus 
it indicates the contingency of the world itself and of each part of it as well as of the 
divine act and puts it into being. 
This way of accounting for the reality of the world seems to have emerged in the 
sixth century before Christ, at the time of the Babylonian exile of the intellectual 
leadership of the Jewish people. The priestly document on the creation of the world 
by the God of Israel, now the first chapter of the Bible, answered the challenge of 
the Babylonian religion, especially the description of the way the world was built in 
the enuma elish. The priestly text says that it was not Marduk, but the God of Israel 
who produced the universe and that He did it in the characteristic way of His action 
according to how the prophetic tradition had described God's action in history-
with sovereign freedom, unconditioned by any other factor than God Himself. 
The account given in this text is significantly different from the older narrative 
on the creation of human beings and of the world surrounding them. The narrative 
in the second chapter of our Bible focuses almost exclusively on Adam and Eve, 
while the priestly report in the first chapter intends to comprise the entire universe 
and carefully attributes to each part its proper place. This indicates the doctrinal 
character of the priestly texts that distinguishes it from the earlier narrative, where 
even the very term "create" was not yet used. The difference is explained by the fact 
that the priestly document responds to the challenge of the Babylonian epic by 
claiming the world in all its parts for the God of Israel to whose creative activity 
each part of it owes its existence . 
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The apologetic and doctrinal intention of the priestly report on the creation of the uni-
verse was executed by seizing upon elements from the Babylonian and other mythological 
descriptions of the origin of the world as well as upon materials from wisdom traditions, 
especially from their efforts at collecting the different forms of natural phenomena and 
arranging them in catalogues. Regarding both types of materials one is entitled to judge that 
the priestly document made comprehensive use of the science of its day in critically select-
ing and interpreting its results by relating them to the creative activity of God. Whatever 
was known at that time about the natural world and the different forms of creatures was 
incorporated in the priestly document. In combining the wisdom materials with the mytho-
logical quest for the origin of the universe, the priestly document certainly claimed to pro-
vide true explanation of the existence of the different forms of reality. And it did so in a 
remarkably sober, occasionally almost rationalistic way. The description in Gen. 1:6-9 of 
how God made a divide in the primeval water to separate what was beneath the divide from 
further supply of water from above with the natural consequence that the waters beneath 
the divide would recede and let the dry ground emerge is a beautiful example of ancient 
engineering and thoroughly rationalistic. Such rationalism fits very well with the monothe-
istic emphasis that puts all the stress on the divine command as cause of the emergence of 
new forms of reality. 
II 
The priestly report on the origin of the universe from a creative action of the God of 
Israel is a document from an ancient culture, and nobody should expect that the asser-
tions of such a document could agree in all details with our contemporary scientific 
knowledge on the origin and development of the universe. In fact, given the historical dis-
tance, one should expect that our present conception of the universe of nature and of its 
history would have less in common with such an ancient document than is actually the 
case. There is rough agreement, first, concerning the fact that our universe had a begin-
ning and that it developed along a succession of stages or steps, however those steps are 
conceived materially. But also concerning the material content of those steps and of their 
sequence, more similarity is to be observed than one might expect-light at the beginning 
of the series, human beings at its end, the priority of light over the formation of stars, 
including sun and moon, furthermore the production of plants by the earth, the function 
of vegetation as a presupposition of animal life, the close relationship between human 
beings and mammals, called "animals of the land" in the priestly creation report (Gen. 
1:24-25). Both kinds of creature appear, according to the biblical report, in the sixth day 
of creation in distinction from the animals of the water and from the birds . 
Such similarities, of course, are limited by dissimilarities-the creation of the earth 
separated in the biblical report from the formation of the stars and prior to them. This 
is due to the utilitarian perspective of the priestly report in dealing with the stars and 
especially with the sun and moon . There is an unmistakable demythologizing bias 
effective at this point , because in Babylon like in other ancient cultures the stars were 
closely connected with deities . Therefore, their importance had to be reduced in this 
Jewish account on the origin of the universe. The example shows, however , how reli-
gious prejudices occasionally distort the presentation of natural facts. 
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Other limitations in the biblical report are simply due to limitations of knowledge as it 
was available at the time. Thus the concept of life is limited to animals (Gen. 1:30), to the 
exclusion of plants, and the classification of animals according to the places of their life 
differs from later classifications according to families and species. There are other, more 
important differences between the biblical report on the creation of the universe and the 
modern understanding of its origin and development. But before turning to them, it 
seems appropriate to engage in some more general and more fundamental reflection on 
the question of where the authority resides that this text enjoys in Christian teaching. 
III 
For many centuries, a literal authority was ascribed to the biblical report on the cre-
ation of the world as part of the inspired word of the divine Scripture. Even today this 
view continues with many Christians who are afraid that the authority of Scripture disin-
tegrates as soon as one admits any incorrectness in detail. The consequence of such a 
fundamentalistic view of the authority of Scripture is that one has to cling to the infallible 
truth of every single proposition in the text. There is no room, then, for appreciating the 
priestly report on creation as a document from an ancient culture, sharing the achieve-
ments, but also the limitations, of its cultural setting. Such an attitude, however, amounts 
to an obliteration of the authentic character of the biblical text itself. It is precisely in its 
form as a document of an ancient culture that the authority of the text must reside. This 
also applies to the report on the creation of the universe. If that is so, the authority of the 
text cannot coincide with the infallible truth of its particular sentences, as if they were 
superior to all later experience. Neither can the authority of such a text consist in the 
old-fashioned view of a past stage in the development of human culture. This last state-
ment, however, is somewhat dangerous, for everything in such a text can easily be 
denounced as belonging to a past cultural situation and can therefore be dismissed as no 
longer relevant. On the line of such a way of arguing any authority of the cultural tradi-
tion can be denied, and yet in human cultural history there is, sometimes at least, author-
ity of the content of the cultural tradition in spite of cultural changes. Therefore, it is 
always necessary to distinguish between elements that have become obsolete and others 
that are still valid . What, then, is at the basis of the continuing authority of a key docu-
ment of our cultural tradition like the biblical report on the creation of the universe? 
Christians will argue that at the basis of such continuing authority there is the contin-
uing faith in the God of Israel and of Jesus Christ. Then the authority of the biblical 
report on creation must be looked for not in particular propositions, but in the way it 
gives witness to the divine reality of the God of the Bible. This was done, as I said earlier, 
by affirming the universe to exist as a result of the creative action of the God of Israel. 
The priestly document made this affirmation in the form of a detailed account of how the 
universe came into being. To this purpose it made use of all the material knowledge 
about the world that was at its disposal. In this act, then, of claiming the universe with all 
its content to exist as God 's creation, resides the authority of the biblical report. That 
authority is obeyed not when the individual statements of that ancient text are preserved 
and repeated, but when the act of laying claim on the universe to exist as consequence of 
God's creative action is repeated, and it has to be repeated by using the material knowl-
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edge of one's own time about the world in similarity to the paradigmatic biblical teaching 
on creation. In the modern situation, it is necessary to that purpose to use the resources 
of modern science rather than to cling to the individual statements of the text against the 
empirical evidence of modern science . 
But how can theology let itself be guided by the paradigm of the biblical report in get-
ting involved in the scientific materials of a later period? The task is facilitated by the 
observation of basic similarities between the biblical approach and our modern view of 
the origin and development of the natural universe. The basic similarity consists in look-
ing at the universe in terms of a sequence of emergent new forms, and in the framework 
of that overall similarity we may try to deal with the more profound dissimilarities and 
differences. 
IV 
In the judgment of my teacher Edmund Schlink, the deepest difference between the 
modern view of nature and the biblical report consists in the modern conception that 
new forms of reality emerge from the autonomous activity of nature itself, while accord-
ing to the biblical view the creatures enjoy their autonomous activity only within the lim-
its of a divine order of their existence that was put up in the beginning. 
This judgment contains obvious elements of truth. Thus the different genera and 
species of vegetation and animal life were put up, according to the priestly report, in the 
beginning by the creator and remain unchanged. He granted to plants and animals the 
power of propagation, but such power of propagation only serves to perpetuate the char-
acter of the species. It doesn't change the nature of species as it would correspond to the 
modern view of natural evolution. At this point the contrast is perfectly clear. 
But on the other hand, the creative activity of God can very well be effective, accord-
ing to the biblical report, through the medium of a created reality. Thus, in Gen. 1:11 
God addresses the earth to produce vegetation, and the earth is called upon once more in 
Gen. 1 :24 to bring forth the animals living on it. Herein, even animal life is understood to 
be a product of the earth. The biblical creation story does not exclude, then, mediating 
agencies in the act of God's creation. In this respect, there is no opposition between the 
biblical report and the basic intuition of the modern idea of natural evolution. So far the 
difference is mainly that in modern theory the productivity of the earth is replaced by the 
idea of nature and, when it comes to the origin of life, by the idea of a self-organization of 
matter and of the creative evolution of life itself. 
The difficulty in comparing the biblical report and the modern conception of organic 
evolution resides at a different point, in the conception of the priestly document, of 
course, that the act of creation was completed at the end of a first period of the world's 
existence, while in the modern view the evolution of life and the universe continues 
through the entire duration of the world's existence. 
At this point, however , the priestly report on the creation of the universe is not typical of 
all forms of the biblical witness . In Psalm 104 we have an account of God's creative activity 
that describes it in terms of a continuing source of the existence of the creatures (esp. Ps. 
104:30). Similarly, in second Isaiah God's action in history is presented as a creative activity 
in the sense of bringing forth something new and formerly unknown (Isa. 43 :19), and in 
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expressing this idea the prophet uses the same terminology (bara) that functions in the 
priestly document as a technical term referring to the creation in the beginning . The idea of 
a continuing creative activity of God, then, is not foreign to the biblical witness, though of 
course not combined with the idea of evolution as in our modem view. It is the continuing 
creation of something new, on which the existence of the creatures depends. That idea clif-
f ers from the traditional dogmatic term creatio continua which meant only the preservation 
of what had been created before. In view of second Isaiah, it is the production of new things 
that continues. The intention of the priestly document in Genesis 1 to limit the notion of 
creation to God's activity in the beginning, is only one variation of expressing the biblical 
faith in God's creative activity as the source of everything. 
What was the motivation behind this particular variation in the conception of God's 
creative activity? One may distinguish two factors here, one more mythological and a 
more theological concern of lasting importance. The theological concern was for the sta-
bility and reliability of the order of creation. In view of the priestly document, such sta-
bility depends on the unchanged form of things as they were established in the begin-
ning. The modem understanding of nature is also interested in that element of stability. 
But we see the stability of nature warranted by the invariable validity of the laws that gov-
ern natural processes. Thus one can argue that this concern of the biblical report has 
been satisfied in the modern conception of nature, though in a different way. 
The mythological motivation in the priestly report on the creation of the world is to 
be found in its function to legitimate the Jewish week of seven days and in particular the 
institution of the sabbath at its end. On the basis of the priestly document the Jewish 
week, with the sabbath at its end, is seen as indefinitely repeating the original week of 
God's work of creation with the seventh day of rest at its end. Accordingly, in the deca-
logue of Exodus 20 the commandment to observe the sabbath day is based on the order 
of creation: "for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and all that is in them, and 
rested the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and hallowed it" 
(Exod . 20:11) . 
Interestingly enough, in early Jewish exegesis the seven days of creation could be inter-
preted differently by relating the sequence of seven days to the entire history of the world 
rather than confining it to an original period . In the Jewish apocalyptic literature (esp. 
Enoch 91 and 93), the seventh day was understood to refer to the future consummation of 
the world in the kingdom of God, and in Hebrews 4 the Christian hope for the eschatolog-
ical future of God was described as a hope to enter into God's own rest after the labor of 
creation. In Enoch 71:15, the seventh day of God's rest, identified with the future aeon of 
consummation, was even described as the source from which peace is pouring since the 
first creation of the world. The peace of the sabbath, then, could be understood as an 
anticipation of the final piece in the kingdom of God. The interpretations of the week of 
creation are interesting in the context of the present argument, because in their own way 
they combine the image of an original period of creation with the idea of a creative activity 
of God continuing through the history of the world until its consummation in the escha-
tological future of God's kingdom . One must not mistake, however , this view for being the 
view of the priestly report on the creation of the world and the first chapter of the Bible. 
There the act of creation is limited to a first period in the history of the world . 
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V 
Important as the difference is between the idea of a creation of the universe in an ini-
tial period of the world's history and the conception of a continuing creative activity of 
God corresponding to the creative development of the natural world , still this is not the 
most profound difference between our modern understanding of natural processes and 
biblical view. The deepest difference, rather, is connected with the atomistic perspective 
of modern science according to which all natural forms are composed of more elemen-
tary particles and processes. This perspective originated from a particular form of ancient 
Greek philosophy of nature, from Democritos, and it influenced modern science to such 
an extend that the development and sequence of natural forms in the history of nature 
are no longer conceivable without it, though the search for the final elements of matter 
led to more complicated results than they could have been expected on the basis of 
Democritos' atomic theory. Most importantly, there is not just one type of elementary 
particles, but several. Furthermore, the difference between particles and events is vanish-
ing, when so-called particles have no more than momentary existence. Nevertheless, the 
idea that the qualitative differences of natural forms can be reduced to different combina-
tions of elementary particles has been victorious. 
Accordingly, in the perspective of modern science, the sequence of natural forms 
starts with elementary phenomena out of which all more complex forms of reality devel-
oped. This perspective is significantly different from the biblical report on the creation of 
the universe, but it does not necessarily contradict its theological intention. The atomistic 
view of the universe and of its development has of ten been perceived as an alternative to 
a theology of creation, and this would be the case if it rendered God superfluous in 
understanding the reality of nature. Such could be a consequence of reducing all natural 
phenomena to combinations of elementary units, if that meant that the elementary units 
are finally the only factors in explaining natural processes and the emergence of natural 
forms. In fact, however, the interaction and combination of elementary units that is 
involved in the emergence of more complex forms seems to always require conditions of 
a holistic nature forming the context of elementary processes. As early as 1966 Ian 
Barbour called on de Broglie and on the Pauli Exclusion Principle as expressing the 
underivable function of the whole in conditioning the parts. A whole either in the form 
of environment or field or as manifest in a system of higher order like the atom in rela-
tion to subatomic particles provides the context for the more elementary processes taking 
place within it. 
In the case of the early universe, the state of that universe as a whole must have func-
tioned as the comprehensive condition of the elementary processes going on within it. 
They took place under the conditions of such high temperatures that the state of the uni-
verse did not allow for the formation of more complex and enduring forms of reality. It 
needed the expansion of the universe and the concomitant process of cooling down to 
develop conditions that allow for the formation of atoms and molecules and furthermore, 
under the influence of gravity , for their conglomeration to galaxies and stars . Thus, in a 
modern view, the development of the universe is also a development of complex and 
enduring forms out of elementary processes. But it is also true that the changing stay of 
the universe imposes conditions on the continuous functioning of those processes. 
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The importance of a holistic framework in the emergence of new forms of existence 
has also been pointed out with relation to the formation of a biosphere on our earth-the 
spontaneous emergence of life depends on a complicated texture of very special condi-
tions as they develop on this particular planet. Life itself seems now to have emerged 
through spontaneous self-organization, once those conditions were given and a thermo-
dynamic gradient could be exploited like in the case of the flame that nourishes its life 
from the potential energy of the candle. Long before the mechanism of life, its dissipative 
nature, was understood, the flame of a candle was considered a symbol of life in its effort 
at temporarily preserving its form at the price of consuming the energies of its environ-
ment. 
As the emergence of living organisms is conditioned by the formation of a biosphere 
on our earth, while this in turn is conditioned by the particular state of the expanding 
universe, the universe as a whole seems arranged in such a way as to make organic life 
possible. This is the basic idea that recently has been discussed under the name of 
"anthropic principle ." It means that the emergence of organic life and finally of human 
beings is not an insignificant accident of nature as compared to the vastness of the uni-
verse. This had been the feeling of sensitive thinkers like Pascal in early modernity, by 
contrast to the biblical view of the creation of the world, where the entire sequence of 
creatures led up to the creation of human beings. The feeling of being at a loss in the vast 
spaces of the universe is no longer assumed to contemporary scientific cosmology. The 
natural constants of the universe are arranged in such a way as to make organic life and 
intelligent animals like ourselves possible . I do not want to go beyond this "weak" form 
of the anthropic principle by claiming that the emergence of intelligent life be necessary 
on the basis of how the order of the universe is arranged from its beginnings. I am quite 
satisfied with the contingent nature of the emergence of life as well as of other natural 
forms in the history of the universe. But the emergence of life and of intelligent life, as in 
human beings, is no longer to be considered an insignificant accident in the history of 
the universe . 
VI 
Some such view of the universe as a totality that conditions the particular processes 
going on within it and the emergence of ever more complex forms of enduring existence 
seems to be required in a theological interpretation of nature in terms of creation. A con-
ception of the universe as an ordered system corresponds to the unity of the one God 
who is supposed to be its creator, and the place of particular phenomena within that sys-
tematic order as well as in relation to its divine origin determines their individual signifi-
cance. On the other hand, contingency of events in general and of the emergence of new 
forms of reality in particular prevents the individual forms and processes from becoming 
completely dependent on the systematic whole of the universe and preserves an element 
of immediacy in them with relation to their ultimate origin . Such contingency of natural 
phenomena, however, seems bound up with their temporal nature, if time is to be con-
ceived as an irreversible flux of events, where each event is finally unique and the future 
always bringing about something new, notwithstanding all the regularities applying in 
the sequence of events. 
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These requirements of a theological interpretation of nature in terms of creation are 
met in the biblical creation report-the universe is ordered in a sequence of six days of 
God's work, and the significance of each work of creation is given by its place in that 
sequence and in the relations to other creatures such place entails . Each new work, how-
ever, is presented as contingent with regard to what went before, and that is expressed by 
the origin of each new work of creation in the divine word of command. Finally, the ele-
ments of systematic order and of contingency in detail are combined in the scheme of a 
temporal series in the emergence of the creatures. 
The abiding importance of the biblical creation report may very well be perceived 
then in the fact that it stands as a paradigmatic exemplification of a systematic scheme 
which meets these three requirements of an overall systematic order, of contingency in 
detail and of temporal sequence in the emergence of particular forms. Each new theolog-
ical doctrine of creation that will integrate theologically the scientific knowledge of its 
time has to meet these same requirements in order to give a theological account of the 
world of nature as God's creation . Such an interpretation is not superfluous with regard 
to our experiential knowledge about nature and it is not an arbitrary imposition upon a 
scientific cosmology. At present I want to emphasize that as compared with those three 
requirements of a theological interpretation of nature it is of secondary importance, 
whether organic life made its appearance on earth as completely new phenomenon or 
whether it emerged in a process of spontaneous self-organization from inorganic matter, 
and it is also of secondary importance, whether or not each new species is to be consid-
ered as a discontinuous new beginning or as a product of the continuous process of 
organic evolution of life . Also of secondary importance, finally, is the question of 
whether or not the emergence of human beings derived from the development of organic 
species rather than coming into existence without mediation by other creatures. I men-
tioned earlier that even in the biblical report such mediating function of a creature in 
producing new forms of existence was not considered to be opposed to the origin of the 
new creature from a divine act of creation, as the function ascribed to the earth in pro-
ducing vegetation and animals demonstrates . Important in a theological interpretation of 
nature is that each new form of existence is recognized as contingent fact and hence as 
immediate to the ultimate cause of all. This immediacy to the ultimate cause of all, how-
ever, is itself conditioned by the place of the new creature in the sequence of others, 
because the divine act of creation relates to each individual creature in the context of the 
universe God created and not an abstraction from everything else. In this way even the 
emergence of human beings is seen in the biblical creation report as conditioned by the 
preceding stages of created existence and related to them. 
In a modern perspective , then , the expansion of the universe might be perceived as 
the instrument of the creator in producing enduring and independent forms of created 
existence . The expansion of the universe does not only provide space for a multitude of 
creatures, but more importantly the concomitant cooling effect provides the basic condi-
tion for all forms of higher organization, higher complexity, beginning with the forma-
tion of atoms and molecules. Organic life emerged as a still higher form of such complex-
ity and , at the same time , of independent existence. Though organisms are less durable 
than atoms and stars , the self-organization of life expresses an element of spontaneity 
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which constitutes a higher form of independent existence . In the biblical report this was 
expressed by the idea that living creatures are distinguished from others by sharing an 
apportion of the divine Spirit, the cause of life. In modern times a similar idea has been 
expressed by T eilhard de Cardin by the affirmation that on the higher levels of complexi-
ty there are also increasing degrees of interiority of existence. 
Human beings emerged at the end of this sequence, as far as our knowledge goes. In 
the biblical creation report this place of humanity implies a special relationship to the 
rest of creation on the one hand, to the creator of all on the other. And here we arrive at a 
further distinguishing characteristic of a theological interpretation of nature as creation 
of God-of the biblical God-and therefore in a Jewish or Christian interpretation of 
nature. In distinction from other religious traditions, the biblical view of humanity's 
place in creation is certainly anthropocentric, and the Christian doctrine of God's incar-
nation in one human person and by that person in humanity puts a particular and ulti-
mate emphasis on that anthropocentric position . But it is not a narrow type of anthro-
pocentrism that would shut itself off from anything else. It is an inclusive anthropocen-
trism that relates the human predicament of the destiny of the entire universe in the light 
of its divine origin. It is a form of anthropocentrism, therefore, that involves a responsi-
bility of humanity for other creatures as far as the range of human activity extends. When 
in the biblical report the human beings are commissioned to exercise dominion over the 
earth and everything on it, that does not mean that all other creatures are delivered to 
arbitrary disposal according to human license, but the divine commission aims at a form 
of dominion that represents within the created universe the authority of the creator 
Himself and therefore involves responsibility for attending to God's creation and to His 
resolution of granting some degree of independent existence to the products of His cre-
ative activity. The place of the human being at the point of culmination of God's creation 
inevitably involves that kind of responsibility in correlation with the special relationship 





In the course of this century the cultural context of Christian churches 
changed significantly. The culture became more visibly non-religious than it had 
been before . Certainly, the separation between church and state originated two 
centuries earlier. But that did not necessarily entail an alienation of the culture 
from its religious roots . With the exception of Judaism, most of the different 
churches that came to enjoy unrestricted activities after the abolishment of an 
established religion, were Christian denominations so that the predominately 
Christian, even Protestant character of the American culture was not deeply 
changed as an immediate consequence of the separation between church and 
state. In other Western societies more explicit links with some or another 
Christian church continued to be effective until the present century. 
Nevertheless, it will become evident that the roots of the process of seculariza-
tion that resulted in the present alienation of the public culture from religion 
and especially from Christianity, can be traced back to the seventeenth century. 
In the contemporary situation, the climate of secularism puts considerable 
strain on the confidence of believers in the truth of the Christian teaching. It is 
the situation Peter L. Berger described years ago in his book A Rumor of Angels 
(1969), in terms of the situation of a cognitive minority whose standards of 
knowledge deviate from those that are publicly taken for granted . Plausibility, 
Berger wrote, "in the sense of what people actually find credible , of views of 
reality depends upon the social support these receive." Where this social plausi-
bility weakens, it requires additional personal strength to maintain beliefs that 
are no longer in line with those dominant in the social context. This is a social 
and psychological situation that has nothing to do with the question of truth. "It 
is, of course, " says Berger, "possible to go against the social consensus that sur-
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rounds us, but there are powerful pressures [which manifest themselves as psycholog-
ical pressures within our own consciousness] to conform to the views and beliefs of 
our fellow men"(43). This is precisely the strain which the secularist culture puts on 
the consciousness and behavior of Christians in Western societies that were formerly 
more or less strongly influenced by Christian values and beliefs. 
One consequence of the secularist mood is that the extent of sheer knowledge 
about Christian teachings, biblical names and events, and the history of Christianity is 
dwindling. The situation is no longer that some people reject the truth claims of 
Christian teachings. Increasing numbers of them don't even know about what should 
be accepted or rejected. This is remarkable because Christianity has been so impor-
tant in our cultural tradition. One cannot understand Western culture and its history 
without the Christian religion. The more widespread the lack of information about 
the contents of the Bible and Christian teachings, however, the easier the creeping up 
of prejudices against Christianity, especially the prejudice that Christianity has been 
an oppressive form of religion. Therefore, even when people are getting interested in 
religion again, which is a natural reaction against the lack of deeper meaning in the 
secularist culture, they would not normally turn to Christianity, but rather to alterna-
tive forms of religion. 
The difficulties of the Christian message in this cultural situation have been sharp-
ened recently by tendencies to relativize the concern for truth. While the enlighten-
ment challenged the traditional Christian affirmations by demanding rational argu-
ment for the truth claims of Christian teaching instead of a simple appeal to authority, 
now truth claims as such are considered obsolete. This turns Christian doctrines into 
mere opinions that may be affirmed or not according to individual options and prefer-
ence. The dissolution of the notion of truth, however, ruins the idea of Christian mis-
sions. Missionary preaching is no longer seen as bringing the truth to other people-
and therefore legitimate-but as imposing upon them one's personal opinions, which 
must appear improper. And even when we leave the issue of missions aside, why 
should people opt for the Christian faith, if not because the apostolic teaching is true? 
Or, more precisely, if it is not even meaningful to claim its content to be true? The 
issue of truth is absolutely vital for the Christian faith. The destruction of the idea of 
truth, on the other hand, can be seen as a strategy of legitimating the secularist culture 
since its lack of true meaning is precisely the point of its most delicate vulnerability. 
II 
Secularism and even modern culture in general have sometimes been characterized 
as a phenomenon of apostasy from the Christian faith. The most important Christian 
thinker who took that view was Karl Barth. In Karl Barth's opinion, modern culture 
has been a revolt against the Christian faith in putting the human being in the place 
of God . There is much that can be said in favor of such an interpretation of modern 
culture. The concept of human nature has indeed become basic in modern culture in 
a ·way that can be compared to the religious foundation of the cultural system in earli-
er periods of history . The concern for human rights is but one aspect, though politi-
cally the most important aspect of the occupation of modern culture with human 
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nature and whatever belongs to it. Increasingly that meant to make the human indi-
vidual the highest value and criterion. But does that modern tendency possess no 
truth whatsoever in a Christian view? Should it simply be rejected as modern aposta-
sy? ls not the emphasis on the individual person of distinctively Christian origin? 
Does not Christianity have a great deal in common with that modern spirit? Did it not 
even contribute to liberate the Christian consciousness itself from the distortion of 
intolerance? The relationship between the Christian faith and modernity seems more 
ambivalent than to allow for a simple rejection of modernity by Christians . Though 
modern culture, in turning secularist, contributed to the alienation of a great many 
people from the Christian faith, it is still necessary for Christians to learn and remem-
ber the lesson that the rise of modernity teaches and to appropriate its positive values 
to the Christian consciousness itself. 
III 
The distinction between the secular and the religious or spiritual realm had a long 
history in the development of Christianity. In earlier centuries that distinction did not 
imply the complete separation and emancipation of the secular segments of social 
life-the political and economic system, but also law and parts of the educational sys-
tem and arts--from the spiritual life of the church . To the contrary, the distinction 
between the secular and the religious sphere had itself a Christian basis . The 
Christian awareness that the present order of society is not yet the kingdom of God, 
but an imperfect and provisional form of social life, lies at the root of the distinction 
between the secular and the spiritual. It is a distinction that sets Christianity apart 
from other religiously imbued cultures like Islam. It separated the Byzantinian Empire 
already from the pre-Christian Roman empire, because in the post-Constantinian 
period there was a balance between the authority of the bishops and that of the 
emperor, while in Ancient Rome the emperor himself had been the highest priest, 
pontifex maximus . 
The distinction between the religious and the secular, however, took on another 
significance after the Reformation of the sixteenth century or, more precisely, after 
the century of religious wars that followed in the wake of the breakup of the medieval 
church which had been the unwanted result of the Reformation. When in a number 
of European countries no religious party could get the upper hand in the attempt of 
imposing its own faith upon the entire society, the unity of the social system had to 
be based on a foundation other than religion , since religion had proved to disrupt the 
social peace. In the second half of the seventeenth century, therefore, most people 
became convinced that religious controversies had to be bracketed if social peace was 
to be restored. This was the historical movement when modern secular culture was 
born . 
In earlier centuries, such a step would have been unimaginable. Even in the centu-
ry of the Reformation, religious unity was generally considered indispensable for the 
unity of a society . This was the reason why neither Luther nor Calvin could conceive 
the possibility of religious toleration, though they emphasized the decisive impor-
tance of the individual conscience in matters of religious faith. The step toward reli-
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gious freedom and toleration was first taken in the Netherlands, near the end of the 
sixteenth century, in order to restore peace between the Catholic and Protestant parts 
of the population of that country. The principle of religious freedom and toleration 
was proclaimed by William of Orange with the confidence of acting in line with the 
Protestant understanding of the Christian faith, in line with the liberty of a Christian, 
which Luther had thought and with the appeal to conscience in matters of faith. But 
actually it was a significant step towards a complete reconstruction of the social sys-
tem and of the culture itself. 
The older assumption that the unity of society requires unity of religious faith at its 
basis was not without good reasons. If the citizens are to obey the law and the author-
ity of a civil government, they must believe that it is right to do so and that they do 
not simply succumb to the caprice of those in power. To this end the wielding of 
power must be regarded legitimate in the name of some authority beyond human 
arbitrariness and manipulation. In other words, religion must oblige and restrain 
those in power as well as those upon whom such power is exercised. In such cases the 
subjects can feel united with those entrusted with legislative and administrative 
power in common responsibility to some authority that stands above all of them. If 
there is no religious unity, however, the legitimacy of government is jeopardized and 
so is social peace among its subjects. 
Such reasoning seems long obsolete . But it has never been effectively refuted. It 
was dismissed for pragmatic reasons, because of the urgent need to restore social 
peace in spite of religious differences and controversies. Alternative legitimations of 
government were developed, of course, replacing the religious one. Most important of 
these alternative legitimations became the idea of representative government. But still 
the plausibility of such legitimation is more pragmatic than theoretically secure. 
IV 
So far I suggested that the origin of modern secular culture is to be looked for at the 
end of the period of religious wars in post-Reformation Europe, generally in the second 
half of the seventeenth century, though earlier in the case of the Netherlands. In order 
to restore social peace in multi-confessional societies, the political system, the authori-
ty of the law, but also the public culture at large had to be based on a foundation other 
than religion whose contents had become controversial. The new foundation was 
human nature. Systems of natural law, a natural morality, even a natural religion were 
designed in order to satisfy that need . Not least of them was the natural theory of gov-
ernment, presented in terms of social contract theories that demonstrated the need for 
civil government in order to secure individual survival at the price of the natural free-
dom of individuals , as with Hobbes, or even in order to secure that individual freedom 
itself within the limits of reason and law, as with John Locke. Wilhelm Dilthey argued 
successfully that these theories that reconstructed the law, morality, and the founda-
tions of the political order on the basis of the idea of a common human nature , 
replaced the old religious foundation of society and thus enabled the European nations 
to put an end to the period of religious wars. The result was the autonomy of secular 
society and culture with regard to the churches and the religious tradition . 
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Other theories on the rise of modern secular culture account for its origin as pro-
duced by a process of secularization. The most famous of these theories is perhaps 
Max Weber's work on the origin of modern capitalism. According to Weber, modern 
capitalism did not develop from purely economic motivations and factors, but its 
early history depended on the Calvinist doctrine on predestination and its impact on 
human conduct. Calvin taught that though God's eternal decree on election or repu-
diation of an individual person remains mysterious, its provision for a particular per-
son can be guessed on the basis of his or her conduct. If they do the works of regener-
ation, it is likely that such a person belongs to the chosen ones . For the Calvinist 
believer, then, there exists a strong motivation to produce works of regeneration. 
According to Protestant ethics, however, these works consist of what one's worldly 
vocation requires in terms of conscientious observation of professional duties in secu-
lar life. Thus Weber assumed that the rational asceticism of the early capitalists had 
its source in the otherworldly hope of Calvinist spirituality. That spirituality got secu-
larized, however, when its dedication was put in the service of the multiplication of 
capital, and in that way it produced a system that finally functions independently of 
the original motivation. 
Other applications of the idea of secularization claimed that the modern belief in 
progress consists of a secularization of the Christian eschatological hope. The hope 
for progress aims no longer beyond this life, but seeks improvement within this 
world. Karl Lowith argued that the development of the modern philosophy of history 
should be regarded as a secularization of the Christian theology of history, the history 
of salvation. Philosophy of progress replaces the providence of God that had been 
believed to guide the historical process toward an eschatological consummation, by 
the predictive power of science and technology bringing about a future of worldly 
happiness. Science itself was described as having secularized the theological concept 
of the law by turning it into the idea of eternal laws of nature, and the ideal of an infi-
nite universe in early modern science was considered as the result of a secularization 
of the earlier belief in the infinity of God. 
In all these examples a religious content is transformed into something immanent 
and this-worldly. Taken together these examples seemed to suggest that modern cul-
ture as a whole was the result of a process of secularization, where instead of God, 
humanity was put in the center and entrusted with the task of directing the course of 
history, the task which hitherto had been considered the prerogative of God's provi-
dence. 
The thesis that modernity arose from a process of secularization got criticized by 
others like Hans Blumenberg, because it puts modern culture under an obligation to 
its Christian past so as if the substantial contents of modern culture would originally 
and truly belong not to modernity, but to its Christian predecessor. Against that 
Blumenberg asserted that modernity emancipated itself from the oppressive claims of 
the Christian religion, human autonomy forming the core of the modern mind. In 
effect, this position was not so far removed from that of the theorists of secularization, 
because their point was also that the religious heritage had been transformed into 
something else, since humanity rather than God was put in the center. 
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There is, however, one fateful flaw in the views of both sides, of those who claim 
that processes of secularization are responsible for the transition from medieval to 
modern culture but also of those critics who account for that transition in terms of an 
emancipation from a culture dominated by religion-both these views conceive of the 
rise of modern culture in terms of a primarily ideological process . In reality, however, 
the hard facts of war and civil war, the experience of a disruption of social order and 
peace in consequence of religious controversies produced the occasion that necessitat-
ed the transition to a reconstruction of society and public culture that was no longer 
based on unanimity in religion, since all endeavors to settle the quarrels between reli-
gious parties had proven to be in vain. As soon as one recognizes this situation in 
early modern history, it becomes understandable that at the origin of modern culture 
people did not mean to turn away from the Christian faith altogether. Emancipation 
from religion was not the motivation but rather the longterm result of the processes 
and pressures on enforcing a reconstruction of society on a foundation other than 
religious faith . Since in the transition to a public culture based on conceptions of 
human nature rather than religion, a break with Christianity was not intended, it is 
also understandable that Christian ideas continued to be effective, but were often 
transformed in the sense of secularized views . 
In a Christian assessment of the relationship of modern culture to Christianity, it is 
particularly important to appreciate correctly the origins of that culture. First, the 
description of the process just offered dissolves the impression, as if modernity from 
the outset was opposed to the Christian faith. Second, the description shows that the 
visions of Western Christianity in the post-Reformation period and the lack of toler-
ance in religious controversies were directly responsible for the rise of a secularist cul-
ture. That entails the lesson for the Christian churches that unless they overcome 
those inherited controversies and restore some form of unity among themselves 
together with a reappropriation of the idea of tolerance to the Christian conception of 
not only freedom, but of truth itself, they cannot reasonably expect that the exclusion 
of religious positions from the public square of modern culture be reconsidered . On 
the other hand, the memory of the role of religion in the origins of modern culture, 
favors certain conceptions and prejudices about the divisiveness and intolerance of 
Christian beliefs, entailing also their irrational character and prejudices, that are very 
difficult to overcome . 
V 
A third fruit of an appropriate understanding of the way modern culture arose from 
its Christian past, is an ability to recognize certain ambiguities in basic conceptions of 
modern culture, ambiguities that are due to a mixture of Christian and non-Christian 
elements. The most important example of this is the modern idea of freedom. On the 
one hand , there is a Christian root of the belief that all human persons are born to be 
free and that therefore their freedom ought to be respected. The Christian meaning of 
that belief is that all human persons are created in the image of God and meant to 
enjoy communion with God-in fact it is only communion with God that actually 
sets us free, according to John 8:36 and Paul , 2 Cor. 3:17. Each human person is ere-
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ated in order to enjoy the freedom that issues from communion with God, but it is 
only in Christ that such freedom is fully realized through redemption from sin and 
death. The modern idea of freedom, as it was proposed most effectively by John 
Locke, differs from the Christian view by focusing only on the natural condition of 
the human person . It differs also, however, from its other source, the ancient stoic 
ideas of natural law, since the Stoics considered the original freedom and equality of 
human beings in the state of nature to be lost because of the necessities of a life in 
society. It was the Reformation doctrine on the freedom of the Christian that made it 
possible in Locke's thought to claim the original freedom as an actuality for the pre-
sent state of human life. And in distinction from later libertarian views of individual 
freedom, Locke thought that pure freedom is necessarily united with reason and 
therefore relates affirmatively to law. One can take this position as an echo of the 
Christian conception that freedom depends on being united with the good and, there-
fore, with God. The prevailing view of individual freedom in modem societies, how-
ever, is the right to do as one pleases. It is not connected with any notion of the good 
as constitutive of such freedom itself. Any idea of freedom, of course, involves the risk 
of its abuse, due to the conditions of the incompleteness of human existence in histo-
ry. The risk of abuse, to be sure, has to be accepted wherever the right to decide inde-
pendently is granted. But it makes a difference, whether the distinction between use 
and abuse is observed or neglected in talking about the very constitution of human 
freedom. If it is observed, freedom cannot be equated with unbridled license . But at 
this point, the modern use of the idea of freedom is deeply ambiguous, and this ambi-
guity is characteristic of the ambivalence of secular culture with regard to values in 
general and to the contents and standards of our cultural tradition in particular. 
Consequently, a consumer attitude is prevailing far beyond the field of goods that can 
be obtained or sold on the marketplace. The ambiguous relationship to values and to 
the cultural tradition is also responsible for the weakness of secularist societies. 
VI 
Under the impact of Max Weber the dominate expectation concerning the future of 
Western culture was, until recently, that secularization would continue to pervade all 
aspects of society and of individual behavior while religion would be increasingly margin-
alized. Since two or three decades, however, it has become evident that secularization or, 
as others put it, progressive modernization of society produces a feeling of meaningless-
ness in the public arena of society and culture, and such feeling can lead to frustration and 
irrational, even violent outbreaks against the social system. This is the weakness of secu-
larist culture and the main reason why it is difficult to predict its future . It depends on 
how long the majority of people will be ready to pay the price of meaninglessness for the 
space a secularist society offers to the exercise of individual license. As long as this is com-
bined with a situation of comparative affluence, it might be tolerable for a long time. On 
the other hand, irrational reactions are unpredictable, especially when the feeling of the 
legitimacy of social institutions erodes . In this precarious situation, the secular societies of 
the West would do well to pay more attention to the cultural tradition as a source of social 
stability and especially strengthen the religious roots of their cultural identity. 
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This is said with regard to the best self-interest of secular society concerning its 
own stability and longterm survival. Religion as such has little stake in whether such 
advice is heeded or not. Contrary to anxieties that were widespread a few decades ago 
among people attached to religious faith, it can be said presently that the future of 
religion is less precarious than that of the secularist society. Religion is not going to 
fall victim to progressive secularization. Religion is not going to disappear, because 
progressive modernization and secularization of society produce a need for sources 
that can provide meaning for human life, a meaning that we do not give to our life 
ourselves, but that we have to receive as given by some authority beyond human 
manipulation. The resurgent interest in religion and in quasi-religious movements 
that started a few decades ago took secularist intellectuals by surprise, but could have 
been predicted (and was predicted by some) as an inevitable reaction to secularism. 
The renewed interest in religion, however, did not always turn to the Christian 
churches . In fact, it does so somewhat rarely. Among the reasons of this peculiar fact 
there seem to be first the widespread prejudices against Christianity as "conventional 
religion" in the public consciousness of the secularist culture. Therefore, alternative 
religious options can seem more attractive. A second group of reasons for the fact that 
the renaissance of religious sensitivity and yearning so often brings water on other 
mills than the churches may have to do with the ways the churches or many of them 
respond to the secularist culture. This is the final issue this lecture is turning to: How 
should the churches relate to the secularist culture? 
VII 
The worst way of responding to the challenge of secularism on the part of the 
Christian churches is to adapt to secular standards in language, thought and the style 
of life. Unfortunately, many Christians and particularly many clergy consider adapta-
tion to the secular culture a necessary strategy for winning over the people who live 
in a secularist society and culture. But if members of a secularist society turn to reli-
gion at all, they look for something else than they have in that culture . It is the spiri-
tual emptiness of secularism that makes people turn to religion. Therefore, if religion 
is offered to them in a secularist style, where the religious content is carefully con-
cealed-if it is present at all-it can be counterproductive. This explains, I guess, why 
in recent decades there has been a decline of membership in mainline churches, while 
conservative churches grow . What people look for in religion is a plausible alternative 
or at least a complement to life in a secularist society , and when religion comes to 
them in a secularist disguise, it is bound to be less attractive . 
This argument does not suggest that the churches should stubbornly continue 
everything that is old-fashioned. The old-fashioned ways of doing things in church 
may include elements that are really boring or even neurotic . Religion should be pre-
sented to members of the secularist society as a vital alternative or complement that is 
plausible as such . But an alternative to secularism it must be. The presentation of reli-
gion , its message and ritual, in secularist disguise inevitably raises the suspicion that 
the religious substance has sold out and that perhaps the clergy themselves do no 
longer believe what they are supposed to preach, when they try to get around the 
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hard issues. It is the proclamation of the risen Christ, the joyous manifestation in him 
of a new life which overcomes death, that the Church owes to the members of a secu-
larist culture . 
That the Church in its teaching and lifestyle should withstand the drain of adapta-
tion to the secularist culture, is not an argument in favor of fundamentalism. It is true 
that fundamentalism in its many forms, with its apparent strength and certitude, is 
psychologically often successful with persons who suffer from the emptiness and 
uncertainties of secularism . Where fundamentalism seizes upon a complete popula-
tion, it can become a terrible power producing a climate of intolerance and violence. 
But it lacks a deeper plausibility. Therefore, the apparent certitude of fundamentalists 
is often shallow. 
Instead of the fanatic alternative of fundamentalism, the opposition of Christian 
proclamation and faith to the spirit of secularism should always seek the alliance with 
reason. That is in keeping with the classical Christian tradition that since the time of 
the early church used the alliance with reason and with true philosophy to argue for 
the universal validity of the Christian teaching. In the confrontation with fundamen-
talism, the secularists are right in exposing irrational fanaticism and intolerance. The 
Christian opposition to secularism must not lay itself open to charges like that. 
Rather, Christian teaching may confidently lay claim to the truth that the secularist 
spirit thinks no longer worth searching for. While at the time of the enlightenment 
Christian doctrines were challenged in the name of reason and rational truth, contem-
porary secularism has itself become irrational. It seems the more promising, in such a 
situation, to renew the old alliance between the Christian faith and reason. Laying 
claim to reason, however, requires the acceptance of criticism on the side of 
Christianity itself and an ethos of self-criticism regarding traditional Christian doc-
trines and forms of spirituality. Even the Bible is not to be exempt from critical 
inquiry. The acceptance of biblical criticism is an inevitable implication of a renewed 
alliance between faith and reason. Our Christian confidence in the truth of God and 
of His revelation should be vigorous enough to suppose that it will not be overcome 
by any findings of critical inquiry, if only prejudiced forms of criticism are themselves 
shown for what they are . It would display unbelief, if we felt it necessary to protect 
the divine truth of the Bible from critical inquiry. Such inquiry can finally only 
enhance the splendor of the truth of God contained in the biblical writings. 
Confidence in that truth, however, is what the Christian proclamation and teaching 
has to live on and to witness to in confronting the challenge of secularism. 

THE SABBATH-REST OF 
THE MAKER OF ALL 
STANLEY L ]AKI 
Whatever problems a typical reader of Genesis 1 may have with its creation 
story, they rarely include a puzzlement about God's resting on the seventh day . 
Yet even on a little reflection that rest reveals the kind of anthropomorphism 
which all too often aggravates biblical parlance about God. Of course, the image 
of God taking a rest should seem inoffensive in comparison with the image of 
God who, according to the second creation story in Genesis 2-3, walks through 
the Garden of Paradise in the afternoon breeze and replaces with leather gar-
ments of His own making the loincloths with which Adam and Eve covered their 
sense of shame. If there is any human shortcoming involved in God's taking a 
rest on the seventh day, it is far less shocking than His pretending ignorance of 
why Adam and Eve felt ashamed on account of their nakedness. 
Still, if one is to give, however indirectly, a literal meaning to the assertion 
about God's taking a rest, it is impossible to avoid the inference that God some-
how got tired as He went through His six-day work. The slightest concession to 
anthropomorphism could then prompt one to picture God in the plainly anthro-
pomorphic posture of toiling and getting tired, distinct as His predicament could 
be from ordinary human exhaustion . 
A most effective antidote to the prompting to think that God is but a superior 
form of a human being is, of course, on hand in the Decalogue . There the very 
first commandment, which imposes the duty to worship no gods, only the true 
God, is bolstered by the prohibition of making graven images of Him: "You shall 
not carve idols for yourselves in the shape of anything in the sky above or on the 
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earth below or in the waters beneath the earth" (Exod . 20:4 ) . This prohibition, partly 
because its transgression entailed death as punishment, forcibly reminded even the 
most earthy Jew of the non-material nature of the true God. But if God was so differ-
ent from anything material, what could be the reason for the emphatic assertion that 
He ceased from His work of six days by taking a rest on the seventh? 
The reason has much to do with the justification of the Decalogue's third com-
mandment to turn every seventh day of the week into a holy day: "Remember to keep 
holy the sabbath day." A justification, and hardly a trivial one, is clearly necessary 
since the manner of fulfilling the commandment is outlined in severe details: "Six 
days you may labor and do all your work, but on the seventh day is the sabbath of the 
Lord, your God. No work may be done then either by you, or your son or daughter, 
or your male or female slave, or your beast, or by the alien who lives with you" 
(Exod. 20:8-10). Indeed, the justification given could not have been more exalted in 
character-the very example set by almighty God is invoked-"In six days the Lord 
made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in them; but on the seventh 
day he rested. That is why the Lord has blessed the sabbath day and made it holy" 
(Exod. 20:11) . 
Clearly, one is faced here with a divine role model set for man. The point is made 
even more emphatically when God enjoins Moses to tell the Israelites that the sab-
bath-rest is both the expression of God's holiness and a means of making the people 
holy . Moreover, if the same rest is "an everlasting token" between Him and the peo-
ple, it is only because "in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, but on 
the seventh day he rested at his ease" (Exod. 31: 17). Last but not least, the serious-
ness of the command is conveyed by the threat that anyone desecrating the sabbath 
would be put to death and "if anyone does work on that day, he must be rooted out 
from his people" (Exod. 31:14). 
A rather different justification of the observance of the sabbath is given in the sec-
ond version of the Decalogue where only the prohibition to make one's slaves work 
on the sabbath is mentioned (Deut. 5:15). This difference is, of course, only one of 
the many that impose the conclusion that the Pentateuch was composed of different 
parts and over a long period of time. The justification of the sabbath rest with a refer-
ence to the example set by God may indeed have been formulated only in post-Exilic 
times. It could, of course, have circulated orally long before and the prohibition itself 
could very well be of Mosaic origin . But since that justification is strikingly similar to 
the concluding phrase of the first creation story, its dating can hardly be separated 
from the dating of that story . 
The dating of the first creation story, as given in Genesis 1 (actually Gen. 1:1-Gen. 
2:3), is in part conditioned by the fact that it starkly differs from the story of creation nar-
rated in Genesis 2 and 3. The latter story, because of its primitively narrative character, 
can readily be assigned to Mosaic times . But the very systematic character of the first cre-
ation story betrays the kind of reflection which coincides with later periods in literary 
development. However, regardless of how the various parts of the Pentateuch are dated, 
the results would not entail a reconsideration of the main conclusion in this essay. 
The usual reason for assigning Genesis 1 to post-Exilic times is its alleged depen-
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dence on Enuma elish, the Babylonian creation story. Recitals of that story had to be a 
familiar experience to the Jews in the Exile. But surely, the post-Exilic author of 
Genesis 1 showed a great originality in eliminating almost everything from that long 
and convoluted story in order to produce from it, if such was the case at all, his own 
story in Genesis 1. He kept nothing whatsoever of the long and bloody struggle in 
which Marduk had to engage before coming to the creation of the world. In that strug-
gle, vaguely symbolic as it could be of the conflict of physical forces or entities, such as 
sea water, fresh water and mist, Marduk first has to vanquish an armada of gods who 
rally behind Tiamat the great mother. Moreover, even after his victory Marduk has to 
use as raw material the chopped up parts of Tiamat's carcass for the formation of the 
various parts of the world. 1 Clearly, there is something unconvincing in Marduk's pro-
ducing the sky by his mere breath, a far cry from creation out of nothing. 2 
In Genesis 1 there is no trace of any butchery, any rivalry or any battle. No 
Leviathan there, no hint of a ChaoskampP-in short, no evidence of any exertion on 
God's part. God, in Genesis 1, produces everything with an ease which is not dis-
turbed by any competition or difficulty. That consummate ease makes it improper to 
think that God needed six days for doing His work, let alone for His resting on the 
seventh. Yet, God emphatically rests on completing His creative work on the seventh 
day. Here too the difference between Genesis 1 and Enuma elish is nothing short of 
monumental. The Babylonian story is neither structured on a seven-day week, nor 
does it come to an end with a rest. Rather, on concluding his world-making, Marduk 
begins a wild celebration with his troupe of victorious gods . Last but not least, in the 
Babylonian story humans are produced only for the purpose of providing the gods 
with slaves so that they may continue their carousings at leisure. 
This contrast between the endings of these two creation stories should alone dis-
credit efforts to make Genesis 1 appear as a borrowing from Babylonian lore . The idea 
of such a borrowing is not even bolstered by the fact that in Babylon the king, his 
magician, and his physician had to abstain from certain acts on the seventh day of 
each week of two particular lunar months, the Marchesvan and the intercalary month 
Elul. They must not eat food prepared with fire, must not ride in chariots, must not 
wear bright garments, and should not exercise authority ... But for the ordinary 
Babylonians life could go on as on any other day of sweat and toil. 
Herein lies a major difference with the Jewish sabbath as legislated in the terms set 
forth above. Also, the Jewish sabbath, unlike the Babylonian, was not fixed to the 
lunar month. There is no trace in Hamurabi's legislation about the obligation to forgo 
manual work on the seventh day of the week. 5 The Babylonian shabattu and shapattu 
are in all evidence unrelated to the Hebrew sabbath. The latter's uniqueness or origi-
nality has so far withstood all efforts to present it as a borrowing from other cultures. 
And the same holds true of Genesis 1 as a whole, although for reasons not necessarily 
identical with the widely received ones. 
One such reason relates to the first phrase of Genesis 1, which contains a detail 
unnecessarily and unjustifiedly turned into one of its distinctive elements . Th e detail 
is the verb bara, a verb made mysterious by countless exegetes. " They are , of course, 
right in saying that in all but five of the fifty or so of its occurrences in the Old 
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Testament, bara stands for an action performed by God. But not a few exegetes of that 
chapter were hardly justified in passing over in silence the fact that there are excep-
tions to such a use of bara. Moreover, the exceptions are not insignificant. Three of 
them, two in Joshua Uosh. 17:15 and 18), and one in Ezekiel (Ezek. 23:4 7), are note-
worthy partly because they are textually well attested readings. More importantly, the 
ones in Joshua and the one in Ezekiel are separated by six or seven centuries. In other 
words, they attest the permanence of the use of bara with a purely human connota-
tion-there is nothing divine in the act of cutting down trees on some hilltops, as 
commanded by Joshua . The same is true of the command of Ezekiel that the bodies of 
two women of ill repute, representing a faithless Judah and Israel, be cut to pieces. 
Tellingly, translators of Genesis 1 are very reluctant to render the first verse of 
Genesis 1 as, say, "In the beginning God has sundered the heavens [from] the earth."7 
Yet this is what would be required by a strict adherence to the basic meaning of bara. 
Instead, it has become a hallowed custom to render that verse as "In the beginning 
God made the heaven and the earth" which does less injustice to the etymology of 
bara than the phrase, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." 
After two thousand years of Christian theological reflection, the word creation can 
emphatically mean only creation out of nothing or creatio ex nihilo. This phrase was 
indeed formulated in early Christian times 8 because it was quickly realized that what 
Christians meant by creation differed enormously from the "creation" performed by 
Plato's demiourgos, let alone from what was on hand in crassly emanationist, pantheis-
tic cosmogonies. In all these the word creare (or its synonyms) could be used, but 
only insofar as it meant mere growth (crescere) from something already there, howev-
er embryonically or seminally. 
Creation out of nothing is, of course, a supremely effortless act, inasmuch as it 
totally eliminates all dependence on matter. As such it cannot mean the cutting 
through of any matter. Of such an absolutely effortless act of creation there is no trace 
in Genesis 1, free though that chapter is of any crude overtone in reference to a God 
who works, and performs indeed the greatest conceivable work, the creation of all. 
But the verb bara in the first verse of Genesis 1 still suggests, etymologically at least, 
that God cut through something, or sundered one part of a thing from another, as He 
created the all, a totality conveyed by a listing of its two main parts, or the heaven and 
the earth. 
That etymological connotation is much less evoked in the concluding phrase of the 
creation story. No reference to heaven and earth is made as God is said to have 
blessed the seventh day and made it holy because on that day God rested "from all his 
work which God in creating had made (barn)." The idea of sundering is only remotely 
present when the creation of man as male and female is reported in terms of bara in 
verse 27. The immediate context is the making of man in the image of God, where 
bara is used twice. 
It would, however , be rash to think that the eminence of man, being made in the 
image of God , called for the use of bara in order to convey an eminently divine action. 
For bara is used in connection with the creation of "the great sea animals and all that 
creeps, (having) a living soul , which swarmed in the waters according to its kind, and 
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every bird ( with) wing according to its kind ." By contrast the verb asa is used to 
denote the making of the obviously much more noble items-the sun, the moon, and 
the stars. By then asa had been used in reference to the making of the firmament 
( verse 7), the most noble part of the Hebrew world edifice . Again, asa is used in verse 
31, in reference to the totality of what God has made, in jarring dissonance with the 
use of bara in the first verse, where the making of the totality of things is stated. Asa is 
again used when the making of all land animals is mentioned (verse 25). The indis-
criminate occurrence of these two verbs in Genesis 1 might by itself discourage efforts 
to ascribe too readily to bara a status with a divine connotation. 
No wonder that in translating Genesis 1 into any modern language, scholars have 
rendered both bara and asa by the same verb, either to make or to create. The two 
Hebrew verbs are indeed synonymous to a high degree, whatever their etymological 
differences. Why then did bara earn the special distinction of being used, in the rest 
of the Old Testament, mostly in connection with an action performed by God? 
Genesis 1 alone makes it difficult to seek that tie in the relative nobility of the object 
of God's action. The stars, the moon, and the sun, to say nothing of the firmament, 
could, even if deprived of any divine status, still seem far nobler than whales and rep-
tiles, yet these lowly creatures and not those heavenly bodies were said to have been 
made in terms of bara. 
The answer for the almost invariable connection of bara with a divine action may 
lie in its etymology. Did not the act of slashing carry the connotation of performing 
something with ease? Analogy with the English idiom, to do something with a flour-
ish, comes to mind. Therefore the first verse in Genesis 1 may mean that "In the 
beginning God made with the utmost ease the heaven and the earth, that is, the totali-
ty of things." However, this point should not be pressed too much. It may be more 
appropriate to say that bara and asa were simply used for the sake of stylistic variety . 
As was noted above, the expression "heaven and earth" means the totality of 
things -or the universe. It should seem natural that if God is assigned any work, it 
should not be about some detail but about the whole. The work should have for its 
object the most encompassing work conceivable, the making of the all or the uni-
verse. Indeed, in three steps it is the idea of this totality which is conveyed in 
Genesis 1. After the general statement concerning the all (verse 1), the work of the 
second and third days conveys the same totality in terms of the principal parts of the 
whole or universe as known to the Hebrews . The whole or universe is a tent-like 
world-edifice, with the floor (the earth) and the roof (the firmament) as its principal 
parts. Plants come with the earth, because wherever there is moist soil, some vegeta-
tion invariably sprouts up. 
The same device is used to convey the notion of the all, or universe , in the work of 
the fourth and fifth days, which witness the production of the main particulars of the 
principal parts. The stars, sun, and moon are the main particulars of the roof of the 
cosmic tent, whereas the birds and the fish are the main particulars of the floor region 
(earth). In fact the author of Genesis 1 gives a hint of his full awareness of using the 
device in question as he summarizes God's action as follows: "Thus the heaven and 
the earth and all their array were completed. " The word arra y is a rendering of the 
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Hebrew cebaam (hosts) because of its closeness to cbi (ornament, glory) and therefore 
also translated as decor. Jerome rendered it as ornatus, which in turn provided the 
basis for summarizing the six-day work as opus divisionis and opus ornatus. Had it 
been translated, as it certainly could have been, as "particulars," its role in supporting 
the repeated assertion of totality as the objective of God's work would have sharply 
stood out. 
The stylistic device to convey the idea of the whole by the listing of its main parts 
is very common in biblical Hebrew. In the Psalms alone 9 one finds a plethora of uses 
of that device. That all people, or everybody, are meant is conveyed by such expres-
sions "low and high," "rich and poor," "little and great," "the just and the wicked" 
(Pss. 50, 114, 10). All beasts are meant by "wild and tame" (Ps. 148). All the time, or 
always, or all seasons, is the meaning of "day and night," "summer and winter," 
"evening, morning, and noon" (Pss. 1, 74, 55). All movements, all postures are meant 
by "coming and going," "to walk and to lie down" (Pss. 121 and 139). Psalm 148 is so 
much structured on this device of stating the whole by listing its main parts as to lend 
itself to be condensed in a few words: In the heavens/ everybody, everything/ on the 
earth/ everything/ everybody/ praise the lord! The similarity with the structure and 
method of Genesis 1 should seem obvious. 
The device, whereby the idea of totality is conveyed in terms of listing the parts, is 
a staple feature in classical as well as modern languages. Suffice to mention the Greek 
en ge hai thalassa, which is terra marique in Latin, and "on land and sea" in English, 
meaning "everywhere" in each case. In English, this device is on hand in the idiomat-
ic phrases, "lock, stock, and barrel" (the three main parts of a rifle), and "hook, line, 
and sinker" (three main parts of a fishing gear). Both mean a far greater totality than 
the entire rifle or the entire fishing equipment. 
Curiously, authors, old and new, of books on rhetoric do not pay sufficient atten-
tion to this very effective device which may best be called "totum per partes." 
Whenever they speak of merismos, those authors, beginning with Aristotle, have in 
mind rather the device of pars pro toto, which is to convey the idea of totality in terms 
of one principal part. Exegetes still have to produce a detailed study of the role which 
the totum per partes plays in the Bible as a means of conveying the idea of totality. 
The reliance in Genesis 1 on the device totum per partes should seem especially sig-
nificant in view of the surprising rarity of the use of the adjective hhol (all), a word 
which, in a context dealing with the all, could be expected to be a dominant feature.10 
Yet hhol occurs only in reference to the birds and reptiles, and to the plants that nour-
ish man . The only broader use of hhol occurs only at the end, in reference to the com-
pletion by God of all his work and to his resting from all his work. 
In Genesis 1 the stating of totality as the object of God's work hinges above all on 
the use of that stylistic device . It is free from that conceptual obfuscation which is the 
hallmark of explaining Genesis 1 in terms of myths and legends, both left studiedly 
undefined. It was not without good reason that Alfred Loisy, a modernist, who would 
have gladly found in Genesis 1 a legend, called it the most scholastic treatise in the 
entire Bible. 11 But that almost scholastically logical character of Genesis 1, anchored in 
the idea of the vastness or total character and of the unrestricted goodness of God's 
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work, remains genuinely biblical, riveted as it is in the biblical notion of the universe . 
This is why the firmament comes first , as a place closer to the throne of God than the 
ground, which logically should have come first. 
The land animals, which should have come with the fish and the birds as chief par-
ticulars of the ground area, come on the sixth day as a background to emphasize the 
superiority of man and woman over them. Adam conveys his superiority over the ani-
mals by naming them. The woman's superiority over the animals is conveyed by the 
fact that Adam finds no suitable mate for himself among them. 
By the sixth day it has been repeatedly stated that whatever God has made is good . 
The goodness, the perfection of God 's productivity, is expressed also in the fact that, 
as any accomplished architect, God too provides for a manager, for a steward . The 
perfection of God's work is further conveyed by the fact that , like all sensible archi-
tects, He too begins by providing light, before He does anything. By specifying the 
purpose of the sun to give light, Genesis 1 reveals much of the ambivalence of biblical 
parlance about light as a special substance, independent of the sun. 11 
Therefore one is entitled, in the context of Genesis 1 alone, to argue that the com-
ing of the light before anything else physical depends above all on the intention of the 
author of Genesis 1 to present God as a most reasonable worker. As such, God does 
what every skilled architect or contractor does-He begins by providing light for His 
work. (He also begins by having on hand the piled up building material-a perspec-
tive within which the presence of a primitive chaos [tohuvabohu] logically follows .) It 
makes no sense, that is, biblical sense, to get around the problem of the coming of vis-
ible light before the sun by searching in the words "Let there be light!" for a hint of 
invisible light as assured either in Maxwell 's electromagnetic radiation or in the 2. 7°K 
cosmic background radiation. It should now also be very clear why it is abusive to 
take, however furtively, Genesis 1 for a science textbook in cosmogenesis and biogen-
esis. It is rather sad that at times well-meaning and devout , first-rate scientists give 
support to that vagary., i 
Such an abuse of Genesis 1 did not begin with latter-day creationists . Inasmuch as 
creationism is an effort to find a concordance between Genesis 1 and the science of 
the day, practically all the church fathers, all the scholastics, all the reformers and 
counter-reformers, and all 18th- and 19th-century exegetes of Genesis 1 were guilty 
on that score. '4 It was not until 1900 or so that the haplessness of this situation began 
to dawn on leading exegetes. 
On the Catholic side, the dawn of awakening was epitomized by F. Hummelauer, 
professor of Old Testament exegesis at Gregorian University and co-editor of the 
series Cursus scripturae sacrae, to which he contributed the volume on Genesis . There 
at the end of his survey of the history of interpretations of Genesis 1 he exclaimed : 
"All is darkness and chaos , whence let light come forth at long last!"' 5 Hummelauer 
felt that there is a solution on hand if Genesis 1 is treated as a series of visions given 
to Moses . The question whether, among other things, the firmament , to say nothing 
of the flat earth, was real or merely visionary for Moses , remained unanswered by 
Hummelauer. Only by doing grave injustice to the very realistic diction of Genesis 1 
could one assume that the firmament and the upper waters were not real for the 
author of Genesis 1, be it Moses or whoever else. 
Dissatisfaction with concordist interpretations of Genesis 1 prompted H. Gunkel, 
on the Protestant side, to give a radically new direction to efforts to cope with that 
troublesome chapter. He did so, however, by insisting that Genesis 1 be treated as a 
legend, a myth, to be understood by aesthetic sensitivity. 10 Like many of his Protestant 
followers ( with G. von Rad being most influential among them) and, from the 1940s 
on, many Catholics as well, Gunkel failed to be specific on the crucial question: What 
is to be meant by legend and how can it be used in coping with the very realist par-
lance of the author of Genesis 1 about the external universe? Much less could he 
explain himself on the subject of aesthetic sensitivity, a very elusive and markedly 
subjective commodity. The question about the specific nature of a legend or myth was 
not, for instance, answered in Danielou's handwaving that the author of Genesis 1 
"used its material freely." 17 In fact, the systematic approach of that author, as outlined 
above, indicates that he did not feel at all free as to what to say and how to proceed. 
The world as he knew it, and his intent to put across the idea of cosmic totality, set 
for him a narrowly defined path for presenting his principal message. 
That message is the kind of key to Genesis 1 whereby it is unlocked from the fate-
ful grip of comparisons with science, old and new. That principal message is not that 
God created everything, not that He has full dominance over everything, not even that 
man was created in His image. Much less is the principal message that man has to be 
an ecologically minded steward of God's creation, if this message is there at all, and 
not merely read into it by some new-fangled ecological consciousness. 
In Genesis 1, as in any other well-written story, the principal message is disclosed 
at the very end. At the end of Genesis 1 God is said to have rested on the seventh day, 
after taking a general look at the completion of a work touching on all things. But this 
brings back the very first puzzle raised at the very start of this essay: Did God need a 
rest? Did He spend energy as He worked? 
Since both these questions ought to be answered, and for very clear biblical rea-
sons, in the negative, an explanation must be sought in a different direction. This 
direction readily offers itself as soon as one takes seriously the possibility, a most like-
ly one, that Genesis 1 is a post-Exilic document. The direction is not that very dubi-
ous one which is tied to the alleged similarity of Genesis 1 with Enuma elish, a story 
which the Jews could hear ad nauseam during their capitivity in Babylon. What really 
nauseated them was their being under cultural pressure to take the seventh day in the 
manner in which all others did-by toiling, selling, buying, and carousing. 
The immediately post -Exilic times witnessed the birth of modern Judaism, with a 
central emphasis on the sacredness of the sabbath rest . General neglect of the sabbath 
observance had already been singled out by Jeremiah as a sufficiently grave offense to 
bring down "unq uenchable fire" on the gates of Jerusalem, whereas its observance 
could assure that "it remain inhabited forever" Uer. 17:19-27) . In reciting the story of 
Israel's infidelity, Ezekiel mentions the habitual breaking of the sabbath and lets God 
recall : "I also gave them my sabbaths to be a sign between me and them, to show that 
it was I, the Lord , who made them holy" (Ezek. 20:12). 
In spite of such prophetic utterances, and in spite of the agonizing lessons of the 
Captivity, the observance of the sabbath left much to be desired among the Remnant, 
whatever the meticulous observance on the part of some. Among the latter were those 
who, in the Maccabean wars, refused to defend themselves when attacked on the sab-
bath, a policy which had to be corrected (1 Mace. 2:31-41) . No corrective action 
stemmed the trend which is codified in the section "Shabbath" of the Mishna. There 
among the "forty save one" works prohibited are not only sowing, ploughing, thresh-
ing, building, pulling down, and similar patently heavy manual works, but also "mak-
ing two loops, weaving two threads, separating two threads . .. writing two letters, eras-
ing in order to write two letters . .. and taking out aught from one domain into anoth-
er." Concerning the latter class of work, among the forbidden minute amounts to be 
moved was the mere drop of oil sufficient to rub the little toe of a one-day old child. 1~ 
More serious trangressions were the target of Nehemiah 's animated pleas on behalf 
of the holiness of the sabbath which he saw threatened by the mercantile pressures of 
profit-making. In denouncing them in eight verses (Neh . 13:15-22), practically the 
grand finale of the historical books in the Hebrew Bible, Nehemiah pronounces eleven 
times the word sabbath. This makes those eight verses well-nigh unique in the entire 
Bible with respect to the sabbath and helps one to understand why its observance 
became so central in the formation of post-Exilic Judaism. 
Since in that formation Nehemiah played a central part, it may not seem unjusti-
fied to connect the redaction of Genesis 1 with his highly-charged concern for the 
sacredness of the sabbath. This may also explain the amplification of older texts of 
Exodus with verses, already quoted, that tie the command about the sabbath obser-
vance to God's rest following his act of creation . Such may have been also the context 
of the addition of various specifics concerning works prohibited on the sabbath . 
Given at a time when the people lived a nomadic life in the desert , the original Mosaic 
legislation could hardly contain all the restrictive details on hand in Exodus 20 which 
is most likely a priestly recension. Most importantly, the obligatory character of those 
details could be greatly strengthened by a parable in which Almighty God acts as a 
role model for resting on the seventh day . 
Reading Genesis 1 as a parable does not turn it into a legend or a myth . The closer 
the ties between parables and reality, the more powerful the message . This is why , for 
instance, the parable of the sower is so effective in its moral message. Genesis 1 would 
lose much of the effectiveness of its essentially moral message, given in terms of God as 
a role model for observing the sabbath, if one were to take lightly the realism of its 
worldview. That view is about the all, as seen by pre-modern man. But, and here comes 
the biblical saving grace for Genesis 1, that all is merely a reminder that there may be 
an immensely larger all, not yet known by man, and ultimately known only to God. 
In this age, when breakthroughs in scientific cosmology are announced every other 
month, it is well to recall that scientific cosmologists can never be sure that they deal 
with the strict totality of things, as they deal with a vast aggregation of galaxies. While an 
infinite universe was always a sheer extrapolation, never to be viewed from the outside 
by scientific observers, the finite Einsteinian universe too precludes its scientific verifica-
tion by external observation . The all, the Universe writ large, remains even in this scien-
tific age the object of an inference, and not a strictly verifiable scientific object. 1'' 
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The same difference exists in the Bible between the all known by man at a particu-
lar time and the all known by God . Awareness of this has telling instances in the 
Bible . Hanna 's exclamation (1 Sam. 2:3) about an all-knowing God witnesses that 
awareness within the common ranks of the people . On a socially much higher level, 
there is a similar, though equally spontaneous, instance on hand in Mordecai 's prayer 
where the inference to an all which may surpass the "heaven and earth " lurks 
between the lines: "You made heaven and earth and every wonderful thing under the 
heavens. You are Lord of all , and there is no one who can resist you, Lord. You know 
all things" (Esther 4C:4-5). Against this background, Esther 's own exclamation, "you 
know all things! " may readily appear in its true perspective . Also in post-Exilic times, 
Susanna takes refuge in the fact that the eternal God knows not only all that is hidden 
but "all things before they come into being " (Dan . 14:42). These exemplary members 
of the Jewish people had, in speaking of the all known to God, immensely more in 
mind than the all that needed to be known about their own particular case . They had 
in mind that all which it was the privilege of the Almighty to know, an all that could 
only be approximated, and very remotely at that, by the ever-growing grasp of man's 
knowledge about things and events. 
Had that difference been kept in mind by those learned in biblical lore, much bene-
fit would have been derived both in Jewish and in Christian circles. Among Jews, a 
barrier would have been set against hairsplitting, so prevalent in Talmudic and 
Midrashic comments on Genesis 1, concerning physical details of the world-making 
as described in Genesis 1. 20 The presence of such a barrier would have channelled 
mental energies for using the sabbath-rest as a spiritual immersion in the meaning of 
creation. The depths of that immersion were far from being fathomed when 
Maimonides registered a by then staple view that God commanded resting on the sab-
bath so that the truth of creation might be pondered and gratefulness for God's kind-
ness be rekindled. 11 
The stifling regulations of Mishnah cast their shadows even when a truly deep per-
spective was voiced. A case in point is the Horeb by Samson Raphael Hirsch, chief 
rabbi in Oldenburg in the 1830s. He viewed the sabbath as a weekly reminder for man 
about the ever possible misuse of his creative abilities: "What was there to safeguard 
the world against man? What safeguard that man in his position of honour would not 
forget God; that he would not look upon the world, which had been entrusted to him 
to govern according to God 's will , as his own property; that in his controlling power 
over the things around him he would not regard himself as master; and that he would 
not live in God 's world solely according to his human will? " The safeguard was the 
sabbath-rest. This meant that "even the smallest work done on the Sabbath is a denial 
of the fact that God is the Creator and Master of the world. " However, the work was 
not ph ys ical exe rtion as such , but any work , however minutely physical which 
involved a "con structive exercise " of one 's intellect: "If you have engendered, without 
the slight est exertion , even the small est change in an object for human purposes , then 
you have profaned the Sabbath , flouted God , and undermined your calling as Jew." 
And as if to opp ose all temptations of mod ernity , Rabbi Hirsch explicitly specifies 
man's "tech nical skill " that assis ts man's spirit so that he may master the world as the 
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operation to be utterly set aside on the sabbath. By the sabbath-rest man restores the 
world to God and acknowledges that his own authority over it stands in subjection to 
Him. 12 
The shift from the last day of the week to the first in the Christian context entailed 
also a liberation from stifling prohibitions. In line with this, Jerome introduced the 
distinction between servile and non-servile work as the true meaning of the Mosaic 
legislation concerning the sabbath-rest. Also, the doctrine of Christ's resurrection 
included a cosmic perspective on the sabbath-rest, as the pledge of the final restora-
tion of all, a process to which the Christian could rightly contribute, especially with 
culturally creative work. More recent theological reflections on the resurrection of 
Christ contain indeed renewed awareness of its ties to the first creation, brought to a 
close by God's resting on the seventh day. n 
There are indeed good reasons for believing that a deeper understanding of the 
sabbath-rest would help to put the six-day creation story in its true perspective-it is 
a parable with the primary purpose of setting up God as a model in the role of resting 
after a six-day work. But precisely because the resting is done by God, it symbolizes 
full spiritual activity. As such it can and should be imitated by man through concen-
trating on spiritual matters while refraining from all sorts of slaving, toiling and busy-
bodying. 
Had Genesis 1 been seen in this perspective ( which is very different from the per-
spective of the various steps of His world-making), the lures of concordism might 
have been resisted from the start, that is, from the late second century that saw the 
work of the first Christian apologists. The lure was the temptation to have the world-
view of Genesis 1 appear to be in conformity with the light which scientific work-
first Aristotelian-Ptolemaic, then Copernican, afterwards Newtonian and Laplacian, 
and in our times Einsteinian and post-Einsteinian-provides about the physical 
world. For all their awareness of the dangers of that lure, a Basil and an Augustine 
nevertheless tended to yield to it. The result was a by now two-thousand-year-long 
bungling with Genesis 1, which brings only discredit to the message about salvation 
and provides endless grist to the mill of scoffers, of ten taking cover with copious ref-
erences to science. 
Most importantly, concordist interpretations of Genesis 1 greatly distract from its 
principal message, which is to see in the Maker of All a role-model for making the 
sabbath holy . It may be best left for Orthodox Jewish scholars to articulate this con-
nection without imposing prohibitions such as , for instance , the stopping of elevators 
on the sabbath. As to Christians , their refocusing on that role-model would dampen 
their enthusiasm for being busy with all sorts of manual projects on weekends. Few 
factors would indeed counter so effectively the runaway secularization not merely of 
life but of the lives of Christians as well, than their devout consideration that the 
Maker of All had set for them the pattern to follow. 
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DAVID j. BAGGETT 
There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide . Judging 
whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question 
of philosophy. -Albert Camus 
In the state of Michigan, a battle is raging over the activity of Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian. A former pathologist, he began medically assisting suicides in 1990 
to enable suffering, terminally ill patients to end their lives. In March 1993, the 
Michigan state legislature banned assisted suicides, a law specifically aimed at 
Kevorkian. What is happening in Michigan, largely inspired by the furor sur-
rounding "Dr. Death," is a microcosm of things to come in the United States. 
The scenario in Michigan concerning physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or medi-
cide is not new, but has been fanning the flames of the debate elsewhere over 
this practice, a debate that will undoubtedly in time take on national and inter-
national proportions. The Hemlock Society, which promotes the legalization of 
PAS for the terminally ill, has upwards of 50,000 members, and recently two 
states voted down "right to die" initiatives by only narrow margins .1 
More and more people are coming to believe that it is their right to end their 
lives when they wish by this intentional means. If assistance from a doctor is 
required, the doctor should not be punished. PAS, so the argument goes, should 
not be legally banned. Those who oppose the legalization of PAS and thereby 
support the banning of it, on the other hand, claim that the state would make a 
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mistake if it does not take a stand against it, and inaction would establish a dangerous 
precedent by essentially sanctioning the deliberate taking of life. 
PAS obviously transcends the scope of Kevorkian and his lawyer, Geoffrey Fieger. 
A more thorough treatment would engage the more thoughtful Dr. Timothy Quill, 
author of Death and Dignity : Making Choices and Taking Charge. However, since 
Kevorkian and Fieger represent such central figures in this emerging debate, it is 
instructive to take them as somewhat paradigmatic of this movement . Kevorkian sees 
himself as the leading proponent of an important historical revolution, in which the 
taboo surrounding death will finally be removed . 
He has apparently received numerous requests for assistance. He screens out many 
of them, ostensibly considering only those which meet the following criteria: the 
patient must be suffering from a fatal or irremediable condition from which he or she 
will never recover, the patient's family must entirely agree, the patient's medical con-
dition must be verifiable by Kevorkian, a psychological consultation when appropri-
ate and the patient must never waver. 
In an effort to explore a few of the relevant issues involved in this admittedly 
morally ambiguous question, let us critically examine a representative argument in 
favor of PAS, which typically goes something like this: People have the right to end 
their own lives, and to enlist medical professionals to help, when pain becomes too 
great to bear and life's quality is thereby reduced to an unconscionable level. Those, 
myself included, who would deny this right are, according to Fieger, religiously moti-
vated fanatics who simply wish to impose their provincial views on others. Three 
important issues raised by this stance of PAS supporters are the following: What 
should be thought of those religiously motivated opponents of PAS? Is it truly peo-
ple's right to end their lives when they wish with a doctor's assistance? And is the 
rationale ofreducing pain sufficient basis on which to risk legalization of PAS? 
RELIGIOUS BIAS 
What should be thought of religiously motivated opponents of PAS? A large num-
ber of the most vocal opponents of PAS are, at some level, religiously motivated . 
Among supporters of PAS there has been a concerted effort to capitalize on the reli-
gious nature of this resistance . Among the likes of Fieger is a conscious and deliberate 
attempt to portray the opponents of PAS as zealous religionists far to the political 
right of mainstream America . These fanatical reactionaries, the argument goes, 
though unwilling themselves to change , are exceedingly willing to impose their nar-
row views on others . At the most elementary and obvious level, this effort is an exam-
ple of the logical fallacy argumentum ad hominem , which assumes that discrediting a 
person thereb y discredits his or her arguments. 
A more legitimate critique of religious motives questions their value in a pluralistic 
society. In an age when the wall of separation between church and state is assiduously 
maintain ed, and when the need for tolerance and openness to a broad spectrum of 
ideas is emphasi zed , religion has taken on a pejorative tone in public discourse. The 
trend is toward increasingly permissive legislation, including the legalization of PAS, 
and perso nal choice seems to be the dictated conclusion of any social issue involving 
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religious conviction. All it takes for an issue to be decided on the basis of personal 
choice is the characterization of the debate as religious in character, at which point it is 
automatically assumed that nothing more needs to be said. If classical theism or tradi-
tional religion is involved, then the question is answered: personal choice has priority. 2 
Certainly this debate entails more than religious considerations alone. Relevant to 
this debate, for instance, are agreed upon nonreligious standards to test conse-
quences. But this debate remains in need of being informed by religion. An issue like 
PAS or euthanasia requires societies to decide on a collective moral vision. Christians 
in this society have always been passionate players in that process, and those of every 
creed must continue to be involved and included. Unfortunately, this culture is 
quickly forfeiting its intellectual capacity to acknowledge the relevance of transcen-
dent and religiously based normative moral codes to public discourse. Richard John 
Neuhaus, one of today's foremost authorities on religion in contemporary society, 
stresses that laws, to retain legitimacy, must be seen to be coherently connected with 
basic presuppositions about right and wrong, good and evil.3 He warns that morality 
becomes mere sentimentality when its religious foundations and theological under-
pinnings are lost, but recently we have too often uncritically assumed that religiously 
based moral concerns can no longer be binding on our public ethic .4 While that has 
taken place, the resultant moral void has simply been dogmatically filled in with other 
moral postulates as greedy for transcendence as anything religion can muster. The 
public square detests a moral vacuum. 
Society's uncritical relegation of religion to a place of irrelevance is having numer-
ous harmful consequences, and those who argue that religious conviction ought to be 
a disqualification from the public debate are laboring under fundamental misunder-
standings. This bias against religion will not only sustain the dichotomy between the 
institutions of church and state, but will drive a wedge between the laws of the land 
and religiously rooted moral values. Whenever this happens, potentially positive leg-
islation and constructive influence can be lost simply because they are construed as 
too suggestive of religion. Imagine the result if Dietrich Bonhoeff er's opposition to 
Hitler, Martin Luther King's battle for equal rights or William Wilberforce's fight 
against slavery had been silenced and consigned to irrelevance just because they were 
in part spurred by religious conviction. 
If the attempt to portray PAS as a legal debate with no room for religion is one 
attempt to silence religious resistance to PAS, another attempt is to portray the debate 
as a scientific and medical matter. Dr. Kevorkian has said that he will "do what a doc-
tor should do: alleviate the suffering of the human being in front of me if it's justified 
medically." Notice that the alleged basis for his actions is medical, not moral. His 
lawyer has similarly asserted that it is inappropriate to "inject a matter of faith with a 
purely medical and scientific issue." The clear implication is that this debate is a med-
ical and scientific debate alone with no room for religion, faith claims or traditional 
morality. 
This is confused thinking . By its nature, science alone is not equipped to handle 
moral, philosophical or metaphysical inquiry. The debate over PAS involves these 
very questions. The insistence that science alone answer the moral questions about 
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PAS assumes a mistaken view of what science does. Science deals with the empirically 
verifiable and quantifiably measurable, not normative and prescriptive questions of 
ethics. Whether anything exists outside science's necessarily truncated vision is not a 
question it can answer, nor one it should be expected to answer. The evidence that 
science offers concerning our ultimate questions, such as detectable patterns of regu-
larity or the auspicious conditions for human life, is necessarily ambiguous and 
inconclusive. 
Arguing that theological considerations be bracketed out of this debate is simply 
naive at best, patently dishonest at worst. Doctors should not be the only ones doing 
medical ethics . Their insights and facts are crucial, but without religious convictions, 
logical distinctions and ethical discussions, the prior philosophical and theological 
assumptions of doctors may be advanced dogmatically in the name of science and 
uncritically accepted. That includes Dr. Kevorkian, who hastens to give primacy to 
his own "scientific" moral ideals and expects the laws to live up to those standards, 
while those with a "religious" moral vision are supposed to keep quiet and, prefer-
ably, out of the public debate. 
Likewise, Howard Simon, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
concurs with Kevorkian when he claims that opposition to legalizing PAS on theolog-
ical grounds is illegitimate. Certainly, however, Simon must be aware of his own 
guiding truth claims and ideological biases, such as when he claims, echoing 
Kevorkian's sentiments, that "the right to control our own lives . . . belongs to each of 
us" and "it is my life and the decision should be mine." These are ambitious theologi-
cal assertions in their own right, as are any fundamental presuppositions which 
incline us toward one side of this debate or the other. Simply because his propositions 
reflect a "secularistic theology," as it were, does not exempt them from scrutiny. And 
just because the assumptions of some are fueled by religious conviction and tempered 
by traditional morality does not mean they ought to be decried. 
As a society we are fast losing our language for moral discourse. And by ruling out 
of court as irrelevant any religious morality, a great historical source of our public 
ethos in this country, we are now more and more refusing to contend with the com-
plexities of ethical conundrums . The probable basis on which an issue like PAS will 
eventually be decided will be very narrow, and it will likely be this: PAS safeguards 
our rights, while a law against it would reduce our freedoms. Is that the extent of col-
lective moral imagination and discussion of which this culture is capable? 
RIGHT TO DIE 
In the fall of 1993, my father suffered and died from an acute case of lymphoblas-
tic leukemia . In his final weeks , his condition deteriorated daily. The final two weeks 
rendered him unconscious much of the time, delirious and disoriented from the 
cumulative effect of chemotherapy, internal hemorrhaging, the cancer itself and the 
several medications being administered . When his time of death arrived, the family 
had already done much of their mourning. Seeing him dying like that seemed worse 
than the actual death itself. 
My father 's suffering could have been worse. It certainly could have been better, 
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but it could have been substantially worse in terms of intensity and duration. As my 
father suffered and my family suffered along with him, I thought about physician-
assisted suicide at times. I was not giving it serious consideration in this case, but was 
attempting to understand its appeal in the lives of those who have had to endure pro-
longed periods of suffering. It is not difficult to see why a relatively painless and 
immediate death can seem so much better than continuing in horrendous pain 
(though modern palliatives make such cases rare). 
But I hesitate affirming a legislative sanction of physician-assisted suicide. Among 
my reservations is a serious concern over the way rights language has been employed 
in this debate, sometimes clouding the issues considerably and avoiding important 
questions altogether. In this section I would like to discuss this rights language in 
moral discourse generally and in the PAS debate particularly, pointing out a few of 
the limitations, assumptions, and implications of its common usage. 
Supporters of PAS submit that it protects the "right to die" of human beings. The 
point they are stressing is people's right to die when they choose to die. Expressed less 
euphemistically, those like Kevorkian and Fieger are asserting people's right to kill 
themselves and to enlist others' help when required. It is not simply the negative right 
of refusing life-preserving treatment, but the positive, legislatively sanctioned right of 
officially assisted suicide. That people have the right to commit suicide, even with the 
help of a licensed health care professional, is becoming an accepted moral postulate, 
increasingly treated as a self-evident proposition, within the conventional wisdom 
and reigning "plausibility structures" of this culture. It is usually stated dogmatically, 
thereby begging a most important question of this debate: Is suicide our right, and 
does it include the right to enlist the assistance of others? 
The assumption that moral debates can be reduced to the level of rights is wide-
spread, a trend concerning which I hold some reservations. I should therefore quickly 
preface this discussion by stressing that I am not yet convinced of the validity and 
soundness of the arguments in favor of conducting moral dialogue exclusively (or 
even primarily) in rights language. Such discourse typically assumes that the world is 
constituted under adversarial power structures and attempts to construct an individu-
alistic approach to ethics, while yielding conclusions far-reaching and communal in 
scope. Rights do not exist in a vacuum, not even private rights, for to assert a right is 
also to impose an obligation on our society to provide means for the exercise of that 
right. Rather than reinforcing individualism when a private right is societally 
affirmed, that society incurs upon itself at the moment of legislation the obligation to 
provide the suitable means for its citizens to enjoy that right. 
That the question of rights has generally come to be seen as the legitimate focus of 
the PAS debate is undeniable, however. Interestingly, both sides of the debate often 
employ rights language. The Hemlock Society, which promotes the legalization of 
PAS for the terminally ill, speaks of a "right to die," while their strongest opponents 
are typically self-avowed "right to life" proponents. The present ban against PAS in 
my home state of Michigan was temporarily repealed when Judge Cynthia Stephens 
decided that "the right of self-determination includes the right to choose to cease liv-
ing." By some estimates, about eighty percent of the population of the state of 
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Michigan believe that human beings possess a "right to die" and that legislation sanc-
tioning PAS ought to be adopted. This figure is usually reflected among my philoso-
phy students at the university where I teach, with about four out of five initially 
affirming PAS because "that's our right." 
An important reason why one's right to die is often uncritically accepted today is 
this society's cultural climate. It is a culture averse to imposition. Since anything that 
smacks of imposition is anathema, the banning of PAS has an inherent strike against 
it from the outset. By its nature, it is a nonpermissive law and is thus characterized by 
its opponents as an imposition of religious values and an infringement of rights. 
Within our contemporary moral context, where primacy is often given to individual 
and private rights, it is small wonder that PAS is finding an increasingly receptive 
audience. Considered carefully, this cultural climate offers little reason to assume that 
suicide is indeed our right. It certainly helps explain why rhetoric appealing to rights 
language in the PAS debate is effective persuasion for so many, but the prior question 
of whether suicide is indeed a right has still not been answered. 
The swelling popular conviction that suicide is a right has usually resulted less 
from good reasons and logical arguments than from a brute assumption being 
absorbed into the working mentality of our culture. When pressed, one reason that 
may be offered for such a right is that suicide as an option is an implication of human 
freedom. We possess a free will with which we can justifiably make our own decisions 
about our lives, it is argued . This rationale, though, is clearly inadequate, confusing 
free will with other types of freedom, and assuming that what we can freely choose of 
our own volition should necessarily be politically, ethically, and legally permissible. 
Quite obviously that is not the case. Something which we possess the capability of 
doing is not thereby a right. Libertarian freedom, if it exists in the face of the chal-
lenge of determinism, implies neither political freedom nor moral license necessarily. 
It may be suggested that a right to die can be gleaned from the Karen Ann Quinlan 
case and subsequent rulings which have established the right under certain circum-
stances to be disconnected from artificial life support systems. This procedure has 
come to be known as passive euthanasia, allowing death to take place naturally. 
Justice Scalia, in the Nancy Beth Cruzan decision, equated the termination of life sup-
port with ordinary suicide, collapsing any distinction between passive euthanasia and 
PAS. However, it does good to recall that Scalia was the only justice to do so. The 
assertion that denial of life-saving medical treatment by a competent patient consti-
tutes suicide has been largely rejected logically and legally, and for good reason. 
Suicide involves active steps taken to induce death, while passive euthanasia affirms 
the causality of the underlying disease as the agency of a person 's death. The 
Michigan ban on PAS that has been alternately legislated and struck down specifically 
distinguishes PAS from "withholding or withdrawing medical treatment. " 
Some opponents of PAS strongly support passive euthanasia for similar reasons 
they oppose PAS. As my father's condition worsened, the family had to make a deci-
sion regarding his "code status." As an opponent of PAS, I was also a strong voice in 
support of declaring my father's status "no code ." That meant, in case of cardiac 
arrest, for instance, he would not be resuscitated. Doctors and nurses would have 
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made pain management and comfort care their priority, not the prolonging of his life 
at any cost. With everything else my father had experienced in recent years medically, 
and now with him suffering from a fatal disease, I and my family decided that it was 
time to draw the line in terms of how much we could reasonably expect medicine to 
do. PAS supporters neglect doing this, it seems, believing that a doctor's obligation is 
not only to prolong life and minimize pain, but to help in the taking of life when all 
else fails. The lesson to learn from vexing moral dilemmas introduced by too great a 
faith in medicine is to draw the line earlier, placing less trust in medicine, not to 
expect medicine to solve the problem that it has helped create (usually at the insis-
tence of patients' families). 
Some suggest that a right to die is presupposed in ongoing medical techniques. 
Such a challenge attempts to blunt distinctions between PAS and what is already 
accepted medical practice. In attempting to alleviate pain, doctors often administer 
substantial doses of analgesics and, in doing so, sometimes hasten death . One of the 
points of resistance to laws against PAS in the medical profession is concern that such 
laws may impede current medical procedures. However, a traditionally honored dis-
tinction can be upheld by means of the doctrine of double effect, traceable to Aquinas. 
This distinction points out the difference between primary and secondary effects, 
arguing that culpability not be extended to secondary effects unintended by our 
actions. Substantial doses of palliative therapies requested by patients may occasional-
ly hasten death, but death in such cases is an inadvertent effect of the primary goal of 
pain relief. PAS intentionally induces death rather than secondarily and inadvertently 
effecting it, distinguishing PAS from ambitious palliative therapy. 5 
Suppose this suggestion: suicide is at least our legal right since so many states have 
struck down legislation making it illegal. In response, I would ask this question: Does 
the absence of legislation against suicide make it our right? Perhaps another impor-
tant reason for not making suicide illegal other than the desire to provide its sanction 
is that criminal punishment is virtually ineffectual as a deterrent to suicide . In this 
case, another reason is obvious: there is no way to punish a successful victim of sui-
cide! The fact that a law against suicide cannot be enforced does little to confirm sui-
cide as our right, particularly given this culture's formal efforts to avoid suicide. If sui-
cide has been given our blessing, why have state legislatures found it in the public 
interest to dissuade such behavior by funding ambitious suicide prevention programs 
1 and forbidding assisting in a suicide? 
1 
To call our presumed right to die into question almost seems a waste of time, but it 
: happens to be that little piece of question-begging with which many opponents of 
PAS have to differ. This alleged right usually functions as the crucial unquestioned 
~ premise in the argument for PAS, without which the argument fails. To say "I have a 
right to end my life when I wish " is easy, while testing the legitimacy of such a claim 
i becomes more involved. We are driven to foundational questions about communal 
responsibilities, limitations on personal rights , the significance of death and the 
1, 
, appropriateness of suicide . 
' What exactly is meant by saying that we have this moral right to choose when to 
; die? A right is something one is entitled to , that to which one has a ju st and proper 
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claim, and implies a principle of congruity and appropriateness. It is something appo-
site to us. The rights a society argues for thereby reveal its anthropology; the basic 
human, moral, legal rights a society believes it possesses reflect what it thinks of 
humanity. The rights people actually possess are dictated by the true nature of human-
ity, which may or may not be accurately reflected in what a society believes . The dis-
cussion of anthropology concerning human nature is prior to the decision about 
human rights, and has to take place at the level of worldview. 
Representatives from a broad array of worldviews are encouraged to enter the pub-
lic debate over PAS and voice their convictions and concerns. They are at liberty to 
convince the populace of the wisdom or compassion of PAS, or lack thereof, by the 
power of their ideas and cogency of their arguments. This courtesy should be extend-
ed to the spectrum of worldviews , from theists and atheists to existentialists, Kantians 
and humanists . The debate over PAS features an appeal to our ultimate commitments, 
our most basic ethical convictions and most deeply cherished values. Satisfactorily 
answering whether or not we as a culture wish to affirm that suicide is a basic and 
fundamental right requires the participation of everyone, the formation of a consen-
sus and the clearest and best of arguments all around. 
The dogma that people have the right to end their lives when they so choose presup-
poses a humanistic understanding, according to which human beings are the masters of 
their own destiny, entirely autonomous and independent. This approach should not be 
exempt in the public arena from the same critical scrutiny rightly aimed at all other pos-
sible worldviews . In contrast to humanists, theists of ten question those Homo sapien-
centered assumptions, positing instead that humankind is God's creation, and as created 
beings, essentially dependent on God, they are subject to God's sovereignty. According to 
most theistic conceptions of humanity, no such right to commit suicide exists. Such a 
right would usurp God's authority, exceed the prerogatives of human freedom and vio-
late the prohibition against murder that the Judeo-Christian ethic, for instance, teaches-
an ethic that has long served to inform public discourse in this culture. 
This culture can discard such theistic perspectives as archaic and outdated if it will; 
the question is whether it should. To assume that all traditional moral convictions are 
necessarily inferior to the "liberated" ethics of today is potentially the apex of arro-
gance, an instance of what has been called "chronological snobbery." 
Unlike life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence, 
suicide is usually not touted as an unalienable right with which we have been endowed 
by our Creator. Kevorkian certainly would not attribute such a right to God; his world-
view is succinctly put in his answer to the question of what happens to us after we die: 
"You rot." Assuming human rights are either intrinsic or conferred, then, that would 
leave the so-called right to die as a necessary part of humanity or personhood. Those 
who are inclined to deny such a right, on the other hand, see PAS as contrary to human 
nature. Theists generally assume that the wisdom of God's moral laws is evident in the 
way they accord with both nature in general and human nature in particular. 
Those truly individualistic impulses and instincts not to be denied within us usual-
ly do not have to do with our rights so much as with our natural desire as human 
beings to survive. J. Gay-Williams, reflecting on euthanasia, has argued that 
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Every human being has a natural inclination to continue living . Our reflexes 
and responses fit us to fight attackers, flee wild animals, and dodge out of the 
way of trucks. In our daily lives we exercise the caution and care necessary to 
protect ourselves. Our bodies are similarly structured for survival right down to 
the molecular level. When we are cut, our capillaries seal shut, our blood clots, 
and fibrogen is produced to start the process of healing the wound. When we 
are invaded by bacteria, antibodies are produced to fight against the alien organ-
isms, and their remains are swept out of the body by special cells designed for 
clean up work. 
It is enough, I believe, to recognize that the organization of the human body 
and our patterns of behavioral responses make the continuation of life a natural 
goal. By reason alone, then, we can recognize that euthanasia sets us against our 
own nature .... Euthanasia involves acting as if this dual nature-inclination 
towards survival and awareness of this as an end-did not exist. Thus, euthana-
sia denies our basic human character and requires that we regard ourselves or 
others as something less than fully human. Euthanasia does violence to this nat-
ural goal of survival. 6 
This innate desire we have to preserve and sustain life has long been encapsulated 
in the Hippocratic Oath doctors take. Euthanasia and PAS violate the natural inclina-
tion people have to preserve life and safeguard society. Deep within us are a desire 
and sense of responsibility to heed our will to live and thereby cultivate the fabric of 
society rather than to militate against and undercut that through an individualistic 
warrant for suicide. How do proponents of PAS justify their exclusively individualistic 
orientation when faced with the inherent sense of social responsibility that we all feel 
and that most all cultures have cherished? 
It suffices to say that the right to die, a crucial premise in the case for PAS, does 
not deserve its status as an unapproachable, unassailable verity . In fact it is but one 
dubious tenet among others in a worldview that claims an exalted view of 
humankind, but which actually leaves an ever decreasing set of safeguards in place for 
the innocent and most helpless of the species. Opponents of PAS seriously question 
whether the arena of death is one in which finite human beings exercise legitimate 
and exclusive autonomy. The words of Gloucester from King Lear still ring clear : "We 
must endure our going hence even as our coming hither." 
SLIPPERY SLOPE 
If this society decides to legalize PAS, it will institutionalize a certain rejection of 
the prohibition against murder by sanctioning assistance in self-murder. Such a deci-
sion will largely be based on an act-utilitarian ethic contending that the elements that 
make an act right or wrong are not the intrinsic features of the act, but the conse-
quences of the act. Assisted self-murder will be legalized in certain cases because in 
those cases the ends will have been deemed to justify the means . Rather than a rul e-
based orientation, utilitarianism will have become the dominant ethical approa ch of 
the legislators, at least in the case of PAS. The opinion of many people is that it is 
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high time for this transition to take place, and for utilitarianism to be accorded its 
special place of honor in the formation of our public ethic . 
Act-utilitarianism remains a problematic method of formulating a public ethic, 
however, because an exclusive regard for each action's consequences, over against 
general prima facie rights and wrongs, makes today's legislative decisions a major, not 
to mention laborious, guessing game. Decisions which are made to minimize suffer-
ing, given the limited knowledge and perspective we have, may turn out tomorrow to 
have been entirely mistaken, a notorious epistemological difficulty of utilitarianism. 
What goes especially unquestioned is whether the utilitarian denial of ethical norms 
is a prudent way in which to achieve the best of consequences . 
Often overlooked is the fact that adherents of traditional rule-based ethics are usu-
ally at least as concerned with the consequences of actions as utilitarians are, some-
times more so. Although traditionalists believe in the existence of objective moral 
standards, they also happen to be convinced that it is the faithful following of those 
ethical norms, in general, by which the overall best consequences are finally secured 
for all concerned. 7 According to this understanding, the deleterious consequences of 
an immoral action are not merely an incidental effect but a manifestation of the 
action's ethically deficient nature, a function or an internal component of evil, if you 
will. An intimate relationship thus operates between an action's intrinsic moral fea-
tures and its ultimate consequences, so that certain behavior is not wrong simply 
because it results in hurt, but rather it often results in harm because it is actually bad. 
A society which institutionalizes the rejection of an inherently right moral precept or 
principle, or embraces a wrong one, places itself at a grave risk to reap the destructive 
whirlwind of consequences which will invariably flow out of that decision. 8 
This analysis can be applied to PAS in a most socially relevant fashion. On rule-
utilitarian grounds alone, if it could be effectively argued that the legalization of PAS 
could and most probably would have devastating results, that alone should be a suffi-
cient reason to ban it. Alleged rights, such as suicide, have been denied to exist in the 
past when they were perceived to be inherently wrong and such restrictive legislation 
was deemed to serve the public interest. Certain rights are also denied to exist when 
their probable result would be the fundamental undermining of a culture . 
Government has the responsibility to impose legitimate limitations on personal free-
doms when necessary to safeguard the welfare of a society . 
Many attempts have been made to delineate the potential harmful effects of 
euthanasia and PAS. These are arguments which appeal to what is called a "slippery 
slope. " The idea behind such arguments is that once we have started down an incline, 
by legalizing PAS for instance , there is no putting a stop to the momentum of the 
result ant downward motion . Some would call such reasoning fallacious, as some 
appeals to slippe ry slope arguments against PAS undoubtedly are, some being mere 
"scare tactics." However , not all of them are , and the fact is that legitimate concerns 
exist over the kind of precedent the legalization of PAS would set. 
It is far from my intentio n to pro vide an exhaustive catalogue of all the possible 
negative conseque nces of legalizing PAS. A few that others have elaborated on include 
the possible decline in overall medical care, the corruption of medical practice , dam-
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age to patients' confidence in physicians, the prospect of PAS becoming the only feasi-
ble medi~al "treatment" for the poor, the making of killing increasingly acceptable 
and routme and the extension of PAS to include the chronically depressed or those 
who simply feel useless or like a burden (note the dehumanizing connotations in 
such labels as "useless" or "burden") . 
Such speculations and conjectures about worst-case scenarios after the legalization 
of PAS are often dismissed categorically by avid PAS supporters . However, it is they 
themselves who have chosen consequentialism as the most reliable route for finding 
the right public policy. If they are true to their principles , they should be as con-
cerned with the potentially damaging results of legalizing PAS as anyone. Their natur-
al rejoinder is that they endorse legalization only under clear restrictions and guide-
lines which would regulate the practice and minimize harmful effects or abuses. 
The logic of PAS itself defies such regulation, however. For if suicide is a right 
intrinsic to human nature, with what substantive justification can we discourage sui-
cide for any reason whatsoever? When human autonomy justifies PAS, as a growing 
portion of this society believes, then any competent person is accorded the "privi-
lege." The lesson will be conveyed through the legalization of PAS that suicide is the 
proper, or at least a legitimate, response to a life subjectively and individually deemed 
below an acceptable quality level. Suicide could well become the epidemic result of 
this implicit societal teaching, and it would not be long before the integrity of the 
whole culture could be seriously violated. Teenagers, among whom suicide is already 
rampant, would essentially be issued a societal sanction to opt for suicide rather than 
enduring their temporal troubles. The suicide rate today among the elderly has 
already surpassed that of teenagers, a tragedy that would be only exacerbated by PAS. 
Another portion of this culture's population considers mercy, not autonomy, to be 
the salient rationale for PAS, the more utilitarian oriented basis. But once we have for-
mally substituted the importance of the quality of life as we judge it for the impor-
tance and dignity of life itself, how can we impose a limit on the logical implications 
and practical ramifications of such a decision? On what nonarbitrary grounds can we 
continue to uphold even those screening criteria of Kevorkian's? How can we with-
hold death from those most in need of it just because they are no longer competent to 
assert their wishes? Once we lift up the immediate reduction of pain or, even better, 
its total elimination as the supreme virtue and sublimest goal of our public ethos, 
does PAS become not only the privilege but the mandate? Do we not confer upon 
ourselves an ever-increasing responsibility to resolve pain by bringing about death? 
Pain is not only part of dying, it is part of living. 
If PAS by nature is beyond regulation, now is the time for us to realize that. After 
medicide is characterized as a right, no reversal of course is realistic, no matter how 
painful the path we traverse. Any attempt to do so would simply produce an outcry of 
protest, just the way prohibition did or a repeal of abortion rights would today : Once 
legislatively affirmed and societally appropriated, rights become entrenched m our 
mindset and practically impossible to remove. . . 
Precedent the crucible of experience, shows the ease with which PAS leads to vol-
untary activ~ euthanasia and, eventually, to involuntary active euthanasia , including 
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the physically disabled, the mentally incompetent and those too expensive to treat. In 
Holland, where PAS has been officially tolerated, three percent of all deaths are now 
directly caused by doctors. That percentage would translate into over 60,000 deaths 
caused annually by doctors in this country. 9 What is more, Dutch physicians are now 
performing more than two times more involuntary euthanasia than voluntary, an 
unpalatable statistic for the empirically minded utilitarian to swallow. 10 A 1991 study 
found that in one year more than 1,000 Dutch patients incapable of giving consent 
died at the hands of their doctors, demonstrating that PAS resides at the threshold of 
euthanasia, another terrifying slippery slope. 11 
Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop writes 
I am convinced that in the 1930s the German medical sentiment favoring 
euthanasia (even before Hitler came to power) made it easier for the Nazi govern-
ment to move society along that slippery slope that led to the Holocaust. The 
German euthanasia movement started with defective babies, then reached out to 
eliminate the insane, then to those suffering from senile dementia, then to patients 
with advanced tuberculoses, to amputees deemed of no further service to the 
Reich, to Gypsies, to Poles, and finally to Jews. The Holocaust was upon us.12 
PAS essentially involves a contract between a patient and his doctor for a service to 
be rendered that will culminate in one party in the contract dying. Even though this 
may be a contract between only two people, it has become a public, communal agree-
ment, not merely a private decision expressive of individual autonomy. It is a form of 
social action, asserts Daniel Callahan, the director and co-founder of the Hastings 
Center and author, most recently, of The Troubled Dream of Life. It thus functions at the 
heart of this culture's social ethic, the glue which holds this diverse country and democ-
ratic experiment together. If PAS is legalized, it will dramatically alter the content of our 
public ethos, becoming part of the social framework of the citizens left behind. 
In my father's final weeks, the family pitched in to be with him around the clock, 
attending to his needs, changing his sheets, feeding him ice. Undoubtedly he was 
experiencing pain at times, sometimes severely, though usually only temporarily. My 
father was also forced to endure some humiliation, being utterly dependent on either 
family or nurses to help with uncontrolled bodily discharges, for instance. During 
that time, echoing through my mind was the rhetoric I had heard in favor of PAS, 
usually wrapped in rights language: "We have a right to die with dignity." Such lan-
guage seems to imply that pain or dependence on others robs us of dignity. In con-
trast , though , looking at my father, I did not feel that way. Yes, my dad experienced 
pain, so we tried desperately to find the right pain medication to help . And he was 
dependent on us, even to the point of being a burden on us . But the family would not 
have had it any other way. We genuinely felt and believed that mutual burden-sharing 
was part of what being a family was all about, and part of what being communal 
beings was about. Our respect for our father only increased through the difficult 
episode; at least in our minds he never lacked any dignity. On the contrary, his will-
ingness to lean on our strength and compassion demonstrated a profound depth of 
character and inner grace. 
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Did my father lack dignity in his own mind? It is difficult to say, since he was 
rather noncommunicative in his final weeks. This much is clear, though: suicide for 
him simply was not a living option. It was not a category he thought in terms of, nor 
was it part of his intellectual furniture. At least one reason for that was this society's 
social ethic, which has not yet formally projected suicide as a legitimate response to a 
life deemed below an acceptable quality level. I could not help but watch my dad and 
wonder how it might have been different had suicide already become part of the intel-
lectual framework and moral mentality of this society. When the pain was intense and 
his care increased, would he have considered himself obligated to request an earlier 
assisted death after seeing the strain that his dying put on the family? Would he have 
felt so burdensome that he felt obliged to hasten his own death? 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Being witness to such a heartwrenching, anguishing experience as my father's 
death, I am reminded that to speak of issues of death, dying, and human suffering is a 
task that requires tremendous sensitivity and compassion. This is no mere academic 
exercise alone, but something vitally at the heart of the human condition, rife with 
human emotion and practical import. Though I sometimes fail, I attempt to tread this 
ground gingerly, hoping that my comments may resonate with both the intellectually 
honest and the emotionally sensitive, even if my readers do not entirely concur with 
my tentative conclusions or sympathize with my concerns. 
This essay has attempted to carve out an important niche in the public debate for 
religiously motivated opponents of the practice of PAS, to call into question the wide-
ly assumed "right to die" of human beings and to make mention of some potential 
negative results of legalizing PAS. It has been my guiding premise that PAS and 
euthanasia are morally bankrupt and legally imprudent, and now I will offer a few 
additional reflections and provisional conclusions. 
Rights language introduces many questions. Does such individualistic language 
underestimate the scope of its communal implications? Has such language extin-
guished categories like responsibility and virtue? Is it adequate to handle morally 
ambiguous cases like PAS? Does it often beg important prior questions like the pre-
rogatives of human freedom and the essence of human nature? Does such language, 
as compelling as it may seem, merely skate on the surface of deeply philosophical, 
metaphysical, and moral issues? 
The legalization of PAS would ensure that a significant shift takes place in the pub-
lic attitude toward suicide. Logically, legally, and ethically, that would be the 
inevitable result. The ACLU, the organization fighting for PAS only with procedural 
safeguards in place, will be the same organization arguing tomorrow for the unconsti-
. tutionality of any safeguards they help institute today. If anyone doubts that, think for 
a moment how often the ACLU has helped the cause of any thoughtful regulation on 
abortion laws. Slippery slope arguments only constitute fallacies when the relation-
ship between alleged causes and dramatic results is not clearly enough established. 
'Concern over the consequences of legalizing PAS is well warranted, given the nature 
and content of such legislation. Regulatory guidelines would soon be seen as arbi-
64 Baggett 
trary, inviting covert evasion or blatant rejection , as the logic of PAS inexorably 
comes to fruition. As Christians we are being remiss when we do not express our 
strongest reservations about such an unwise and far-reaching law as PAS, which 
would be based on a relatively few truly "hard cases" that remind us that our best 
energies as a community are spent supporting the hospice movement, loving and sup-
porting suffering patients and working toward even better pain control. 
The laws of our democracy invariably reflect the moral convictions of the majority, 
whether the majority is right or wrong . If the echoes of public support for PAS rever-
berate into a mighty shout, the legislators are sure to hear and heed . PAS could very 
well become a salient feature of the social, economic, and political landscape of this 
society entering the twenty-first century: an expansive, decreasingly discriminatory, 
profit-driven enterprise offering suicide as one more "service" to be sought at a bar-
gain. What might enhance the likelihood of this happening is Kevorkian's promise 
not to eat as long as he is imprisoned for breaking the new law. In effect, he argues, 
the state will then be assisting his suicide, and in that scenario he may well become 
something of a martyr and catalyst for the cause . 
Meanwhile, the Christian Church should use its freedom to voice its concerns in a 
winsome and compelling manner, credibly and intelligently finding ways to influence 
the outcome of the public debate. Without claiming perfect discernment of God's will, 
we should willingly participate in discussing this dilemma , listening sensitively to 
those who disagree with us, becoming informed about the relevant issues to be 
addressed and questions to be asked and playing our own special part in the whole 
process. Lovers of God and humankind, committed to objective truth and normative 
morality, should not remain silent and uninvolved when they see their culture buy 
into the fleeting and misguided values of humanistic philosophy. 
As the Church stresses its views on PAS, Christians should also remain insightfully 
aware of the need for harmony and integrity within and among all of their own vari-
ous beliefs. Can Christians continue reconciling consistent opposition to PAS and 
euthanasia with inconsistent opposition to abortion or war? Can Christians justify 
opposing PAS if they support capital punishment? The earliest Christian communities 
were consistently "pro-life ." They were pacifists who were firmly opposed to capital 
punishment , abortion , and suicide of any kind. Philosopher James Rachels 's con-
tention sounds reasonable that Christianity 's eventual concession on issues like war 
and capital punishment, tempering its earlier radical stand, was but a politically expe-
dien t compromise , not something theologically and exegetically derived . Today 
Christians must be willing to think through their opposition to PAS, and to follow 
again their logic and convictions to their natural conclusions . I am convinced that the 
mos t logically and theologicall y consistent view for Christians opposed to the legal-
ization of PAS is to be additionally opposed to war, capital punishment and abortion, 
though I know thoug htfu l Christians who disagree with me. 
Assuming PAS is officially sanctioned here one day , then the Church will be faced 
with having to work on this issue more from the bottom up than from the top down, 
not unlike what has happened wit h abortion. What makes this appropriate is that 
being a Christian means not only that we believe rightl y as individuals , but that we 
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have been baptized into a community with a certain set of beliefs, practices, and 
morals, offering an alternative ethos to that of the world. It is relatively easy to stand 
against the legalization of abortion or euthanasia, and even to extol the virtues of the 
necessary sacrifices of bringing an unwanted pregnancy to term or of living until 
nature takes its course. But it is much more challenging, yet arguably closer to the 
heart of Christ, for the Church to reach out in love to the unwed mother or the suffer-
ing patient and provide for their needs to help them cope with their situations, so in 
desperation they do not resort to abortion or PAS. It is not the duty of the Church 
simply to engage in ethical debate and to battle laws against PAS, but to reach out to 
the suffering and needy, offering a cup of cold water and lending a sympathetic ear, to 
help convey a sense of meaning and impart a will to persevere to those who feel most 
like giving up. 13 
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THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION 
AFTER COMMUNISM: THE 
MIXED BLESSING OF 
WESTERN ASSISTANCE 
MARK ELLIOTT 
This paper was delivered at the Consultation on Theological Education and 
Leadership Development in Post-Communist Europe, Oradea, Romania, 5 October 
1994. 
In the summer of 1994 staff of St. Petersburg Christian University, which in fact 
is a seminary, sifted through literally tons of books donated from the West, ferret-
ing out the occasional title relevant for a theological library. On the one hand, the 
task required time consuming sorting through mountains of boxes for the relatively 
rare gems in the rough. On the other hand, the shipping had been donated , several 
thousand useful titles were being gleaned from the heap, and seminarians would 
make use of a fair portion of the rest that the school would pass over. And so it is 
with Western assistance to theological education in the East, writ large: a mixed 
blessing. The question is: how help should and should not be given, and how help 
should and should not be received. 
In February 1993 Overseas Council for Theological Education and Missions, 
Peter Deyneka Russian Ministries, and Wheaton College's Institute for East-West 
Christian Studies hosted a meeting of evangelical theological educators in Moscow. 
Insights drawn from that conference , plus seminary site visits and library research, 
served as the basis for a survey of the current state of Protestant theological educa-
tion in the former Soviet Union . Three findings of that investigation follow. 
Mark Elliott is Professor of History and Director of the Institute for East-West Christian Studies, 
Billy Graham Center, at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois. 
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1. Prior to glasnost formal Protestant theological education was practically 
nonexistent. However, under Gorbachev an explosion of pent-up energy and 
demand saw well over 40 residential programs established in three years ( 1990-
1992) . These schools have emerged "in a manner unique in the history of 
Reformation churches. Never before, and nowhere else, have Protestants launched 
as many formal theological training programs as rapidly as they have in Soviet suc-
cessor states."' 
2. The new seminaries and training centers possess unusually dedicated staff 
and extraordinarily eager students, but the vast majority of the schools lack suffi-
cient texts, adequate libraries, qualified faculty, and permanent facilities. 
3. At the present time programs, representing several thousand residential stu-
dents and several thousand additional extension and correspondence students, 
depend very heavily upon Western assistance. This third point serves as the focus 
of the present study . 
How Western help is managed-or mismanaged-will make a major difference in the 
ability-or inability-of new schools to strengthen the Church in the East and to assist 
the Church as it seeks to witness to an enormous number of nonbelievers in its midst. 
"We do not want ready-made Western Christianity to be dumped on us," a Russian 
theological educator reported in 1992. "We would love to have the tools, and then we 
will work it out for ourselves." 2 While such sentiments abound among post-Soviet bloc 
seminary administrators, paradoxically, Ralph Alexander of Biblical Education by 
Extension rightly characterizes the present fixation of these same leaders on Western 
accreditation as an "obsession." 3 
What does this readily observable striving for Western credentials portend and how 
might it foster rather than deter the manufacture of "ready-made Western Christianity" 
east of the old Iron Curtain? Russian church historian Walter Sawatsky has predicted that, 
particularly among evangelical Protestants, "the dominant literature in theology, and even 
the dominant theories for theological education will likely be drawn from North 
America," at the expense of training that is "contextually Slavic."4 While the new Russian 
Protestant Euro-Asiatic Accreditation Association hosted a conference in October 1994 on 
the history of "The Protestant Movement in Russia" without Western participation, it 
appears, at the same time, that this body is likely to adopt wholesale Western criteria for 
the evaluation and credentialing of evangelical seminaries in the former Soviet Union.5 
Western standards may be desirable in terms of required instructional facilities, facul-
ty with earned doctorates, libraries of sufficient size and quality, and a broad curriculum. 
But for the foreseeable future such criteria are prohibitively expensive, beyond the reach 
of the vast majority of institutions in former Soviet bloc countries. Even worse, uncritical 
acceptance of Western standards, what Regent College professor Paul Stevens calls "slav· 
ish replication of Western curriculum and educational philosophy," would unquestion· 
ably doom theological education in former East bloc countries to abject economic depen-
dence upon the West , and with it, de facto foreign control. " 
Theological Education After Communism 69 
Furthermore, to the extent that Western credentialing favors academic accomplish-
ment over pastoral training and ministry, it may actually undermine, rather than facili-
tate, Christian leadership training after communism. How so? If Western accreditation 
standards prevail, it quickly becomes apparent that at present the "right" credentials can 
only be had in the West, hence the scramble for study abroad, Western degrees, and 
what might be termed "bright flight." 
Manfred Kohl's survey of theological educators in the East documented "overwhelm-
ing support for training in-country . "7 But the decline in Soviet-style central church 
authority and the lure of the West already is spelling more and more post-Soviet seminar-
ians opting for golden opportunities abroad. Borrowing from an American folk-song, 
"Will they ever return" or will they "ride forever 'neath the streets of Boston"? Past per-
formance suggests another brain drain could be in the making. Seventy-five percent of 
Colombian theological students who have studied abroad never have gone home, the 
same for 85 percent of seminarians from the Caribbean and 90 percent of seminarians 
from India. 8 Is there any reason to believe it will be otherwise with former East bloc semi-
narians? 
Wilson Chow, president of Hong Kong's China Graduate School of Theology, just 
returned from the former Yugoslavia, already reports a "brain-drain of the theologically 
trained because of internal ethnic conflicts, the unstable political situation, [and] the 
attraction from seminaries in the West. "9 The present priority of North America 's 
Association of Theological Schools upon globalization provides a perfect example of a 
Western academic standard being unhealthy and counterproductive for theological edu-
cation elsewhere .10 In the name of diversity and globalization too many Western seminar-
ies currently are luring to their campuses rare, theologically trained seminary educators 
from abroad, often draining the lifeblood of struggling institutions . How ironic that 
Western seminaries could be so insensitive to the damage they may inflict upon schools 
outside the North Atlantic community-all in the name of a better understanding of the 
rest of the world! 
Even if every theological student in the West did return home, unhealthy side effects 
still might cause the church in the East to question the advisability of study abroad. As 
Ralph Alexander points out, when seminarians study in another country, "training is 
removed from the normal ministry context. "11 In addition, seminarians' introduction to 
Western living standards and Western cultural values makes going home a difficult adjust-
ment. The negative influences of narcissistic materialism and individualism are self evi-
dent. But even defensible Western mores, such as the high premium placed on efficiency, 
productivity, and punctuality, pose problems for graduates attempting to re-enter societies 
that frequently value the building of relationships more highly than the completion of 
tasks by a set date. Also, modern higher criticism of the Scriptures, a staple of Western 
theological education--even in evangelical institutions reacting to it-will not be a wel-
come import in the eyes of a great many church leaders east of the old Iron Curtain . 12 
The intense yearning of theological educators in the East for academic respectability 
actually could undermine effective leadership development. As Yugoslav theologian Peter 
Kuzmic argues, "We cannot uncritically copy Western models where truth is separated 
from practice and where the world of academia is separated from the world of ecclesia. 
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Instead of being accountable to the church, religious truth becomes a selfish, elitist, acad-
emic exercise." 13 In the same vein, theology professor Paul Stevens warns that "pride in 
degrees and publishing records" can lead to "the loss of humility as a Christian goal."14 
Both a respect for learning and a fear of learning-lest it replace a fear of the Lord-
should stand side by side to prevent the one from breeding unbridled pride or the other 
from breeding mindless anti-intellectualism. 
In the West programs exist which focus on the imparting of knowledge, or the forma-
tion of character, or practical and experiential preparation for ministry, or some combi-
nation of the three . Already in the East some of the same tendencies find expression. For 
example, the Evangelical Baptist Theological Seminary in Odessa appears to have the 
greatest emphasis upon academic scholarship of any Protestant institution in the former 
Soviet Union, while Donetsk Bible College stresses missions, ministry skills, and "experi-
ence-based learning with existing new churches." 15 At a February 1992 meeting on lead-
ership training in Vienna, Austria, Greg Reader oflnternational Teams stressed that "the-
ological education should be accountable to the context it serves."16 It would appear that 
an effective application of this principle may be observed at Donetsk: students maintain 
close, ongoing ties with local churches. 
It can be argued that the lengthier and the more extensive theological education 
becomes, the greater the danger that it will increase the distance between pulpit and pew. 
Theological educators in the East should note that this "clergy-lay problem" requires 
conscious, ongoing, creative attention, and that the West is hardly the place to look for 
its solution. 17 (Ironically, the Kremlin's longstanding prohibition against Protestant theo-
logical education led to an ad hoc apprenticeship system of pastoral training, the unin-
tended positive effect of which was to minimize the distance between clergy and laity.) 
A final reason indiscriminate emulation of Western theological education would be 
unwise is that the West itself is increasingly unsure of the validity of its own approach, 
which one detractor has described as the "trained incapacity to deal with the real prob-
lems of actual living persons in their daily lives." Oddly enough, the world seems to 
crave this "desert experience ... at the very moment when leaders in Western theological 
education are having serious misgivings about their enterprise." 18 
A seminary student studying in North America once asked, "How is it that the only 
form of theological education that has been given to us in Africa comes from the part of 
the world where the church is in decline?" An equally pointed rejoinder could have been, 
"How is it that, knowing the church in the West is in decline, African denominations are 
so hungry to get this sort of ministerial training that the West offers?" 19 
From a distance few can detect the disarray to be found in many Western churches 
and seminaries, especially through the rich camouflage of institutional endowments, 
bricks and mortar, and the flood of Christian books , videos, conferences, and the like. 
On the other hand, the global commitment and material prosperity of many Western 
evangelical churches, missions, and seminaries has translated into an extraordinary, per-
haps unprecedented outpouring of assistance for fledgling seminaries and Bible institutes 
all across East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. In most institutions Western 
assistance is welcome. The question is what kind of assistance is beneficial and who 
should make that decision . 
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If the case has been made that the Western connection to Christian leadership develop-
ment in the East is a mixed blessing, what recommendations might contribute to more 
enlightened Western assistance? 
1. Theological educators in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union should be 
encouraged to develop culture-specific criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of leadership 
training programs. They should be creative and judicious in adapting, rather than submit-
ting to the wholesale adoption of, Western accrediting standards. They should weigh care-
fully the costs of accepting secular governments as the accrediting agents for theological 
schools. And they should look worldwide for innovative approaches to the evaluation of 
programs and graduates, such as those Jack Graves of Overseas Council for Theological 
Education has identified in Brazil and Indonesia. 
2. They should have close institutional, faculty, and student interaction with the local 
church. 2° Churches do not exist in order to support seminaries. But seminaries should 
exist in order to support churches. 
3. They should stress the importance of theological training in-country, for all the pre-
viously discussed cultural, theological, and economic reasons. To that end seminaries in 
former Soviet bloc states should: 
a. encourage study abroad only for especially talented, mature, and dedicated pas-
tors targeted for teaching positions; 
b. shorten the length of Western instruction, utilize extension programs and com-
petency tests and encourage completion of M.A. programs, rather than longer 
M.Div. or doctoral programs; 
c. encourage Western and indigenous churches, missions, and seminaries to work 
together in a few in-country advanced degree programs; 
d. encourage Western partners to invest more resources in Western faculty teach-
ing in the East, especially those with relevant language skills, and less in video 
talking heads and student scholarships for study in the West;21 
e. also, before opting for West European or North American theological educa-
tion, students from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union should 
consider alternatives in non-Western nations that would entail much less cul-
ture shock and theological dissonance, at a fraction of the cost. For example, 
the South Asia Institute of Advanced Christian Studies, Bangalore, India, would 
welcome students from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in its 
fully accredited programs for pastoral training or advanced degrees for future 
theological educators .22 
4. Regarding curricula, Western theological educators would do well to encourage the 
introduction in former Soviet bloc evangelical institutions of: 
a. courses on Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism which delineate common 
ground and insurmountable differences;23 and 
b. courses on biblical principles of conflict management. Unseemly strife abounds 
and demands serious attention within and between congregations, within and 
between denominations, within and between Christian confessions, and between 
Christians and persons of other faiths and no faith. Western Christian arbitration 
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and conflict resolution services could be consulted for advice in developing 
instruction in this vital area. H 
5. Above all, Evangelical Christians, East and West, must foster and practice greater 
cooperation, especially in so expensive and labor intensive an endeavor as theological 
education. 25 
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JOHN WESLEY'S MINISTRY 
TO THE POOR 
KENNETH J. COLLINS 
The evidence pertaining to John Wesley 's ministry to the poor in eighteenth-
century Britain and Ireland is considerable. Indeed, reforming activities, of one 
form or other, were a part of the life of Methodism during its early days at 
Oxford, as well as the preoccupation of the seasoned Wesley .1 Field preaching in 
the midst of coalminers , providing employment for the indigent, establishing 
lending stocks for the poor, and creating charity schools for the ignorant were a 
few of the many works of mercy undertaken by Wesley and the Methodists. 
In the face of such evidence, the preliminary task of the historian must be to 
develop an appropriate hermeneutical framework which is best able to make sense 
not only of this rich diversity of activity, but which is also able to demonstrate the 
overarching motivation and purpose behind it. In a real sense, to address the theme 
of "Good News to the Poor " exclusively or almost exclusively along economic lines, 
as is often done today, is to make a judgment about the nature of Wesley's ministry 
to the poor which may belie not only its scope, but also its eighteenth-century con-
text. 2 Two problems typically emerge from this approach : First, a predominantly 
economic reading of the "good news" to the poor often leaves the larger soteriologi-
cal and valuational context of Wesley's ministry underdeveloped . In this setting 
such teleological questions as "Why did Wesley do what he did? " and "To what 
end did he do it?" are shunted aside in favor of the descriptive question "What did 
Wesley do?" Such an approach, then, often issues in a "flat" or "horizontal " reading 
of Wesley's reforming activity since it brackets out, to a significant degree, the 
depths of his specifically spiritual motivation . 
Kenneth]. Collins is the Samuel]. and Norma C. Womack Professor of Philosophy and Religion at 
the Methodist College in Fayetteville, N.C. 
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Second, an overly economic reading, informed by contemporary political judg-
ments, runs the risk of defining good and evil principally along economic or class 
lines where the sins of the oppressor, but not those of the oppressed, are clearly rec-
ognized.3 Here the non-poor are not really a part of the environment where the 
redemptive activity of God takes place, though their continued presence is undoubt-
edly required if only to give added value, by way of contrast, to the poor. Indeed, the 
value-laden language of "preferential options" and the like, which have become a part 
of the rhetoric of liberation theology today, reveal the proper inclusions as well as 
exclusions-though in a way perhaps foreign to Wesley's own ethic. 
In light of these two considerations, this present work will demonstrate that the 
soteriological orientation of Wesley's ministry to the poor is able to unite his multifar-
ious reforms in terms of motivation, valuation, and purpose. To be sure, soteriology 
as a hermeneutical framework will not only be able to embrace the themes of eco-
nomic justice-as in other approaches-but it will develop and evaluate such themes 
as part of a larger, more inclusive, whole. 4 Here all people, poor and non-poor, will be 
a part of the soteriological environment, though each group will undoubtedly play a 
different role. More importantly, here the love and worship of God, hardly a concern 
of modern economic theory, will be factored into the equation. 
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO MINISTRY: RICHES, IDOLATRY, AND LOVE OF THE WORLD 
One of the difficulties of a work like E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English 
Working Class is its failure to realize sufficiently that not only were Wesley's econom-
ic categories, for the most part, medieval,5 but that they were also, more importantly, 
soteriologically and ecclesiastically construed. For example, Wesley's definition of 
riches as "anything more than will procure the conveniences of life," 6 as found in his 
sermon, "The Wisdom of God's Counsels" or his claim of ten repeated in his sermons 
that "one [who] has food and raiment sufficient for himself and his family, and some-
thing over, is rich," 7 are judgments hardly reflected in any reputable economic theory, 
past or present. It is therefore all the more disturbing when contemporary Methodist 
interpreters of Wesley's economics ignore the ecclesiastical context of this definition 
and thereby render the transitions from church to state and from the eighteenth cen-
tury to the twentieth that much easier, but also that much more dubious. 
One of the clues, however, to Wesley's assessment of riches is found in his depar-
ture from the much-touted equation rich equals evil, an equation which has numerous 
modern variations. For although the Methodist leader's criticism of the rich was exten-
sive, it was by no means total. To be sure, the preceding equation is undermined and 
its continuity broken in several places in Wesley's writings . For example, in his journal 
of 17 November 1759, Wesley notes, "It is well a few of the rich and noble are called." 
And he adds undoubtedly with hope and expectation, "Oh that God would increase 
their number! "8 Second, in his piece, "The General Spread of the Gospel," produced in 
1783, the Methodist evangelist exclaims: "Before the end even the rich shall enter into 
the kingdom of God. "9 Moreover, just a few years before his death, Wesley opined that 
"it is no more sinful to be rich than to be poor." But he immediately added, clarifying 
his meaning: "But it is dangerous beyond expression." 10 
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What the preceding material from Wesley's writings suggests, then, is that the rich 
are neither evil by definition, nor do they constitute evil's irreducible core. In other 
words, the dividing line between good and evil does not by necessity run along eco-
nomic lines, although it often does. Interestingly, Wesley held both of these ideas 
together, and in tension, and thereby preserved the basis for an even more radical 
assessment of human evil, one which moved beneath the realm of economics in order 
to probe the very depths of human desire and will, a substratum which, for Wesley at 
least, lay behind sinful social structures. 
In substantiation of the foregoing claim, it should be noted that Wesley under-
scored the danger of riches, interestingly enough, not only by an appeal to economic 
considerations, but also by an appeal to the rhetoric of the heart. He did this in two 
key ways: First, riches were deemed exceedingly dangerous in that they strike at the 
very root of the personality and often displace the love of God with the love of the 
world. Indeed, riches as a temptation to idolatry, as a detraction from the glory of 
God, is a recurring theme in the sermon corpus. 
Beyond this, Wesley stressed the danger of riches by means of a distinctive 
"Platonic" vocabulary-a vocabulary which reveals some of the more important value 
judgments made by this eighteenth-century leader. To illustrate, in this particular 
idiom believers are cautioned against setting their affections on "transient 
objects ... things that fly as a shadow, that pass away like as a dream." 11 Wesley elabo-
rates in his sermon "Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith," produced in 1788: 
I ask in the name of God by what standard do you judge of the value of things? By 
the visible or the invisible world? Bring the matter to an issue in a single instance: 
which do you judge best, that your son should be a pious cobbler or a profane lord. 12 
In fact, the members of the Methodist societies were enjoined repeatedly to lay up 
their treasures not on the earth but in heaven; to set their hearts not on penultimate 
things, but on that which is ultimate. "He who is a child of God can truly say," 
Wesley exclaims: "All my riches are above! All my treasure is thy love." 13 The first 
danger of riches, then, is that it strikes at the very heart of true religion: it magnifies 
the visible and discounts the invisible; it displaces, in other words, the love of God, 
and all holy affections, with the love of the world. 14 
Second, the danger of riches consists in their being a great hindrance to the love of 
neighbor. In other words, with the love of God despoiled, with the affections of the 
heart now turned towards temporal things and self will, it is impossible to love the 
neighbor as one ought. "A rich man may indeed love them that are of his own party, 
or his own opinion," Wesley observes, "but he cannot have pure, disinterested good-
will to every child of man. This can only spring from the love of God, which his great 
possessions expelled from his soul. "15 Again, riches intensify self-absorption and 
therefore beget and nourish "every temper that is contrary ... to the love of neighbor," 10 
such tempers as contempt, resentment, revenge, anger, fretfulness, and peevishness. 11 
In considering the case of Methodism in particular, as a reflection of the universal 
Church, Wesley revealed the corrosive effect of riches in three movements. First, any 
revival of religion, like the evangelical revival of the eighteenth century, "must neces-
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sarily produce both industry and frugality. "18 That is, disciplined Christians will not 
only work assiduously, taking care to use wisely their talents and graces, but they will 
also cut off all needless expense. Second, these very characteristics, the fruit of vital 
religion, "cannot but produce riches. "19 Third, as riches increase, "so will pride, anger, 
and love of the world in all its branches," the very things which will vitiate the love of 
God and neighbor and thereby destroy vital religion. The movement has now come 
full circle. 
II. STEWARDSHIP AND THE PROMISE OF MINISTRY: 
THE LOVE OF GOD AND NEIGHBOR 
One solution to the problem of undermining vital Christianity through riches is to 
maintain, as Theodore Jennings does, that the economic counsel of John Wesley as 
expressed in his well-known sermon, "The Use of Money" is seriously flawed and, 
therefore, must be rejected-at least in part. 
To illustrate, Jennings, no doubt influenced by Marxist economic analysis , is 
apparently unwilling to grant Wesley the first two movements of his economic triad: 
namely, the advice to "gain all you can," and "save all you can. "20 Accordingly, for the 
phrase "gain all you can" Jennings substitutes something like "gain all you need." In 
other words, people should be allowed to earn no more than what they require for 
their basic human needs, regardless of the amount or difficulty of the work done. But 
observe that in his "Use of Money," Wesley does not restrict the gaining of money in 
terms of human need; instead, he maintains that a person's needs determine how 
much should be given to the poor. That is, to inhibit the gaining of money in a pre-
emptive fashion may , in turn, restrict the amount of money available for ministry to 
the poor. In fact, what constraints Wesley does, after all, place on the rightful earning 
of money are in terms of such things as the health of laborers (they must neither hurt 
their bodies nor minds), and the well being of their neighbors (they must not hurt 
their neighbors in their bodies or their souls). Beyond this, Jennings is equally critical 
of Wesley 's second counsel to "save all you can," since Wesley substantiates its value 
not by a specific appeal to the needs of the poor, but by an appeal to avoiding the 
"self-indulgence that leads to sin. "21 
The problem with Jennings ' analysis, and others like it, is its failure to appreciate a 
truth readily acknowledged by Wesley, namely, that vital religion necessarily produces 
both industry (gain all you can) and thrift (save all you can), a point alluded to earli-
er. "For wherever true Christianity spreads," Wesley affirms, "it must cause diligence 
and frugality .... "22 In a similar fashion, Wesley admonishes the Methodists in his "Use 
of Money ": "No more sloth! Whatsoever your hand findeth to do, do it with your 
might. " And again: "No more waste! Cut off every expense which fashion, caprice , or 
flesh and blood demand ."23 Therefore, the prohibition or stifling of industry, the frus-
tration or elimination of thrift by well-meaning social policy or by law may have, in 
the end , some unintended but nonetheless serious ramifications. 
Fortunately , the solution which Wesley himself offered to the continuing problem 
of undermining Christianity through wealth was to add to the first two counsels a 
third , namely , "Give all you can." H Although this normative statement, this guide to 
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behavior, is well known in Methodist circles, what has not been fully appreciated is 
the complex motivation which lay behind it. For example, in exhorting his own 
Methodist societies, Wesley actually made three distinct kinds of appeal by means of 
this prescription . First, and perhaps most important of all, he noted that believers 
should give all they can because it is the Lord who is the Creator and rightful 
Governor of the world. In other words, for Wesley, God is the true owner of all 
things; believers, therefore, are merely stewards of this bounty . 
Second, for Wesley, the love of God through the discipline of stewardship must 
issue in the love of neighbor. Put another way, God has placed in the hands of those 
who have the necessities of life and something left over-Wesley's definition of rich-
the wherewithal to minister to the poor. Therefore, the "rich" are to be the conduits, 
the channels, of the blessings of the Most High. "Let thy plenty supply thy neigh-
bours' wants," Wesley urges in his sermon "On Worldly Folly." 25 Therefore, to stifle 
this gracious movement from God to humanity through needless self-indulgence is 
nothing less than robbing the poor. "Everything about thee which cost more than 
Christian duty required thee to lay out is the blood of the poor!" 26 
Third, Wesley acknowledged one last motivating factor, and it consisted, interest-
ingly enough, in improving the spiritual life of those who ministered to the needy . 
Thus, in the larger economic and soteriological environment of ministry to the poor , 
there are three not two principal agents for Wesley: God and the poor, of course, but 
also those who served the poor. Indeed, Wesley's economic ethic is remarkably dis-
tinctive in that it expresses pastoral concern for the latter as well . 
III. JOHN WESLEY'S VARIEGATED MINISTRY TO THE POOR 
Though seldom noticed , Wesley in his writings, especially in his sermon corpus , 
employs the term "the poor" in two key ways . First of all, commenting on Matthew 
5:1-4, he specifically rejects a mere economic reading of the term "the poor " as 
found in "Happy are the poor in spirit for theirs is the kingdom of heaven ."27 Indeed, 
by means of this judgment, Wesley sought to reaffirm, once again and in a critical 
way, the radical nature of human evil which cannot be utterly identified with the 
particular sin of greed or with the acquisition of wealth. In fact , in his sermon "Upon 
Our Lord 's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the First, " produced in 1748, the 
Methodist leader not only denies that the love of money is the root of all evil , but he 
also indicates something of the Lord 's design in offering the Sermon on the Mount. 
Wesley writes : 
This sense [an economic reading] of the expression 'poor in spirit ' will by no 
means suit our Lord 's pr esent design , which is to lay a general foundation 
wh ereon the whole fabric of Christianity may be built ; a design which would be 
in no wise answer ed by guarding against one particular vice ; so that even if this 
wer e suppos ed to be one part of his meaning , it could not possibl y be the 
whol e.28 
Th e poor in spirit, then, the blessed of the Lord , are all tho se of what ever out ward 
circumstanc es who "have that disposition of heart which is the first step to all real 
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substantial happiness . "29 Poverty of spirit, in other words, entails lowliness in heart, 
and it begins "where a sense of guilt and of the wrath of God ends; and is a continual 
sense of our total dependence on him for every good thought or word or work. "30 In 
short, not outward circumstances but inward dispositions define this first definition 
of the poor, and, more importantly , these same dispositions constitute the general 
foundation of all true religion. But Wesley, quite obviously, also employed this term, 
secondly, in a largely economic way. To illustrate, in his sermon, "Dives and 
Lazarus," produced in 1788, Wesley exclaims: 
Hear this, all ye that are poor in this world. Ye that many times have not food to 
eat or raiment to put on; ye that have not a place where to lay your head, unless 
it be a cold garret, or a foul and damp cellar! Ye are now reduced to "solicit the 
cold hand of charity." Yet lift up your load; it shall not always be thus. 31 
Ever energetic in ministry, Wesley sought out those who lacked the necessities of 
life: he visited them in their homes and preached to them in the fields. As a result, he 
knew by firsthand experience how "devilishly false is that common objection, 'They 
are poor, only because they are idle."' 32 Furthermore, Wesley's lifelong association 
with the destitute resulted in his love, respect, and appreciation for these children of 
God. In 1757, for instance, in a letter to Dorothy Furly, he exclaimed: "In most reli-
gious people there is so strange a mixture that I have seldom much confidence in 
them. I love the poor; in many of them I find pure, genuine grace, unmixed with 
paint, folly, and affection." 33 And a few years later, in 1765, Wesley once again 
demonstrated his affection for the impoverished and wrote in his journal: "I preached 
at Bath, but I had only the poor to hear, there being service at the same time in Lady 
H[untingdon]'s chapel. So I was just in my element." 34 
A. The Temporal Needs of the Poor 
So concerned was Wesley with the plight of the poor that he sought to improve 
their temporal condition through numerous ministries. Thus, in November 1740, for 
instance, Wesley undertook a humble experiment which involved about a dozen 
unemployed people, drawn from the Methodist societies, in the carding and spinning 
of cotton . 35 The next year , in 17 41, greatly offended by the poverty within the United 
Society itself, Wesley developed a systematic program to feed the hungry, clothe the 
naked, employ the poor, and visit the sick. 36 In fact, according to Ward and 
Heitzenrater, for over forty years "all the class-money in London, amounting to sever-
al hundred pounds a year, was distributed to the poor by the stewards." 37 Moreover, 
these attempts to ameliorate the temporal condition of the needy, some more success-
ful than others, were augmented in 17 46 by the opening of a free dispensary to pro-
vide medical services 38 and by the institution of a lending-stock to offer cash to the 
impoverished. And though at its inception the stock did not amount to more than 
fifty pounds, it eventually served more than two hundred and fifty people .39 
In light of the preceding material, it should be evident by now that a significant 
portion of Wesley's benevolent activity actually took place not indiscriminately but 
within the context of the Methodist societies themselves. In other words, lending 
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stocks, dispensaries, collections and the like most often serviced those poor who were 
already participating in some way in the institutional life of Methodism. 40 More to the 
point, Wesley's sermons demonstrate a hierarchical order in meeting the temporal 
needs of the poor which clearly privileges those in the church over those beyond its 
walls . Thus, in assessing the proper distribution of goods beyond the real needs of 
one's family Wesley counsels: "If when this is done there be an overplus left, then 'do 
good to them that are of the household of faith.' If there be an overplus still, 'as you 
have opportunity, do good unto all men.' "41 Not surprisingly, then, there are relative-
ly few instances in either Wesley's Journal or his letters which chronicle acts of chari-
ty which are not somehow purposely related to a larger ecclesiastical and soteriologi-
cal context. 
Furthermore, Wesley's ever-present soteriological orientation is revealed not only 
in his concern over the temporal needs of the poor, but it is also demonstrated, once 
again, in his emphasis on the spiritual state of those who minister and in his critical 
assessment of their ministerial labors. To illustrate, in his homily, "Upon Our Lord's 
Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth," Wesley maintains that though 
believers may do good to their neighbors by dealing bread to the hungry and by cov-
ering the naked, they still may have "no part in the glory which shall be revealed. "42 
And he displays the reasoning behind this judgment in the following excerpt from 
this same sermon: "For how far short is all this of that righteousness and true holiness 
which he has described therein! How widely distant from that inward kingdom of 
heaven, which is now opened in the believing soul! "43 
Viewed from yet another perspective, Wesley affirms that before the love of God 
and neighbor is established in the heart through faith in Jesus Christ all works of 
piety and mercy are not good, technically speaking. And though the Methodist leader 
was obviously unwilling to call works of charity done apart from justifying faith good , 
strictly speaking, he was equally unwilling to call them "splendid sins" as some of his 
Calvinist friends were willing to do. 44 And, in a real sense, his doctrine of prevenient 
grace explains such reluctance . But perhaps the clearest expression of the indissoluble 
relationship between works of mercy and holy tempers is found in Wesley's sermon 
"On Charity" which was written in 1784. In this piece, for example, Wesley states: 
"That all those who are zealous of good works would put them in their proper place! 
Would not imagine they can supply the want of holy tempers, but take care that they 
may spring from them . "45 
So then Wesley endeavored to root his ministry to the poor not only in terms of a 
"horizontal axis," corresponding to the scope of the various temporal needs of the less 
fortunate , but also in terms of a "vertical axis" which plumbed the depths of motiva-
tion and purpose and thereby recognized the value of holy affections for those who 
ministered. Simply put, dispensing wealth improved the spiritual state of the giver as 
well as the temporal condition of the receiver. Hoarding wealth , on the other hand, 
spoiled the spiritual state of the rich and left the temporal needs of the poor neglect-
ed. In fact, in his Notes on the New Testament Wesley reveals a symbiotic relationship 
between the indigent and those who minister to them which operates under the larger 
providence of God. Commenting on the continuing existence of the poor in Matthew 
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26:11 "Ye have the poor always with you," Wesley exclaims, though perhaps some-
what insensitively: "Such is the wise and gracious providence of God, that we may 
have always opportunities of relieving their wants, and so laying up for ourselves trea-
sures in heaven. "46 
B. The Spiritual Needs of the Poor 
Though the descendants of the social gospel movement as well as some of the 
modern progenitors of liberation theology have, at times, looked askance at the lan-
guage of "saving souls" as an instance of theological obscurantism, such language 
reverberates in the writings of John Wesley. At an early Methodist conference, for 
instance, Wesley asked those assembled to consider what is the office of a Christian 
minister? To which he and others replied: "To watch over souls, as he that must give 
an account. "47 And when he detailed the responsibilities of a "Helper" shortly there-
after Wesley exclaimed, revealing much of his mission and purpose: "You have noth-
ing to do but to save souls. Therefore spend and be spent in this work. "48 
To be sure, this particular emphasis of the redemption of souls, far from being an 
unusual or occasional one, continued throughout Wesley's life. Thus, in 1763, as he 
considered the purpose or end towards which the church should be directed, he 
wrote the following in his sermon "The Reformation of Manners": 
This is the original design of the church of Christ. It is a body of men compact-
ed together in order, first, to save each his own soul, then to assist each other in 
working out their salvation, and afterwards, as far as in them lies, to save all 
men from present and future misery, to overturn the kingdom of Satan, and set 
up the kingdom of Christ. 49 
Moreover , when John wrote to his brother Charles in 1772, ostensibly to consider 
an aspect of the doctrine of Christian perfection, he reminded him, among other 
things, that his business as well as his own was "to save souls." 50 
In view of this emphasis, part of the good news to the poor according to Wesley 
consists not only in the transformation of the Christian community such that, with 
the holy tempers of love in place, the body of Christ is now impelled to share sacrifi-
cially to meet the temporal needs of the poor, but it also consists in the glorious 
proclamation to the poor of the redemption of the inward person, that all people of 
whatever rank and station in life can be renewed in spirit, that the deepest recesses of 
the heart can be made anew. Indeed, in his sermon, "Salvation by Faith," preached at 
St. Mary's Oxford in 1738, Wesley points out that "whosoever believeth on him shall 
be saved ,"51 and, more importantly for the task at hand, he affirms in this same ser-
mon that the poor themselves have a "peculiar right to have [this] gospel preached to 
them ."52 
This right to the gospel by the poor, however, is also matched by a need for the 
gospel in terms of both its temporal and spiritual aspects. In other words, just as 
Wesley was reluctant to draw an exact equation between the economic condition of 
the rich and their soteriological status , so too was he reluctant to draw a similar equa-
tion in terms of the poor. That is, though the poor are often characterized by the 
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graces of humility and patience, Wesley was well aware of the sins often peculiar to 
this estate . To illustrate, in an early manuscript sermon, Wesley asks the question , "O 
faith working by love, whither art thou fled"? To which he curtly replies : "among the 
wealthy? No. The 'deceitfulness of riches ' there 'chokes the word .. .' Among the poor? 
No. 'The cares of the world ' are there, 'so that it bringeth forth no fruit to perfec-
tion .' "53 And much later , in 1784, the seasoned Wesley continued this theme and 
observed how "the poor were overwhelmed with worldly care , so that the seed they 
had received became unfruitful. "54 Beyond this, in his sermon "Spiritual Idolatry ," 
Wesley affirms that idolatry in the form of "the desire of the flesh " plagues not only 
the rich, but the poor as well . "In this also 'the toe of the peasant...treads upon the 
heel of the courtier .' Thousands in low as well as in high life sacrifice to this idol. "55 
This leveling of all men and women as sinners, poor and non-poor , this universal 
flavor of sin, actually resulted in the enhanced status of the poor within the Methodist 
societies where rank and privilege, so valued by the world, counted for nothing . In 
fact , to know oneself as a sinner, to desire "to flee the wrath which is to come " was 
the only requirement for membership in a Methodist society-a characteristic of 
Methodist life, by the way, often resented by the rich .56 
C. Wesley's Valuation of Different Kinds of Ministry 
One way of understanding the relation between holiness of heart and life and the 
works of mercy which flow from it, especially as such works relate to ministry to the 
poor , is found, once again, in the work of Theodore Jennings. Thus , for example , this 
contemporary scholar sets up a means/end relationship and maintains that the love of 
God reigning in the heart is a suitable means to works of charity and apparently to 
the-yet-higher end of reform of the political order. "Wesley emphasizes inward trans -
formation, " Jennings maintains , "because he is so earnestly interested in outward 
behavior. "57 Elsewhere in his writings, Jennings specifically links holiness to political 
goals, that is, to the elimination of private property and to the establishment of com-
munism . "Wesley supposes that the Methodist movement will produce not only a 
spread of the gospel throughout the earth," he writes, "but also , and therefore, bring 
in the communist society ."58 And though these political goals themselves are ques -
tionable, especially in light of recent events in Eastern Europe, the valuational struc-
ture into which they are placed is even more dubious. Is the satisfaction of the tempo-
ral needs of the poor, though important , the very highest goal , the telos , at which 
Wesley aimed? Was political transformation really the end, the major purpose of the 
eighteenth-century revival? Or is this modern reading of Wesley , in its attempt to be 
relevant , actually reductionistic in that it entails the substitution of the penultimate 
for what is truly ultimate? 
Yet another way of reading Wesley , of construing the relationship between the love 
of God reigning in the heart and all manner of good works (individual , political , social) 
is to contend that the one endlessly leads to the other in a cyclical fashion. In other 
words, in this interpretation , the love of God and neighbor issues in works of mercy 
which in turn enhance the love of God and neighbor .59 Here each element is a means to 
the other and the question of valuation , of an ultimate telos , is thereb y avoided. 
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Though this second reading of Wesley is much more plausible than the first, it too 
must be judged as inadequate simply because it cannot incorporate the kinds of value 
judgments which Wesley did, after all, make in this area . For example, in his sermon, 
"On Visiting the Sick," produced in 1786, Wesley advises his visitors in the following 
fashion: 
But it may not be amiss usually to begin with inquiring into their outward con-
dition. You may ask whether they have the necessaries of life. Whether they 
have sufficient food and raiment. If the weather be cold, whether they have 
fuel.60 
But after this, Wesley asserts, the visitor is to proceed to things of greater value. 
"These little labours of love," he writes, "will pave your way to things of greater 
importance. Having shown that you [have] a regard for their bodies, you may proceed 
to inquire concerning their souls." 61 Furthermore, Wesley repeats this judgment, no 
doubt for emphasis, but this time he clearly displays what is the telos of all ministry: 
"While you are eyes to the blind and feet to the lame, a husband to the widow and a 
father to the fatherless , see that you still keep a higher end in view, even the saving of 
souls from death, and that you labour to make all you say and do subservient to that 
great end. "62 
Though these value judgments have seldom surfaced in the secondary literature, 
they are by no means idiosyncratic but represent Wesley's own thinking throughout 
his career. For example, much earlier, in 1748, Wesley had written concerning those 
engaged in ministry that "He doth good, to the uttermost of his power, even to the 
bodies of men .... How much more does he rejoice if he can do any good to the soul of 
any man!" 63 And two years later Wesley continued this theme in his sermon "Upon 
Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth" and wrote: 
Over and above all this, are you zealous of good works? Do you, as you have 
time, do good to all men? Do you feed the hungry and clothe the naked, and 
visit the fatherless and widow in their affliction? Do you visit those that are 
sick? Relieve them that are in prison? Is any a stranger and you take him in? 
Friend , come up higher .... Does he enable you to bring sinners from darkness to 
light, from the power of Satan unto God? 64 
Two points are noteworthy in light of the preceding evidence : first, for Wesley at 
least, a part of what it means to love your neighbor as yourself always involves the 
exercise of both material gifts and spiritual talents; it entails the employment of all 
those gifts and graces which will enhance the physical well being of the poor and their 
spiritual character. Second, and perhaps more importantly, though the material needs 
of the neighbor have chronological priority; they clearly do not have valuational pri-
ority in Wesley 's thought, 65 for their fulfillment prepares the way, to use Wesley's own 
terminology , for things of greater importance. 
But perhaps the most lucid expression of the goal of ministry as well as of its 
accompan ying motivating factors in terms of the value and necessity of personal 
inward transformation (spirituality) is found in the following selection from the ser-
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mon On Zeal, a sermon which epitomizes Wesley's thought in this area and which 
provides insight into his ethical motivation and concern. Notice, for instance, what is 
at the heart of this ethic and the consequences which flow from it . Wesley declares: 
In a Christian believer love sits upon the throne, which is erected in the inmost 
soul; namely , love of God and man, which fills the whole heart, and reigns with-
out a rival. In a circle near the throne are all holy tempers: long-suffering , gentle-
ness, meekness, goodness , fidelity, temperance-and if any other is comprised 
in "the mind which was in Christ Jesus ." In an exterior circle are all the works of 
mercy, whether to the souls or bodies of men . By these we exercise all holy tem-
pers; by these we continually improve them, so that all these are real means of 
grace, although this is not commonly adverted to. Next to these are those that 
are usually termed works of piety : reading and hearing the Word , public, family, 
private prayer , receiving the Lord's Supper, fasting or abstinence . Lastly, that his 
followers may the more effectually provoke one another to love, holy tempers , 
and good works, our blessed Lord has united them together in one-the church, 
dispersed all over the earth; a little emblem of which, of the church universal, 
we have in every particular Christian congregation. 66 
In this sermon, then, it is as if Wesley has allowed us to peek into the throne room 
of his entire theological and moral enterprise. 67 And on the throne sits not any politi -
cal ideology nor works of mercy, however noble or valuable they may be . No, love 
itself sits on the throne, and next to it are all those holy tempers (holiness) described 
earlier. And it is precisely only when these elements are in place , as both motivating 
factors and as the highest goal of all ministry, that Wesley is then willing to consider 
works of mercy , piety and the like . As noted earlier, "No outward works are accept-
able to him [ God] unless they spring from holy tempers,"68 he cautions . And again, 
"That all those who are zealous of good works would put them in their proper place! 
Would not imagine they can supply the want of holy tempers, but take care that they 
may spring from them! "69 Therefore all those "dispositions of mind " like meekness, 
gentleness and long-suffering, etc. , are not beside the point, a pious extravagance or 
indulgence, but are "absolutely necessary ... for the enjoyment of present or future 
holiness . "70 Indeed, they are nothing less than the lodestars of the moral life, the key 
to Wesley's ethic. 
CONCLUSION 
It should be apparent by now that the soteriological orientation of John Wesley's 
ministry to the poor is marked by three carefully drawn axes . First, Wesley's horizon-
tal axis of ministry , directed towards the temporal needs of humanity , is more broadly 
conceived than some and includes the principal agents of God , the poor , as well as 
those who are engaged in service . Second , Wesley 's vertical axis of ministry is atten-
tive not only to the proper spiritual motivation of those who minister to the poor , 
underscoring the crucial nature of right tempers , but it is also attentive to the spiritual 
life of the poor themselves . Indeed , for Wesley , all people, poor and non-poor , young 
and old, male and female , need to be ren ewed through faith in love . Third , th e 
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Methodist leader's valuational axis, present in several of his later sermons, not only 
assesses the worth of temporal and spiritual ministry, but it also places nothing other 
than holy love at the center of things in terms of both motivation and purpose. Next 
in importance, of course, are all those holy tempers of the human heart from which 
flow works of mercy and works of piety. Indeed, for Wesley, only when this "inward" 
work has begun is one ready for vigorous, redemptive service. 
Viewed from another perspective, these three axes demonstrate the truly radical 
nature of John Wesley's ministry to the poor in that he realized that the evils of eco-
nomic injustice, though significant, were informed by more basic evils which had 
their roots in the human heart. Accordingly, the greed of the rich, their taste for luxu-
ry and waste, could not be overcome simply by state fiat, nor by moralizing, but by a 
transformation of the inward person as well . 
Moreover, with respect to the poor themselves, Wesley was critical enough to real-
ize that no group or class has a privileged soteriological status since all have fallen 
short of the glory of God. Indeed, it was precisely on this basis of a universal need for 
redemption, of a radical transformation of the human heart, that Wesley was able to 
break out of the political strife and animosity so typical of his day to bring together 
the poor and those who ministered to them in a larger, more inclusive circle of min-
istry, to foster mutual concern and affection among them as joint members of the 
body of Christ, and ultimately to unite them in the broadest circle of love. 
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38 . Marquardt points out the need for this benevolent activity and writes : "Eine weitere wirk-
same Hilfe neben der Versorgung mit Lebensmitteln und Lieidung brachte eine andere Massnahme, 
die Wesley 1746/47 in London und Bristol eingeleitet hatte: die medizinische Versorgung der Armen. 
Der hygienische Zustand vieler Unterfunfte war katastrophal, die medizinische Versorgung vollig 
unzureichend , die Ernahrung oft schlect und die Kenntnisse in bezug auf Lebensweise und 
Krankenpflege waren minimal... ." Cf. Manfred Marquardt , Praxis und Prinzipien der Sozialethik 
John Wesleys (Gottingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , 1977) , p . 26-27. 
39 . Ward and Heitzenrater , The Works of John Wesley, 20:125. One of the reasons for the effi-
ciency of this stock was that Wesley laid down a number of ground rules : first, only twenty 
shillings was to be lent at a time; second , this sum was to be repaid weekly within a three-
month period . Cf. Ward and Heitzenrater , The Works of]ohn Wesley, 20:204. 
40 . It should be noticed that the leading motif which informs Wesley 's concept of justice is 
not equality but "the rendering to each his or her due, " as found, for instance, in the writings of 
Plato, Cicero, and other classical authors. Holland and Howell who, quite perceptively , note 
this difference write : "Wesley's definition of the 'just' is Ciceronian, connoting rendering to all 
'their due ' and prescribing 'exactly what is right, precisely what ought to be done ,' said , or 
thought, both with regard to the Author of our being, with regard to ourselves, and with regard 
to every creature which he has made ." Cf. Lynwood M. Holland and Ronald F. Howell , "John 
Wesley's Concept of Religious and Political Authority, " Journal of Church and State 6 (Autumn 
1964) : 301. 
41. Outler , Sermons, 2:277 . ("The Use of Money ") 
42. Ibid ., 1:689-690. ("Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth ") 
43 . Ibid ., 1:690 . ("Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount , Discourse the Thirteenth ") . Vilem 
Schneeberger affirms that Wesley's benevolent activities grew out of soteriological considera-
tions , that is, the love of neighbor is nothing less than the outworking of vital faith. Cf. Vilem 
Schneeberger, Theologische Wurzeln des sozialen Akzents bei John Wesley (Zurich and Stuttgart : 
Gotthelf Verlag, 1974). 
44. For instance, in his sermon, "The Reward of Righteousness ," Wesley writes : "when you 
visit them that are sick, or in prison-these are not 'splendid sins,' as one marvelously calls 
them , but 'sacrifices ' wherewith God is well pleased ." Cf. Outler , Sermons, 3:404. 
45 . Ibid ., 3:305 . ("On Charity") Bett affirms that Wesley strongly associated good works and 
the love of God simply because "there is no real love of our fellows that does not ultimately 
spring from the love of God , shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit. " Cf. Henry Bett, The 
Spirit of Methodism (London: The Epworth Press, 193 7), p . 200 . 
46 . Wesley , Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament, p. 86. 
47 . Thomas Jackson , ed ., The Works of]ohn Wesley, 14 vols . (Grand Rapids, Michigan : Baker 
Book House , 1978), 8 :309 . 
48. Ibid ., p . 310 . 
49 . Outler , Sermons, 2:302 . ("The Reformation of Manners ") In addition , in his "Letter to a 
Clergyman " Wesle y writes: "I think he is a true , evangelical Minister , diakonos, "servant " of 
Christ and his church, who . .. "so ministers, " as to save souls from death , to reclaim sinners 
from their sins ; ... " Cf. Jackson , Works, 8:498 . 
50 . Telford , The Letters of]ohn Wesley, 5:316. More than a decade later, in 1784 to be exact, John 
reminisced about the founding of Methodism and the employment of lay preachers and exclaimed: 
"He chose a few young, poor , ignorant men , without experien ce, learning , or art ; ... seeking no hon-
our , no profit , no pleasure , no ease, but merely to save souls ." Cf. Outler, Sermons, 2:558-559 . 
51. Outler , Sermons, 1:128. ("Salvation by Faith ") 
52 . Ibid . ("Salvation by Faith ") Bracket ed material is mine . 
53 . Ibid ., 3:536 . ("The Trouble and Rest of Good Men") Manuscript sermon s are those which, 
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for whatever reason , Wesley saw fit not to publish , although he did keep copies of them among 
his papers . Interestingly, all these pieces were written early , relatively speaking, and range from 
1725 to 1741. Among the manuscript sermons are such important works as "The Image of 
God ," and "The One Thing Needful. " See Outler 's introduction to his critical edition of 
Wesley's sermons for more on this particular genre. 
54. Ibid ., 2:565. ("The Wisdom of God's Counsels ") 
55. Ibid., 3:106 . ("Spiritual Idolatry") Wesley also tried to comfort poor believers by directing 
their attention to the providence of God . In his Journal on 31 December 1772 Wesley wrote 
"Being greatly embarrassed by the necessities of the poor, we spread all our wants before God 
in solemn prayer; believing that He would sooner 'make windows in heaven ' than suffer His 
truth to fail." Cf. Curnock,Joumal, 5:495. 
56 . In his sermon, "On Riches," for instance, Wesley points out the contempt which the rich 
often hold towards their "inferiors," and in his "On the Danger of Riches" he underscores the 
reluctance of the wealthy even to be among the poor. Cf. Outler, Sermons, 3:108 and 3:244. 
57. Jennings, Good News, p. 144. 
58. Theodore W. Jennings, Jr., "Wesley's Preferential Option for the Poor ," Quarterly Review 
vol. 9, no. 3 (Fall 1989) : 22. Ignoring the political and social context of eighteenth-century 
England , Jennings contends that Wesley repudiated the right of private property . However, 
there is sufficient evidence in Wesley's own writings to demonstrate that he upheld both reli-
gious and civil liberty . More to the point, in his "Thoughts upon Liberty" Wesley observes that 
civil liberty entails "a liberty to enjoy our lives and fortunes in our own way; to use our proper-
ty, whatever is legally our own, according to our own choice ." And in his "Observations on 
Liberty" he adds : "Civil liberty is a liberty to dispose of our lives, persons, and fortunes, accord-
ing to our own choice, and the laws of our country ." Cf.Jackson, Works, 11:41, 11:92. 
59. Wesley maintained that works of piety as well as works of mercy are in some sense neces-
sary to sanctification. In other words, if there be time and opportunity, these works are the nor-
mal means to an improvement of the rich grace of God. Wesley, however, did not contend that 
doing good works necessarily results in an increase in holiness . The emphasis here, as else-
where, is on the grace of God and works of mercy as a means of that grace. Cf. Outler, Sermons, 
2:164. ("The Scripture Way of Salvation") 
60. Ibid ., 3:390 . ("On Visiting the Sick") 
61. Ibid ., p . 391. ("On Visiting the Sick") These hortatory comments found in the sermons 
reveal that in his ministry to the poor Wesley was never simply preoccupied with their tempo-
ral needs, important though they were, but he also was ever concerned with the transcendent , 
with the issues of God and eternity, a trait which gave his economic ethic, at least at times, a 
decidedly "other worldly" emphasis. "Every pound you put into the earthly bank is sunk, " 
Wesley writes in his "The More Excellent Way," "it brings no interest above. But every pound 
you give to the poor is put into the bank of heaven." Cf. Outler, Sermons, 3:276 . 
62. Ibid ., 3:393 . ("On Visiting the Sick") Emphasis is mine. 
63 . Ibid ., 1:519 . ("Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Third ") With respect 
to the roles of ministry, the task of visiting the sick (and the poor) demonstrates not separa-
tion as in some praxis models , not ministry which occurs in one direction only, from the poor 
to those who minister to them, but it reveals , once again, a mutuality of need and of love in an 
ever larger circle of ministry. Moreover , this mutuality of need and love is amply displayed in 
Wesley 's sermon, "On Visiting the Sick," in which he counsels his readers to visit the afflicted 
in person for two principal reasons : first, unlike a physician , the visitor can do great good to the 
souls of men and women. Second , sending relief by another likewise does not improve one's 
own graces ; there is no advance, in other words , in the love of God and neighbor. "You could 
not gain that increase in lowliness , in patience , in tenderness of spirit , in sympathy with the 
The Soteriological Orientation of John Wesley 's Ministry to the Poor 9 1 
afflicted, " Wesley notes , "which you might have gained if you had assisted them in person. " Cf. 
Outler , Sermons, 3:389 , 393. 
64 . Ibid ., 1:695 . ( "Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount , Discourse the Thirteenth ") 
Emphasis is mine. 
65 . Ibid . ("Upon Our Lord 's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth ") 
66 . Ibid. , 3:313-14. ("On Zeal") 
67. Though there is no evidence that Wesley ever read St. Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle, the 
central images which both spiritual leaders use to describe the Christian life are remarkably 
similar. Both, for instance, employ paradigmatic metaphors which not only contain implicit 
value judgments, but they also highlight the crucial nature of love . For example , Teresa 's sev-
enth mansion and its "geographical " location in the center of the castle is analogous to Wesley's 
placing of love on the throne from which all else in the Christian life flows. Compare Teresa of 
Avila , Interior Castle, trans . E. Allison Peers (New York: Doubleday , 1989) , p. 206ff with 
Outler , Sermons, 3:313-14 . ("On Zeal"). 
68 . Outler , Sermons, 3:320. ("On Zeal") Bracketed material is mine . 
69. Ibid ., 3:305 . ("On Charity ") 
70. Ibid., 4 :223. ("On Living Without God ") The danger of beginning not with love and holy 
tempers but with political and economic concerns is that "justice " so conceived will most likely 
be unreformed , speckled with anger , class animosity, and perhaps even outright hatred of the 
middle-class or the rich. In other words, its concern for the poor will be expressed in all those 
unholy tempers against which Wesley inveighed . Once again , love and holiness are the proper 




Pelikan, Jaroslav, Christianity and Classical Culture. The Metamorphosis of Natural 
Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism ( Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen , 
1992-1993) . New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1993. xvi, 368 pps . 
ISBN 0-300-05554-4. 
Based on the Gifford lectures given at the University of Aberdeen in 1992 and 
1993, Pelikan's book is a significant contribution to understanding the fourth 
Christian century and the influence of decisions made during that period upon sub-
sequent generations of Christian theologians. The driving questions which gave 
form to the lectures and the subsequent volume related to the interaction of 
Christian ideas and Classical Greek culture; the case studies chosen for investiga-
tion were the four theologians known as "the Cappadocians" according to their 
home province: Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Macrina (siblings) and their 
friend Gregory of Nazianzus. Cappadocia, comprising much of eastern Asia Minor , 
was largely a rural area with intermittent small towns and villages. The seats to 
which Basil appointed his brother and friend were anything but prestigious in the 
Byzantine imperial organization. Yet from that unlikely context , those four schol-
ar/church persons/theologians came to dominate the mind of their century . 
The method of the volume was not to deal with each author in sequence . Instead, 
Pelikan systematically organized a presentation of the views of the individual theolo-
gians around the focal questions , but did not hesitate to allow the four friends to dis-
agree with each other. The exposition was presented in the flowing lucid style one 
has come to anticipate from Professor Pelikan. In nearly every instance, the quota-
tions were artfully chosen from both the primary and secondary literature . Indeed, it 
will be interesting to observe how many salient quotations from Cappadocians and 
modern scholars will become standard features of later works! 
Essential to reading the volume is an awareness of the structure (described by 
Pelikan, pp . 38-39) . The first part of the volume examined the issues of theologi-
cal language , the ways of knowing God, the unity and diversity of God, the uni-
verse as cosmos, space and time, the image of God , human divinization , the 
nature of good and eschatology from the perspective of "natural theology as 
apologetics ." In the second part of the tome, these same issues, with some varia-
tions on themes, are approached from the perspective of "natural theology as 
presupposition. " It is therefore advisable to read the corresponding chapters of 
the two sections in light of each other as well as within the sequence of the sec-
tion in which they appear. No small task at that! 
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The thesis of the volume was that "the natural theology of the Cappadocians, and of 
the Greek Christian tradition as a total entity ... was the product of. .. encounters with 
Hellenism (p. 21)." Pelikan argued that the central feature of the Cappadocian approach 
was "the language of negation" or apophasis. This understood the mystery of God to be the 
essential of God, and minimized the significance and accuracy of any positive affirmations 
which might be made about the nature and purpose of the divine. The main goal for 
humans, suggested the Cappadocians, was "Christian perfection, " a notion already seen in 
the Qumran and biblical materials and especially with Alexandrian theology but with 
roots in Plato and Aristotle. Christian perfection was more than a restoration of the image 
of God according in creation. It sought also the achievement of the union of the human 
will with the divine will. These two foci of theological reflection, about humans and God, 
controlled the entire theological system of the Cappadocian writers . 
Many of the particulars of Cappadocian theology will sound remarkably modem to most 
readers. For example, it was insisted that the attribution of gender to God was a human 
limitation and, as a matter of orthodoxy, God was beyond any ascription of gender. To 
assert the characteristic of gender to God, even in the ascription of "Father," is to approach 
the edge of heresy. With regard to abortion there was a difference of opinion: Basil consid-
ered abortion murder; Gregory of Nyssa understood a fetus as a potential human. With 
regard to eschatology, Basil insisted that the last judgment included condemnation . 
Gregory of Nyssa and Macrina argued for a universal restoration. Gregory of Nazianzus 
affirmed an Origenist hope for universal salvation. 
While one hesitates to criticize such a magisterial effort, and with which one finds such 
resonance from one's own research, there are a number of concerns which do arise. The 
first is with regard to the influence of Origen of Alexandria. This writer, as Pelikan rightly 
suggested, was perhaps the major Christian theological influence on the development of 
Cappadocian thought (29-30, et passim). Pelikan properly indicated certain areas of agree-
ment and disagreement of the fourth century writers with their third century 
Alexandrian/Caesarean predecessor. However, throughout Pelikan's analysis, the treatment 
would have been enriched by reference to Origen's thought. As it is, a careful analysis of the 
debt of the Cappadocians to Origen on the precise issues examined in the volume remains 
a desideratum . Part of the problem, with regard to Origen and to other early Christian 
materials is the unfortunately laconic footnote style, which takes up much space on the 
page but allows minimal possibility of allusion to relevant illuminatory materials. 
Other issues are actually more central to the analysis. The assumption of both the 
Cambridge Platonists, on the one hand, and of Ritschl and von Harnack on the other, that 
there was a clear divergence between "gospel" and "hellenism" in earliest Christianity was 
perpetuated in the volume . Space does not allow a thorough critique of this thesis on the 
basis of extant early Christian texts, but suffice it to say that it would probably be more 
accurate to say that there was a divergence between popular hellenistic culture and the aca-
demic hellenistic culture encountered, understood and appropriated by Origen and the 
Cappadocians. Such a distinction would require a more nuanced analysis, an analysis com-
plicated by the fact that Ephrem of Syria, contemporary of the Cappadocians, was making 
quite similar arguments about natural theology, the nature of God and the goal of 
humankind , all without direct recourse to academic Greek philosophy . 
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Secondly, the conflicts with the Arians and Manichaeans were minimally mentioned. 
Here Pelikan, and many other scholars, have taken their lead from the Cappadocians in not 
mentioning the names of certain opponents. The tradition of depriving one's enemies of 
free publicity, however, does not mean that the writers were ignorant of the challenges at 
hand . The Cappadocian's contemporary and intellectual fellow traveller, Ephrem, overtly 
developed his arguments in direct opposition to both Arians and Manichaeans, a fact which 
complicates Pelikan's picture of the Cappadocians. Thirdly, there is minimal discussion of 
the developments of academic philosophy either at Alexandria or at Athens and other cen-
ters. Most of the major writers of the period , including Plotinus and Porphyry, who had 
definitive influence on the philosophical possibilities appropriated by the Cappadocians, 
were not mentioned. Finally, significant research of the last two decades missed Pelikan's 
net. The traditional understanding of crucial elements of Cappadocian thought require 
nuancing because of the work of, for example, Andre de Halleux who was not mentioned. 
Despite these shortcomings, Pelikan's analysis of the fourth century Cappadocian the-
ologians is a major contribution to the history of Christian theology. It is to be hoped 
that this treatment of the theological background to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan 
Creed of 381 CE. will add substance to the renewed interest in that landmark ecumeni-
cal creed, a document which institutionalized many of the theological conclusions of the 
Cappadocian writers, a statement promulgated by a Council of Constantinople initially 
convened under the presidency of none other than Gregory of Nazianzus . 
DAVID BUNDY 
Associate Professor of Church History 
Christian Theological Seminary 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
McCoy, Charles S. and J. Wayne Baker, Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger 
and the Covenantal Tradition, with a Translation of Bullinger's Detestamento seu f oedere 
Dei unico et aeterno (1534). Westminster/John Knox Press: Louisville, Kentucky, 
1991, 180 pp. 
In recent years both theologians and political philosophers (particularly political 
philosophers who are interested in influences on the American Founding Fathers) have 
devoted attention to tracing the lines of influence of covenant thought in the realms of the-
ology and governmental theory. For the first time to this reviewer's knowledge, these two 
trajectories, have been brought together in a single work. McCoy and Baker, both theolo-
gians, have competently traced the development of covenantal thought from its roots in the 
work of Heinrich Bullinger in the 16th century to its political adaptation in the thought of 
the American framers of the United States Constitution. Such an ambitious undertaking is 
accomplished in a book of only 98 pages, leaving the reader hungry for more but intrigued 
sufficiently to pursue the issue for himself in greater detail. Nevertheless, the authors have 
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not in any way sacrificed accuracy by limiting the text. It is now commonly accepted that 
James Madison, the primary framer of the basic American legal document, the 
Constitution, was heavily influenced by men who were themselves influenced by "federal" 
thought, men such as John Witherspoon, John Locke, and David Hume. 
Long before Madison, the Puritans of England and New England lived and moved in a 
covenantal world . McCoy and Baker take the reader on a fascinating journey back 
beyond the Puritans to the covenantal thought of Cocceius, well-known to theologians, 
and, in political philosophy, to Johannes Althusis, unknown to almost everyone . The 
fountainhead of this rich federal tradition is traced ultimately to the Swiss Reformer 
Bullinger. Covenant theology, as most theologians are aware, was a powerful organizing 
influence in sixteenth and seventeenth century Reformed theology. But the connection 
between this early covenant theology and later political thought has often been ignored 
or lost. McCoy and Baker have begun to remedy this situation in their work. 
The authors have also done the theological world a huge favor by providing a transla-
tion of Bullinger's major work on the covenant, De Testamento seu Foedere Dei unico et 
aetemo (On the One and Eternal Covenant of God), published in 1534. If one is interested 
to know how covenant thought began in earnest, he must read this work preferably in 
the Latin, but at the very least, in this convenient translation . 
If there are any criticisms of the book, the primary one is that the authors do not devote 
enough detail to the influences of federal thought on the American Founding Fathers. In 
general, the entire work could profitably be expanded. But, despite these shortcomings, if 
they can be so-called, this work is must reading . In addition, it contains a fairly comprehen-
sive bibliography of covenant literature, primary and secondary. This reviewer would also 
recommend Baker's earlier work on Bullinger's covenant thinking, Heinrich Bullinger and 
the Covenant: The Other Reformed Tradition. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980.) 
MARC CLAUSON 
Lexington Christian Academy 
Lexington, Kentucky 
Richey, Russell E., Early American Methodism. Bloomington and Indianapolis : Indiana 
University Press, 1991, xix, 137 pp . ISBN 0-253-35006-9 . 
Early American Methodism is a collection of six insightful essays, half of which originally 
appeared in different form in Methodist History. Russell E. Richey, research professor of 
church history at Duke University Divinity School, is a honed essayist capable of distilling 
vast amounts of secondary literature for the non-specialist, and , following the "principle of 
fecudity," suggesting new lines of interpretation. Religious history typically appears in the 
fuller dress of the narrative , yet the linkage of Methodism and the essay form seems highly 
appropriate given John Wesley's fondness for the sermonic essay, his chief means of theolo-
gizing . Much of the evidence Richey musters--personal journals and meditations-would, 
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in less deft hands, seem merely arbitrary and anecdotal. Considering his ability to find 
much where little appears to the untrained eye, Richey seems possessed of the same "glass 
to the heart" (p. 44) that animated Francis Asbury. 
Richey understands his work to be "self-consciously a revisionist endeavor" (p. xi), 
executed in the narrow confines of forty years, 1770-1810. It is a rare work of history that 
is at once both avowedly revisionist and yet discerning of and sympathetic toward the reli-
gious sensibilities of the phenomena in question . Revisionist history is almost by defini-
tion reductionist history, dismissing religion as vestigial. The revisionism on display here 
is enriching, not denuding, for it clarifies much of Methodism's original intent in America, 
namely, "To reform the Continent, and to spread scriptural Holiness over these lands" (p. 
36). Richey's clarity is not simply cleaning an old lens grown dusty with time, but a fresh 
lens ground in part by contemporary concerns, that illumines the past and suggests how it 
can in tum illumine the future. It is a subtle clarity, turning on evidence such as two 
words highlighted here and a preposition substituted for a conjunction there. On such 
subtleties hangs the "Methodist construction of reality" (p.79) that Richey builds . When 
Bishop William McKendree changes Wesley's two-pronged dictum of reforming the conti-
nent and spreading scriptural holiness to reforming by spreading scriptural holiness (pp. 
35, 61), Richey overturns the conventional interpretation that saw reform being collapsed 
into evangelism. Reform, for Richey, cannot be a competitor to holiness. In the early 
national period under review, Methodists "had a very powerful corporate purpose and did, 
in fact, offer a model of a reformed continent" (p. 62). 
In what was almost an aside in the journals of eighteenth-century Methodist preachers, 
"We rode" (p. 8), Richey again finds very nearly an entire world, a world of community 
that overturns a cherished idol of Methodist-and American-individualism: "the solitary, 
cloaked horseman, braving storm and cold ... to deliver the gospel" (p. 8). Most often those 
paired riders were Southerners, as Richey shows in perhaps the most engaging essay, 'The 
Southern Accent of American Methodism." In the South, early Methodism proposed "an 
evangelical alternative to patriarchal Anglicanism" (p. 55), built the church biracially, 
showed profound ambivalence toward slavery, and dramatized grace in public gatherings, 
especially the quarterly conference and later the annual conference. Here Richey makes the 
claim never before heard that "the South shaped American religion as a whole" (p. 50), 
although Methodism has largely ignored its Southern roots. Overcoming the New England 
bias for religious beginnings is not easy. The choir director in Thornton Wilder's Our Town 
charged his New Hampshire Congregational choristers to stifle their loud singing. That 
should be left to the Methodists. 
Richey's early American Methodism is not bawdy or unseemly, but certainly full-
throated. "We need a rewritten version of Methodist history, seen from the bottom 
up" (p. 53). Looking from the bottom-up vantage, three realities-community, frater-
nity, and order-gave to Methodism "incredible power" (p. 13) when properly bal-
anced. Community eventuated in feasts of love, fraternity happened especially among 
the travelling preachers who rode in pairs, and order carried forth the scriptural epis-
copacy that Americans inherited from Wesley's Anglicanism. There is almost a triune 
premise at work among community, fraternity, and order, for within the Trinity, 
although of infinite and not measurable span, there is also "the ordering of the spiri-
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tual resources of each for the sake of the whole connection and ultimately the king-
dom" (p. 13). 
The final essay, 'The Four Languages of Early American Methodism," is not only a cul-
mination but also a model for writing denominational history. Every denomination has its 
own linguistic structure, its preferred "grammar of grace." Richey testifies to the efficacy of 
the first Methodist language, the popular or evangelical, every time he cites a journal entry 
from Francis Asbury,Jesse Lee, or others . The popular language connected Methodists with 
revival-minded Presbyterians and Baptists. Revival, "predominantly a communal affair" (p. 
3), sometimes erupted with no preacher present. John Wesley, however pleased he might 
have been with the popular or evangelical language, spoke more directly and doctrinally in 
the second language Richey identifies, the Wesleyan. It was not only the language of the 
warm heart, but also of the clear mind. The third language, the episcopal or Anglican, 
might seem a simple reiteration of the Wesleyan, but Richey claims that these two lan-
guages, certainly capable of juxtaposition, were "not really conceptually unified" (p. 92). 
These two languages might be spoken at the same annual conference, although at different 
times for different reasons. The fourth language, the republican, was spoken most clearly 
by James O'Kelly, who formed the Republican Methodist Church in 1792 when that year's 
General Conference denied his motion to give preachers the right to contest the bishop's 
appointment of them. Perhaps only the episodic Methodists could continue to speak four 
languages without blending them into one, as did the Lutherans and Calvinists. But every 
denomination will be found to speak many voices, not unlike the requirement to show the 
church's four classic marks: unity, holiness, apostolicity, catholicity. 
It is said that short stories are harder to write than novels, and historical essays presum-
ably exact greater labor than narratives . Early American Methodism shows both the essay 
form and its practitioner at their best. Only occasionally does Richey transgress John 
Wesley's "a plain truth for plain people" criterion. Only occasionally is slender evidence 
made to support more than it really can. If this revisionist history is written from the bot-
tom up, it ends at a kind of summit, allowing one to see early Methodist standards like the 
camp meeting and the quarterly conference in a truer, more bracing light. 
RODERICK T. LEUPP 
Visiting Professor of Theology 
Asia-Pacific Nazarene Theological Seminary 
Metro Manila, Philippines 
Gill, Kenneth D., Toward a Contextualized Theology for the Third World (Studies in the 
Intercultural Theology of Christianity , 90 pp .; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994). 
xi, 311 pp . ISBN 3-631-47096-7. 
This volume traces the historical and theological developments of one of the major 
Pent ecos tal traditions in Mexico as it formulated an understanding and praxis of 
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Christianity which was contextualized in a particular 'Third World" milieu. The book is 
the final stage of a dissertation presented at the University of Birmingham, England, written 
under the direction of Prof. Walter Hollenweger. Gill is presently Collection Development 
Librarian at The Billy Graham Center Library, Wheaton College. Previously, he held posi-
tions at the Asbury Theological Seminary and University of Texas-El Paso Libraries. 
The Pentecostal tradition studied here is known by various names: "Jesus Name," 
"Jesus Only," or "Oneness" Pentecostalism. The perspective arose in the early years of the 
Pentecostal tradition when it was noticed at a camp-meeting at Arroyo Seco, California, 
that the New Testament instructions to baptize, with the exception of Matthew 28:19, all 
talked of baptism "in Jesus' name" rather than with the traditional trinitarian formula . 
This liturgical observation led to a permanent division between "Trinitarian" Pentecostals 
and "Oneness" Pentecostals, a difference of perspective which has become more pro-
nounced through the conflict and intellectual posturing of both sides. The "Oneness" per-
spective has become primarily, with the exception of the United Pentecostal Church, a tra-
dition of Hispanic and African-American churches in the United States, and an important 
branch of Pentecostalism outside the U.S.A., especially in Mexico. 
The first chapter (pp. 1-42) discusses the origins of "Jesus' Name Pentecostalism" trac-
ing its development from the Arroyo Seco Camp-meeting through the formation of the 
Assemblies of God (from its beginnings anti-Oneness) and the U.S.A. "Oneness" denomi-
nations, the Pentecostal Assemblies of the World and the United Pentecostal Church . 
The second chapter (pp. 43-74) describes the development of the "Jesus' Name 
Movement" in Mexico. During 1912, Romanita, a young Mexican woman, was converted 
at a small house church in Los Angeles. In 1914, after the end of the Mexican civil war, 
Romanita returned to Mexico, and with the assistance of her nephew, Miguel Garcia, 
began Bible studies. One of the converts was a Methodist Holiness pastor Ruben Ortega, 
who before he took over leadership of the new "Iglesia Apost6lica," was rebaptized in 
"Jesus' Name" in southern Texas. From this modest beginning, the new movement 
spread throughout Mexico and into the United States where a separate denomination was 
organized in 1930. As with most of the Pentecostal and/or Holiness churches, these all 
divided, generally over issues of leadership and organization, to form other related 
groups. 
The struggle for organization and theological unity within the framework of evolving 
contextualization in Mexican culture is described in chapter three (pp. 75-116) . Never 
dominated by foreign missionaries or mission organizations, the Iglesia Apost6lica was 
able to decide which foreign elements would be a part of its liturgy, theology, and praxis. 
Importantly, its clergy, theologians, and other leaders were never the paid staff of foreign 
organizations. It was a church of the lower and lower middle classes with an indigenous 
leadership, frequently of worker-pastors. 
Although it is not thus presented by Gill, much of the rest of the story of the denomi-
nation is the history of a remarkable family, the Gaxiola family which is now entering its 
third generation of leadership in the church . Maclovio Gaxiola Lopez established (1943) 
the Liberia Latinoamericana as the publishing house of the Iglesia Apost6lica. He took 
over publication of the periodical El Mensajero Apost6lica, which in 194 3 became El 
Esegeta. Interested in education both of ministers and clergy, he organized the first Bible 
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schools. In 1948, his son Manuel J. Gaxiola began to publish a Sunday School curricu-
lum which evolved into Espositor Biblico Cristiano. In the midst of his pastoral, educa-
tional and publishing responsibilities, Maclovio Gaxiola published a systematic theology, 
Teologia Moral: Doctrina y Disciplina Cristiana (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria Apost6lica, 1962) 
which for the first time offered a comprehensive systematic treatment of the Apostolic 
theological perspective. This was followed by a history of the church: Historia de la Iglesia 
Apost6lica de la Fe en Cristo Jesus (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria Apost6lica, 1964). 
The second section of the volume describes the process of theological development. 
Beginning with a description of early Christian theology (perhaps the weakest part of the 
volume), Gill narrates the development of "Oneness" theology in the U.S.A. before moving 
to a perhaps too brief discussion of the Mexican context in chapter six (pp. 177-198). Here, 
on the basis of materials published by the Iglesia Apost6lica and interviews, Gill presents a 
narrative of the development of the theological perspective of the tradition as it has wres-
tled with the harmonization of the liturgical, christological, and trinitarian doctrines. He 
argues that the theologians of the Iglesia Apost6lica have found ways to state these doctrines 
which are within the framework established by the ante-Nicene church and that are not 
incompatible with trends in contemporary theology. In this theological effort, Manuel 
Gaxiola has been the major constructive theologian. As a theologian, ecumenist, and histo-
rian , he builds upon the base of his father's work and has published an impressive list of 
scholarly books and articles, thirty of which are listed in Gill's bibliography. Most of the 
anonymous official documents of the church also reflect significant, of ten determinative 
input from Manuel Gaxiola and his father. Manuel Gaxiola, who also earned a doctorate at 
the University of Birmingham under Hollenweger, is certainly one of the most prolific 
Pentecostal historians and theologians. 
The appendices to the book provide important organizational and credal docu-
ments, as well as information about two splinter denominations, the Iglesia Evangelica 
Cristiana Espiritel and La Luz del Mundo. The classified bibliography will be an indis-
pensable resource for scholarship on Mexican Pentecostalism and the index facilitates 
access to the tome . 
Gill's volume presents a carefully documented case study of theological development 
within one "Third World" context which is both interesting and important . The Iglesia 
Apost6lica has grown into one of the largest Mexican non-Catholic denominations. As 
such , it is a model for other traditions seeking to shed the vestiges of European and 
U.S.A. cultural structures in light of their own reading and living of the biblical narra-
tives. The book will be an essential source for discussing the development of 
Pentecostalism and the Holiness Movement outside the U.S.A. 
DAVID BUNDY 
Associate Professor of Church History 
Christian Theological Seminary 
Indianapolis , Indiana 
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Poewe, Karla, ed., Charismatic Christianity as a Global Culture (Studies in Comparative 
Religion; Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). xiv, 300 pp. 
This is a major effort to describe and analyze a reality apparent to observers of glob-
al Christianity; that is that the traditions first defined by the religious expressions of 
the Mediterranean, Reformation, and North American mainline experience are being 
circumvented or challenged by a new tradition, Pentecostalism. If David Barratt's sta-
tistics (Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements ( Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1988) are anywhere close to accurate, even in a comparative sense, Pentecostalism and 
the Charismatic groups have come to be the second largest Christian communion after 
Roman Catholicism. The volume, edited by Karla Poewe, professor of anthropology at 
the University of Calgary, is comprised of a collection of 11 essays by an international 
team of 10 specialists in anthropology and religious studies. 
The introduction by K. Poewe, exploring "the nature, globahty and history of 
Charismatic Christianity," provides a phenomenological description of the data, asserts 
its global expanse citing relevant sources, and attempts to provide a narrative of the 
process of this expansion. This is probably the most problematic section of the book. To 
take Chinese Christianity, for instance, directly from Jesuits and Pietists, to current 
expressions of charismatic Christianity in China, without any attention to the American 
and British mission efforts of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their 
encounter with Pentecostalism, which has been documented by Daniel Bays, among 
others, is not historically accurate. The influence of the independent, denominational or 
para-church Holiness and Pentecostal missions never enters into the discussion. 
It is not that this experience, which had established its own global dimension 
before World War I, should be determinative for the interpretation of the whole, or 
that the traditions, as they now stand, have not grown far beyond any American or 
European beginnings. However, this lack of attention to the contribution of the 
American experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as the com-
plete lack of attention to European contributions, especially from England, Italy, and 
Scandinavia, to the development of Pentecostalism and/or Charismatic religion seri-
ously mars the book. It is highly improbable that early Pentecostal missionaries were 
aware of M. Ricci, K.F. Gutzlaff, or even J. Gossner. It is certain that they knew 
Phoebe Palmer, William Taylor, Sadar Sundu Singh, Charles Parham, William 
Seymour, Oral Roberts, Jimmy Swaggert, William Branham, and Gordon Lindsay, as 
well as T.B. Barratt, W.F.P. Burton, Lewi Pethrus, and Reinhard Bonnke. More appro-
priate is the emphasis on the "faith mission" tradition of Muller and James Hudson 
Taylor who did become "icons" for the traditions. 
This reviewer would want to argue with Poewe that Pietism had an important 
influence on the development of Pentecostalism, but that it was filtered through the 
American and European Holiness and Pentecostal experience. After it was exported, 
the nexus of ideas and methods which are part of these spiritual traditions, achieved a 
life of their own. The American and European Holiness and Pentecostal experience 
liberated, for better or worse, the ideas of personal piety accompanied by an empiri-
cally verifiable response to the perception of the presence of God in the believer 's life 
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and the accompanying need for "social holiness" from the necessity of direct connec-
tion to established ecclesiastical traditions. Thus for example, in Latin America and 
Africa, the "Charismatic religion " did not originate with the results of German 
Lutheran mission, but developed quite apart from these churches with primary impe-
tus from other traditions. In Poewe's defense, however, it must be said that scholars of 
Pentecostalism in its global forms have often forgotten the complex European her-
itage which lies behind their own ideas . Poewe's formulation may help us to work 
toward a more adequate understanding of the tradition. 
The first section of the volume deals with methods and models. Andre Droogers, 
University of Amsterdam, explores from a sociological perspective, "why and in what 
sense religious experiences are or are not normal (p . 3)." Irving Hexham and K. 
Poewe present an enlightening study analyzing how the Pentecostal and Charismatic 
churches in South Africa were treated by both the media and by the extreme right and 
left position in the apartheid struggle. 
The second section contains articles on Latin America (David Martin), a ground-
breaking study of Korean Pentecostal Missions to Japan (Mark A. Mullins, Meiji 
Gakuin University, Tokyo) which suggests many new avenues of research, and a 
review of the discussions about the relationship between Pentecostalism and 
Fundamentalism by Russell Spittler. 
The third section explores the process by which "orality" was turned into "literary 
narrative ." Charles Nienkirchen contributes an important essay in which are 
described the "conflicting visions of the past" in the "prophetic use of history in the 
early American Pentecostal-Charismatic movements (p. 119)." The essay by Nancy 
Schwartz is a pioneering analysis of the Legio Maria, a large independent "charismat-
ic" Catholic church in western Kenya and Tanzania where she has done research 
since 1982 and related to her still unpublished Princeton Ph .D. dissertation. Stanley 
Johannesen, University of Waterloo, presented case studies on the development of 
"third generation Pentecostal Language (pp . 175-199)," which attempts to suggest 
alternatives to the influential analysis of Jean-Daniel Pluss based on Riccour and liter-
ary theory. 
Walter Hollenweger, professor emeritus, University of Birmingham, contributed an 
important article directed more toward Pentecostals in the so-called "first world" than 
to anthropologists and sociologists. He deplores the tendency to "ruthlessly" trans-
form oral narratives to written forms which become exclusionary rather than inclu-
sionary. He insists that "privileged Pentecostals and scholars must learn to speak in, 
and listen to stories (p. 200)." 
The final essays in the section entitled "Charismatic Christian Thought," were con· 
tributed by G. Roelofs , graduate student at the University of Amsterdam, who exam· 
ines the use of orality and language in Flemish (Belgian) charismatic groups, and by 
Karla Poewe who, in an extremely important methodological and programmatic arti-
cle, urges a "rethinki ng [ of] the relationship of anthropology to science and religion: 
This chapter alone is worth the price of the volume. 
This volume is indeed a tour def orce. Each essay is a significant contribution to 
understanding religious life in the contemporary world . It models a multi-disciplinary 
Asbury Theological Journal 103 
approach to the study of Pentecostalism and Charismatic Christianity and removes it 
from the exclusive province of historians and theologians . Quite appropriately, histo -
rians and theologians will need to be aware of the theories and analytical results of 
sociological and anthropological study . These can probably be brought to new levels 
of sophistication by an awareness of the diachronic narrative of the tradition being 
studied . As Poewe suggests, those inside and outside the traditions can make comple-
mentary contributions to the study of this very interesting, complicated, and multi-
layered expression of religious beliefs . 
DAVID BUNDY 
Associate Professor of Church History 
Christian Theological Seminary 
Indianapolis, Indiana 

